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Introduction
In 2001, Akerlof, Spence and Stiglitz won the Nobel prize for their work on adverse selection,
signalling and screening. The prize was in recognition of their foundational contribution
to information economics, a revolution in economic research that brought the underlying
idea of information asymmetries to the heart of many emerging elds of economic research
(Stiglitz 2000); for instance, economics of privacy, auctions with information revelation and
mechanism design. This dissertation contributes to these three areas of microeconomic
research.
Chapter 1.2 The rst chapter is a contribution to the literature on the economics of
privacy. During the last decade, an increasing number of economists have researched the
economics of privacy. This economic literature reports an apparent dichotomy between a
high degree of privacy concerns across the US population and a low degree of data protecting
actions (see Acquisti 2004, Acquisti and Grosklags 2005 for an overview). This dichotomy
has been called the privacy paradox. In a natural environment with demand uncertainty
and customer entry, I identify customer entry as a new explanation for the behavior of rms
and the privacy paradox.
I investigate a two-period model with two monopolists and two buyers. One monopolist
sells her good 1 only in period 1 and one monopolist sells her good 2 only in period 2. In
period 1, one buyer demands good 1 and then goes on to demand good 2 with positive
probability. In period 2, players learn whether this buyer has demand for good 2, and
2This chapter is based on the paper "On the Value of Purchase Histories - Type-dependent Demand
Uncertainty and Consumer Entry", Litterscheid 2014.
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there is a second buyer with demand for good 2. Seller 1s purchase history contains her
customers purchases and name/identity. I am interested in the rst monopolists incentives
to sell information about her customers characteristics to the monopolist of a second good
and whether seller 1 prefers a disclosure or a condential policy. I provide conditions for
the parameters so that the rst monopolist prefers the disclosure policy and protably sells
the purchase history to seller 2. Given that a second buyer enters, seller 2 is willing to
pay more for buyer 1s purchase history than she would have been willing to pay if she had
expected no other buyer to enter. The reason is that the purchase history, containing the
buyers identity, enables seller 2 to distinguish between the two buyers and to make targeted
o¤ers. In other words, the intuition for my main result lies in the new additional value of the
purchase history. Consumer entry allows me to evaluate a value of the purchase history that
stems from the second sellers ability to identify and target the customer. This additional
value is generated by the new entrant since the optimal o¤er is distorted if the seller cannot
distinguish between the customers.
Chapter 2.3 The second chapter is a contribution to the literature on public informa-
tion revelation prior to an auction. A typical example is a situation where the owner of
a company announces the sale of this company (target) via an auction (takeover auction).
All bidders share a common interest in the quality of the target, e.g. the targets future
cash ows. The potential bidders are asymmetrically and imperfectly informed about the
targets quality. Potential bidders are also heterogenous and have some additional private
interest in the company, e.g. potential synergies that arise when the buyer merges with the
target. Before the auction, the seller can open her books and disclose private and common
value information. Private value information that drives synergies may arise in many areas,
for example in procurement, research and development, production, human resources, sales
and marketing etc. Common value information is related to quality, e.g. cash ow forecast.
While one potential bidders strength is his marketing environment, another potential bidder
3This chapter is based on the paper "Revealing Independent Private Value Information When Bidders
Have Interdependent Values", Litterscheid 2014.
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may have technological know-how that helps to decrease production costs (see Szech 2011 for
a similar argument or Gärtner and Schmutzler 2009). The seminal paper that inspired most
of the related research is Milgrom and Weber 1982a who showed that a seller prefers public
disclosure of a¢ liated information in an interdependent value auction setting. This is the
so-called linkage principle. The main question I address in this chapter is whether the seller
also prefers public disclosure of private value information over concealing her information.
I restrict attention to disclosure of private value information prior to an interdependent
value second-price auction with two bidders who hold preliminary private information about
the good. To investigate the main research question and to disentangle the e¤ect of public
common value information from public private value information, I assume that the seller
does not hold common value information. The key aspect is the extent to which disclosure
a¤ects the biddersbidding strategies in equilibrium. Unlike Milgrom and Weber 1982a,
the disclosed information a¤ects bidders idiosyncratically allowing to enhance the bidders
exposition to the winners curse. I nd that the linkage principle (see Milgrom and Weber
1982a) holds if the sellers information is su¢ ciently informative, but it does not hold if the
information contains little information.
Chapter 3.4 The third chapter is a contribution to several branches of the literature on
mechanism design: literature on optimal contracts in a principal-agent model with asym-
metric information about the agents type, literature on sequential screening, and literature
on multi-dimensional screening. The principal is the buyer and the agent is the seller.
Together with Dezsö Szalay, I analyze a screening problem where the agent produces
an object consisting of multiple items and has a multi-dimensional type that he learns over
time. The principal would like to buy this object from the agent and contracts with an
agent to trade a bundle of services. Moreover, the agent has private information about the
costs of producing one item in the bundle from the outset and privately learns the cost of
producing the other item later on. When the principal and the agent write the contract
4This chapter is based on the paper "Sequential, multidimensional screening", Litterscheid and Szalay
2014.
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after the agent knows part of his information but before he perfectly knows his cost type,
then the known part of his cost type is called his ex-ante type and the other type is called
his ex-post type. The optimal sequential mechanism or optimal contracting is dynamic and
consists of a menu of n submenus each of which contains m contracts; where n is the number
of ex-ante types andm is the number of ex-post types. Principal and agent get together both
at the outset, when the agent picks one of the n submenus, and later on, when the agent
knows his ex-post type and picks one of the m contracts of the submenu he selected. Only
afterwards is the object produced and the agent paid. The seminal paper of the sequential
screening literature that considers the same type of dynamic contracting is Courty and Li
2000. Our work di¤ers from the current literature in that our allocation problem is two-
dimensional and that we allow for interdependencies, substitutionality or complementarity
between the two dimensions of the object. This two-dimensional screening problem lacks
structure and thus is potentially very complicated to solve. To derive an explicit solution,
we consider a simplied situation and restrict the agents type to the realization of a vector of
two binary random variables. We provide a solution method to derive the optimal contract
and a characterization of the optimal contract. We nd that the distortions of the optimal
two-dimensional allocation depends on the strength of complementarity/substitutionality of
the two components of the object. For mild complements or substitutes, a simple solution
procedure picks up the optimum. For substitutes or strong complements upward distortions
are possible. Thus, we provide a natural setting in which upward distortions may arise as a
feature of the optimal mechanism.
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On the Value of Purchase Histories -
Type-dependent Demand Uncertainty
and Consumer Entry
1.1 Introduction
The ability to predict a customers valuation and future demand has high economic value
because it may enable a monopolist to reduce a customers information rent. There is ample
evidence for synergies rms generate by sharing information about their customers. For
instance, there is evidence that hospitals prot from exchanging information with each other
(Miller and Tucker 2009). Prot-oriented companies such as Google, Facebook or Amazon
collect huge data sets about their customers. Google and Facebook then sell the service of
behavior-based/targeted advertisement to other companies.
During the last decade, an increasing number of economists have researched the economics
of privacy. This economic literature reports an apparent dichotomy between a high degree
of privacy concerns across the US population and a low degree of data protecting actions
(see Acquisti 2004, Acquisti and Grosklags 2005 for an overview). This dichotomy has been
called the privacy paradox.
So, on the one hand there are rms that collect and sell large amounts of data about
customers and on the other hand there is the privacy paradox. One important question in
this context is how the two motivating phenomena t together (Taylor 2004). To answer
5
this question, most relevant papers analyze a sellers privacy policy in a variant of a simple
two period model and compare the optimality of two privacy policies, the condential policy
and the disclosure policy, from the sellersperspectives. Selling customer purchase histories
is forbidden by the condential policy and allowed by the disclosure policy. The condential
policy does not allow the seller(s) to exchange the information a buyer has revealed about
himself. The disclosure policy allows the seller(s) to exchange, and to sell, personalized
information, but introduces the ratchet e¤ect.1 To justify the privacy paradox, environments
or conditions that imply that the seller prefers the disclosure policy have to be found.
Most papers on the economics of privacy nd that a condential policy outperforms the
disclosure policy when customers are rational and positively correlated (see e.g. Taylor 2004,
Dodds 2003, Calzolari and Pavan 2006; for a survey, see Fudenberg and Villas-Boas 2006,
2012, Hui and Png 2006, Zhan and Rajamani 2008).2 The main challenge is to enlarge the
contractual space so that there is a contract that sets both, sellers and buyers, better o¤. In
the spirit of Fudenberg and Tirole 1983, Dodds 2003 nds that the principals joint surplus
is higher under the disclosure policy than under the condential policy if the principals
discount factor is su¢ ciently higher than the workers discount factor, but he does not
characterize the contract explicitly. Calzolari and Pavan 2006 provide conditions so that in
the presence of negatively correlated valuations and changing support, the seller benets from
a disclosure policy. The intuition in this setting is that there are countervailing incentives.
The rst seller may also prot from disclosure in the case of direct externalities on seller 1s
1The ratchet e¤ect is present in models where the buyer has a persistent type and the seller has perfect
memory but no commitment power to long term contracts (see e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole 1983 ). The
ratchet e¤ect describes the idea that a buyer who has persistent information cannot undo the revelation of
his private information once he has revealed it. Since he will never again receive any information rent for
revealed information, he might refrain from potentially revealing actions such as purchasing a good. This
might inhibit trade and lower the sellers expected revenue. Fudenberg and Tirole 1983 consider sequential
bargaining without commitment in a two period model between a seller and a buyer.
2For a broader overview of the economic literature on privacy, we recommend a survey by Hui and Png
2006. See also Zhan and Rajamani 2008. For a general overview of the economic literature on behavior-
based pricing, see Fudenberg and Villas-Boas 2006. For a recent contribution, overview and a discussion
of di¤erent types of behavior-based pricing models, see Fudenberg and Villas-Boas 2012. The literature
on privacy policies is related to the literature on dynamic pricing (see e.g. Baron and Besanko 1984),
which shows that the optimal long-term contract implements a sequence of the solution to the short-term
contracting problem.
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payo¤ (Calzolari and Pavan 2006).
I depart from the assumptions of these related papers in the following dimensions. First,
I assume that there is a customer with uncertain, type-dependent future demand. Second, a
new customer enters in the second period. Third, I restrict attention to persistent valuations
(as true for the examples from the introduction). In particular, two monopolistic sellers
(in this chapter either called monopolist or seller) trade sequentially with two buyers: One
incumbent (in this chapter also called buyer 1) and one entrant (in this chapter also called
buyer 2). The incumbent customer has unit demand for the rst monopolists good 1 in
period 1 and with positive probability a unit demand for the second monopolists good 2 in
period 2. The entrant buyer has a unit demand for the second monopolists good 2 in period
2. In my model the incumbent customers type determines his time-persistent valuation and
his probability to demand one unit of the good 2. The incumbent privately knows his type
at the outset of the game, information that seller 2 does not have but could gain from seller
1. So, the rst sellers purchase history can be informative about her customers type and
enables seller 2 to distinguish the incumbent from the new buyer.
This chapter provides a new explanation for the privacy paradox and extends existing
results to a very natural setting with persistent valuation, type-dependent demand uncer-
tainty, and customer entry. To the best of my knowledge, the paper on which this chapter
is based is the rst paper addressing the privacy paradox and considering a dynamic pricing
model with persistent valuation, type-dependent demand uncertainty, and customer entry.
In the presence of demand uncertainty for good 2, the second monopolist updates her belief
about the incumbent buyers true valuation conditional on the event that the buyer has
positive demand for the object. A typical example for such preferences with demand uncer-
tainty is a customers status preference. Some customers have a higher probability to buy
further status goods in the future. One can nd many more applications for preferences that
have an underlying persistent type but demand uncertainty: Add-on products, applications
for mobile devices, insurances, media and newspapers, portfolio management, health care,
schooling, etc.
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My main insight concerning the privacy policy of the rst monopolist is that she some-
times prefers the disclosure policy. I nd that the rst seller prefers to sell the purchase
history at a strictly positive price if the second seller cannot identify the buyers and is suf-
ciently more pessimistic about her incumbents type than she is about the entrants type.
Why is the purchase history more valuable if a new customer enters seller 2s market?
When the new customer, buyer 2, enters the market and the rst monopolists former cus-
tomer, buyer 2, comes to the second monopolist to buy good 2, then the second monopolist
cannot distinguish the two customers. The purchase history of the rst monopolists former
customer provides two types of information. First, it provides the second monopolist with
information about the valuation of the rst monopolists former customer. Second, it informs
about the identity of the rst monopolists former customer. The latter type of information
implies that the second monopolist then can distinguish the two customers if she buys the
purchase history from the rst monopolist. This purchase history provides her with some
additional value that would not be present without the entry of the buyer 2. One can nd
conditions under which the rst monopolists total revenue from committing to a disclosure
policy, which is the sum of rst period prots and the price of the purchase history, exceeds
her total revenue under the condential policy, which is equal to her rst period prots.
Section 2 presents the main assumptions of the model with customer entry and my
approach to derive the main result. Section 3 presents the analysis of the model. Subsection
3.1 considers seller 2s contracting problem if she bought the purchase history of the rst
monopolists customer. Subsection 3.2 considers seller 2s contracting problem if she did not
buy the purchase history. Subsection 3.3 presents seller 1s o¤er of the purchase history to
seller 2. Subsection 3.4 presents seller 1s contracting problem under the condential policy.
Subsection 3.5 presents the last step of the analysis, seller 1s contracting problem, and my
main result. Section 4 presents the conclusion. Proofs are relegated to Appendix 1.
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1.2 Model and Approach
1.2.1 The Model
I consider a two-period bargaining model. There are two sellers (in this chapter, always
female, i.e. in the "she" form) and two buyers (in this chapter, always male, i.e. in the "he"
form). Seller 1 sells good 1 and seller 2 sells good 2. One buyer has unit demand for good
1 in period 1 and lives with certainty in period 1. I will often refer to him by calling him
buyer 1. His valuation of one unit of either of the two goods is determined by his persistent
type i 2 fA;Bg. If his type is A (B), then his valuation, 1, is A (B) and his probability to
have unit demand for good 2 in period 2 is A (B); A > B and A 2 [0; 1] and B 2 [0; 1].
Buyer 2 has only unit demand for good 2 in period 2. I assume without loss of generality
that he enters at the beginning of period 2. Buyer 2s type is his valuation 2 2 fA; Bg.
Nature draws both buyerstypes at the beginning of the game. The type of any of the
two buyers is the respective buyers private information; that is, none of the other players,
including sellers 1 and 2, can observe his type. Buyer 1 learns his type when at the beginning
of period 1. Buyer 2 privately learns his type at the beginning of period 2, when he enters
the market. It is common knowledge that buyer 1s type i is a binary random variable
with probability   P (i = A) and (1  )  P (i = B). Similarly, with probability 
buyer 2s type is A and with probability 1    his type is B. From the other players
perspectives, buyer 2s type 2 is a binary random variable with probability   P (2 = A)
and (1  )  P (2 = B).
Payment p denotes the price set by seller 1 for x units of good 1. Let t denote the price
set by seller 2 for y units of good 2. x and y can be chosen from the unit interval. Then
x denotes a buyers consumption of good 1 and y denotes the buyers consumption of good
2. A buyers utility of purchasing good 1 (or 2) with probability x (or y) at price p (or
t) is quasilinear in the payment x   p (or y   t). Let P denote the price for seller 1s
customer information. Both sellersvaluations and production costs are normalized to 0,
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which is common knowledge. Seller 2s willingness to pay is denoted by WTP and is the
additional expected payo¤ that she can earn by making use of the information contained in
the purchase history. I assume that seller 1 has full bargaining power with respect to this
additional expected payo¤. Seller 1s o¤ers are publicly observable to all players. Seller 1
can generate revenue p from trade with the buyer and P from trade with seller 2. Seller
2 can generate revenue t from trade with each buyer. She may set di¤erent prices for the
incumbent and the entrant if she can distinguish them. She can only distinguish them under
disclosure.
Like Taylor 2004 I assume that seller 1 possesses a device that saves the buyers purchase
decision, and which she cannot manipulate. In my setting, the purchase history contains the
buyers identity and his purchase decisions3.
Seller 1 can commit to a privacy policy, which is either a disclosure policy or a condential
policy as in Taylor 2004. The condential policy does not allow seller 1 to use the information
that she has learnt about her customers. She commits in particular to not selling the purchase
history. The disclosure policy allows seller 1 to choose to sell the purchase history to seller
2.
The exact timing of the game is the following:
Period 1:
1. Nature selects buyer 1s type. Buyer 1 enters and learns his type. Seller 1 commits to
a privacy policy and makes o¤er to buyer 1. If o¤er accepted: Buyer 1 receives good
and pays price.
2. Only under disclosure policy: Seller 1 o¤ers purchase history to seller 2. If seller 2
accepts seller 1s o¤er, then seller 2 receives the purchase history and pays price. If
seller 2 rejects seller 1s o¤er, then seller 2 does not receive the purchase history and
pays nothing.
3I will assume that the list contains reports instead of purchase decisions, since I restrict attention to
direct mechanisms.
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Period 2:
3. Nature draws demand for good 2 of buyer 1 and type of buyer 2. Buyer 2 enters and
learns his type. Seller 2 makes o¤er to each of her customers. If seller 2s o¤er accepted
by a customer, then customer receives good and pays price.
It is helpful to explicitly describe the buyersdemand for seller 2s good in detail. At the
beginning of period 2 nature draws buyer 1s demand. With probability i buyer 1s demand
is 1 and with 1  i it is 0. Buyer 2s demand is 1. Thus, there are either one or two buyers
active in period 2. If buyer 1s demand is 0, then seller 2 faces a single customer. If buyer
1s demand is 1, then seller 2 faces two customers.
Seller 1s strategy consists of several actions: a decision on the privacy policy, an o¤er to
buyer 1 under the condential policy, an o¤er to buyer 1 under the disclosure policy and the
price P for the purchase history under the disclosure policy. I can formulate seller 1s o¤er
to seller 2 in short form if I allow her to choose P =1, implying that she does not want to
sell the purchase history.
Keep in mind that seller 2s belief when she buys the purchase history is di¤erent from
her posterior belief conditional on the buyers actual purchase decision. Seller 2s strategy
consists of several actions: her reply to seller 1o¤er, an o¤er to buyer 2 if she can identify
her, an o¤er to buyer 1 if he has unit demand and she can identify him and an o¤er to both
buyers if she cannot distinguish between them.4
1.2.2 The Approach
Before I begin the analysis, I briey outline my approach. I apply the Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium solution concept (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991). The main goal of the analysis
is to derive su¢ cient conditions for a Perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) in which the seller
chooses the privacy policy and her expected revenue exceeds the total payo¤from committing
to a condential policy. I solve the game backwards. In order to solve for the sellersoptimal
4Note that seller 2 can only distinguish the buyers if she purchases buyer 1s purchase history.
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o¤ers at each of their information sets, I apply the adequate revelation principle, which
allows attention to be restricted to the set of direct mechanisms when solving for seller 1s
and seller 2s optimal o¤ers. Then seller 1s customers purchase history contains buyer 1s
reported type and his identity.
The proof of my main result is done in ve main steps.
First, I consider seller 2s decision problem in period 2 after seller 2 bought the purchase
history, state her optimal play after she bought the purchase history given the purchase
history contains full information about the valuation of seller 1s customer and derive seller
2s expected revenue provided she did not buy the purchase history.
The second step is the analogue to step 1 for the case when seller 2 did not buy the
purchase history.
Third, I derive the price for the purchase history if the purchase history of the rst
monopolists customer fully reveals the customers type to seller 2.
Fourth, I derive seller 1s expected revenue from committing to the condential policy.
Fifth, I need to show in a nal step that there are conditions under which seller 1 prefers
the disclosure policy. I do this by showing that the sum of the revenue from selling good
1 to her customer and the revenue from selling the purchase history to seller 2 exceeds the
revenue from committing to the condential policy, which I derived in step 4. In particular,
I derive a lower bound for seller 1s expected revenue and show that this lower bound can
be higher than her revenue under the condential policy. In order to do so, I consider a
particular mechanism of seller 1. I show that this mechanism is incentive compatible and
individual rational; that is, the mechanism induces buyer 1 to fully reveal his valuation and to
participate. I provide conditions under which seller 1s total expected revenue from o¤ering
this mechanism under the disclosure policy exceeds her revenue from selling to the customer
under the condential policy. Since the buyers behavior is consistent with the postulated
beliefs, this is a PBE unless seller 1 can generate higher expected revenue by o¤ering another
mechanism that is also incentive compatible and individual rational. I conclude that seller
1 strictly prefers the disclosure policy under the provided conditions. Note that in principle
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there could be another incentive-compatible and individual rational mechanism that seller 1
would prefer under the disclosure policy.
1.3 Analysis
1.3.1 Seller 2s Contracting Problem After She Bought the Pur-
chase History
In this subsection, I consider the second monopolists contracting problem after she bought
the purchase history from seller 1. If she bought the purchase history from seller 1, then
she has the possibility to identify the customers. I have to distinguish two branches of the
game tree. In the rst case she faces two buyers and in the second case only one buyer
demands her good. The former case occurs with probability A+ (1  ) B and the latter
case occurs with probability (1  (A + (1  ) B)).
If she faces only one customer, then she knows that this is buyer 2 which implies that
the purchase history does not contain any valuable information. Therefore seller 2s optimal
o¤er to buyer 2 is independent of buyer 1s purchase history in the latter case.
Since the posterior about the buyer is always valuable, her optimal o¤er to the new
customer solves
max
yA;yB ;tA;tB
tA + (1  ) tB (1.1)
subject to
jyj   tj  0; (1.2)
jyj   tj  jyi   ti; (1.3)
yj 2 [0; 1] (1.4)
for i; j 2 fA;Bg,j 6= i,
where constraint (1:2) is the individual rationality condition of type j of a buyer, con-
straint (1:3) is the incentive compatibility condition of type j of a buyer and constraint (1:4)
is the feasibility condition since the allocation is restricted by the unit demand of a buyer.
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Constraint (1:4) must be imposed because the buyer has unit demand in my setting.
If seller 2 observes that the incumbent customer has unit demand, then her optimal
o¤er to buyer 1, seller 1s former customer, conditions on the information in the purchase
history and is a function of seller 2s posterior. Let si denote the probability with which
the incumbent buyer with type i reports type A to seller 1, i 2 fA;Bg, i.e. 1   si is the
probability that the incumbent buyer of type i reports type B. By Bayesrule, seller 2s
belief that buyer 1s type is A conditional on report A and positive demand for good 2 is
equal to
A (sA; sB) =
sAA
sAA + sB (1  ) B : (1.5)
Analogously, seller 2s belief that buyer 1s type is A conditional on report B and positive
demand for good 2 is equal to
B (sA; sB) =
(1  sA)A
(1  sA)A + (1  sB) (1  ) B : (1.6)
Then her optimal o¤er to buyer 1 who reported k, k 2 fA;Bg, solves
max
yA;yB ;tA;tB
k (sA; sB) tA + (1  k (sA; sB)) tB (1.7)
subject to
(1:2) ; (1:3) ; (1:4)
for i; j 2 fA;Bg,j 6= i.
The purchase history can have positive value only in the former setting. In order to
derive seller 2s willingness to pay for the purchase history, I can restrict attention to the
branch of the game with two buyers in period 2.
Proposition 1.3.1 If seller 1s customer reported A to seller 1 with probability 1 if he has
type A and with probability 0 if he has type B, then seller 2s posterior beliefs are A (1; 0) = 1
and B (1; 0) = 0. If seller 1s customer demands good 2, then seller 2s expected revenue
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conditional on the report h is equal to(
max (A; B) + A; if h = A
max (A; B) + B; if h = B
Proof. In Appendix 1.
If the rst monopolists buyer fully reveals her type to seller 1, then the second monopolist
can perfectly discriminate this customer. Moreover the purchase history has another value,
which is the value from being able to distinguish the two customers.
1.3.2 Seller 2s Contracting Problem If She Did Not Buy the Pur-
chase History
In this subsection, I discuss seller 2s contracting problem if she cannot condition on seller
1s purchase history.
It is obvious that seller 2 knows that her customer was not the customer of seller 1, if she
has only one customer. This event occurs with probability (1  (A + (1  ) B)). The
purchase history provides no valuable information about buyer 2 in this situation. Therefore
the purchase history is valuable only with probability A + B (1  ).
Next, I consider the case with two customers. In principle, her posterior belief that buyer
1s type is A conditional on the event that he has positive demand for good 2 is given by
  A
A + (1  ) B :
Note that    if and only if A  B. Therefore the probability that seller 2 will be serving
buyer 1 who has a valuation A is given by
A:
However, she cannot distinguish the two customers and only knows that one of the two
customers must be seller 1s former customer. Her belief that a customers type is A is then
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equal to 1
2
+ 1
2
. Her optimal o¤er to buyer 1 solves
max
yA;yB ;tA;tB

1
2
+
1
2


tA +

1 

1
2
+
1
2


tB (1.8)
subject to
(1:2) ; (1:3) ; (1:4)
for i; j 2 fA;Bg,j 6= i.
Proposition 1.3.2 From the perspective of stage 2 at period 1, seller 2s expected revenue
under the condential policy is equal to(
(1  (A + (1  ) B)) max (A; B)
+ (A + (1  ) B) 2 max
  
1
2
+ 1
2


A; B
 ) :
Proof. In Appendix 1.
1.3.3 Seller 1s Optimal O¤er to Seller 2 Under the Disclosure
Policy
After trading with the buyer, seller 1 maximizes her revenue from selling the purchase history
at a price P to seller 2 and has to respect that seller 2 rejects any price above her willingness to
pay (WTP ). WTP is a function of seller 2s posteriors, since seller 2s expected revenue after
having purchased the purchase history is a function of her posterior about buyer 1. From the
perspective of stage 2 at period 1, WTP is the di¤erence between seller 2s expected revenue
conditional on the information provided by the purchase history and seller 2s expected
revenue without this information.
From the perspective of stage 2 at period 1, seller 2s expected revenue conditional on the
information provided by the purchase history is equal to the sum of the expected revenue
from selling to buyer 2 and the expected revenue from selling to buyer 1. The expected
revenue from selling to buyer 2 depends on her belief about buyer 2s type, . The expected
revenue from selling to buyer 1 depends on her belief about buyer 1: the posterior belief
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about buyer 1s type and about buyer 1s type-dependent probability to demand good 2.
From the perspective of stage 2 at period 1, seller 2s belief that buyer 1 will have positive
demand is equal to
A + (1  ) B:
From the perspective of stage 2 at period 1, seller 2s belief that buyer 1 sends a report A
conditional on positive demand is given by
sAA + sB (1  ) B
A + (1  ) B : (1.9)
The posterior belief that buyer 1 has type A, conditional on positive demand and report h,
h 2 fA;Bg, is given by (1:5) and (1:6). Therefore, from the perspective of seller 2 at the
beginning of stage 2, the probability that buyer 1 has type A, sent report A to seller 1 and
will have demand for good 2 is given by
sAA.
Seller 1 maximizes the price for the purchase history P subject to
P  WTP (A (sA; sB) ; B (sA; sB)) : (1.10)
Since seller 1 has the full bargaining power with respect to the additional information rent
that her purchase history provides to seller 2, seller 1 can set the price equal to seller 2s
willingness to pay for the purchase history. Then seller 2s optimal price is a function of the
buyers reporting behavior in equilibrium and the posterior
P  (sA; sB; A (sA; sB) ; B (sA; sB)) = WTP (sA; sB; A (sA; sB) ; B (sA; sB)) :
I would like to consider the case where the value of the purchase history reaches its upper
bound and derive seller 2s WTP . Suppose buyer 1 reports his type truthfully to seller 1,
i.e. buyer 1 reports A with probability sA = 1 and B with probability sB = 0. Substitution
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into (1:5) and (1:6) gives that seller 2s posteriors are A (1; 0) = 1 and B (1; 0) = 0. Then
seller 2 will be able to perfectly screen buyer 1 provided she buys the purchase history. The
purchase history also provides seller 2 with the identity of the buyers.
Proposition 1.3.3 sA = 1 and sB = 0. At stage 2 of period 1, seller 1 o¤ers the purchase
history to seller 1 for a price equal to
P  (1; 0; 1; 0) (1.11)
= (A + B (1  ))
 
max (A; B) + A
+ (1  ) B  max (( + ) A; 2B)
!
:
Proof. In Appendix 1.
1.3.4 Seller 1s Contracting Problem Under the Condential Pol-
icy
If seller 1 commits to the condential policy, then her optimal o¤er is a myopic decision. I
can apply the standard revelation principle. Her optimal o¤er to her customer solves
max
xA;xB ;pA;pB
pA + (1  ) pB (1.12)
subject to
jxj   pj  0; (1.13)
jxj   pj  jxi   pi; (1.14)
xj 2 [0; 1] (1.15)
for i; j 2 fA;Bg,j 6= i.
Proposition 1.3.4 Seller 1s revenue from committing to the condential policy is equal to
max (A; B).
Proof. In Appendix 1.
18
This result implies the following threshold (1:16), which is very important for the deriva-
tion of my main result.
Corollary 1.3.1 Seller 1 chooses the disclosure policy if and only if the expected revenue
exceeds
max (A; B) : (1.16)
In the next section, I will consider a mechanism that is implementable with reporting
strategies sA = 1 and sB = 0. I will provide conditions so that seller 1s expected revenue
under disclosure policy exceeds this threshold (1:16).
1.3.5 Seller 1s Contracting Problem Under the Disclosure Policy
In this section, I state seller 1s optimal mechanism under the disclosure policy. Clearly, the
solution to this problem is the same as if seller 1 sold also good 2 but had no commitment
power to the prices for good 2. I can solve the hypothetical game in which seller 1 sells both
goods and has perfect memory but cannot write long-term contracts. This hypothetical
game can be solved by applying the revelation principle by Bester and Strausz 2001.
Assumption 1.3.1 A > B:
By the revelation principle of Bester and Strausz 2001, the optimal mechanism under
the disclosure policy satises feasibility, individual rationality and incentive compatibility,
sequential rationality, and Bayesrule. Therefore seller 1 takes into account that her choice
of a mechanism a¤ects the optimal mechanism of seller 2 via the sale of the purchase history
and seller 2s updated posteriors A and B.
Before I state seller 1s contracting problem, I make one simplifying assumption. A buyer
of type B can never prot since he never receives a positive rent. However a buyer of type
A may prot from rejecting seller 1s o¤er. Therefore I assume offA  B, where off
denotes a sellers o¤ path posterior about the buyer conditional on the event that the buyer
does not participate in mechanism 1 or rejects seller 1s o¤er.
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Note that I restrict attention to the case in which seller 1 always sells the purchase
history under the disclosure policy. Seller 1s optimal mechanism ((xA; p

A) ; (x

B; p

B)) under
the disclosure policy solves
max
xA;xB ;pA;pB ;sA;sB
 
(sA + sB (1  )) pA + ((1  sA) + (1  sB) (1  )) pB
+P  (sA; sB; A (sA; sB) ; B (sA; sB))
!
(1.17)
subject to
xAA   pA +  (yAAA   tAA)  0, (1.18)
xBB   pB +  (yBBB   tBB)  0, (1.19)
xAA   pA + A (yAAA   tAA)
 xBA   pB + A (yBAA   tBA)
, (1.20)
xBB   pB + B (yBBB   tBB)
 xAB   pA + B (yABB   tAB)
, (1.21)
sA 2 f1g if (1:20) is slack,
(0; 1] if (1:20) binds
, (1.22)
sB 2 f0g if (1:21) is slack,
[0; 1) if (1:21) binds
, (1.23)
(1:5) , (1:6) ,
xi 2 [0; 1] ; i 2 fA;Bg . (1.24)
Note that
  
yjA; t

jA

;
 
yjB; t

jB

is seller 2s equilibrium o¤er conditional on having pur-
chased the purchase history of buyer 1 who reported j. In the PBE, seller 1s conjecture
about seller 2s optimal o¤er in period 2 to the customer who reports h is correct. Constraints
(1:18) and (1:19) are the individual rationality constraints of types A and B, respectively.
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Constraints (1:20) and (1:21) are the incentive compatibility constraints of type A and B,
respectively. Constraints (1:22) and (1:23) are consistency conditions that make sure that
a buyer with type A or B, respectively, lies about his type only if the respective incentive
compatibility constraint binds, which implies that he is indi¤erent between reporting A or
B. Moreover, conditions (1:22) and (1:23) imply that a buyer does not lie with probability 1.
As explained above, conditions (1:5) and (1:6) dene seller 2s posterior beliefs conditional
on observing the buyers report and given that the buyer reports A with probabilities sA and
sB. Condition (1:24) is the technological feasibility, i.e. a seller cannot sell more to a buyer
than he demands. Moreover, x can be interpreted as a probability.
Lemma 1.3.1 If seller 1 o¤ers a perfectly separating mechanism so that sA = 1 and sB = 0,
then the expected price of the purchase history, P  (1; 0; A (1; 0) ; B (1; 0)), is given by
f(1  ) BBg if ( + ) A  2B and A  B
fA (B   A) + (1  ) B (2B   A)g if ( + ) A  2B and A  B(
A (A + A   2B)
+ (1  ) B (A   B)
)
if ( + ) A  2B and A  B
fA (A   B)g if ( + ) A  2B and A  B
: (1.25)
Proof. In Appendix 1.
By corollary 1, seller 1s expected revenue is equal to A if she chooses the condential
policy.
Theorem 1.3.1 Suppose assumption 1 holds. Then seller 1 strictly prefers the disclosure
policy if parameters ; A; B; A; B satisfy either one of the following parameter regimes:
I) ( + ) A  2B and A  B and B   A > 0 or
II) ( + ) A  2B and A > B.
Proof. In Appendix 1.
Theorem 1.3.1 is the main result of the chapter; it constitutes the last step that is needed
to show that rms could prot from a disclosure policy simply because of two reasons;
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personalized information is valuable to a company if there is another clientele. This result
explains the rmsbehavior to collect customer information and not to commit to strict
privacy policies when customers are rational.
Theorem 1.3.1 shows that a rm can prot from a privacy policy that allows the sale of
the customer information when the buyer of the purchase history has a slightly di¤erent set
of customers. Assuming that seller 2 has a slightly di¤erent clientele than seller 1 is natural,
when seller 1 and seller 2 o¤er di¤erent products.
In the case of type-dependent demand uncertainty and customer entry, the identity of
a buyer himself may be valuable to seller 2. Therefore, type-dependent uncertainty di¤ers
from the assumption of discounting. The main di¤erence in terms of trade-o¤s is that seller
2 may have a positive value for the pure knowledge of buyer 1s identity.
Note that    implies that the parameter regime characterized by conditions I) of
Theorem 1.3.1 is empty;    implies also that the parameter regime characterized by
conditions I) of Theorem 1.3.1 is empty. The su¢ cient conditions I and II can be interpreted
as follows: seller 2 is optimistic about her other clientele and pessimistic about seller 1s
clientele. Theorem 1.3.1 shows that under conditions I and II there must be an equilibrium
in which seller 1s customer reveals information about his type. Conditions I and II show
that the value of the purchase history depends on seller 2s belief about the other customer,
buyer 2. Hence, the purchase history is valuable for seller 1, because informs seller 2 about
the identity of seller 1s customer.
1.4 Discussion and Conclusion
As in Taylor 2004, the model integrates di¤erent dimensions of privacy (information): a
customers purchases and his identity. Taylors major explanation for rms that collect and
sell large amounts of data about customers and the privacy paradox is that customers do not
understand the ratchet e¤ect. Therefore customers reveal their preferences without receiving
any information rent. However, I derive an explanation for a setting with rational customers.
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The model di¤ers from Taylor 2004 in two dimensions: I allow for type-dependent demand
uncertainty and customer entry in period 2.
The intuition for my main result lies in the new additional value of the purchase history.
This additional value is generated by the new entrant, since the optimal o¤er is distorted if
the seller cannot distinguish the customers. This is the case when the second monopolist is
su¢ ciently more optimistic about his other clientele than about seller 1s clientele.
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Revealing Independent Private Value
InformationWhen Bidders Have Inter-
dependent Values
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Motivation and Main Findings
Suppose the owner of a company announces the sale of her company (target) via an auction
(takeover auction). All bidders share a common interest in the quality of the target, e.g.
the targets future cash ows. The potential bidders are asymmetrically and imperfectly
informed about the targets quality. Besides, potential bidders are heterogenous and have
some additional private interest in the company, e.g. because of the potential synergies that
arise when the bidder merges with the target.
It has been shown that the information structure is very important for the outcome of
an auction (see e.g. Milgrom and Weber 1982a or Bergemann and Pesendorfer 2007). If the
seller has more information about the target than the bidders and she can choose how much
of her information she wants to publish, then her incentives to disclose depend on the e¤ect
of disclosure. In the presence of informational externalities, public disclosure of information
may have a variety of e¤ects. First, public disclosure of the sellers information has a direct
informational e¤ect on a bidders estimate of his valuation, which induces him to adjust his
valuation. Second, it may induce a linkage principle if it reduces the winners curse of a
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bidder by providing more information about the common value component (Milgrom and
Weber 1982a). Third, public disclosure of information about all biddersprivate values may
induce strategic e¤ects as a reaction to the relative asymmetries among the bidders. This
chapter assumes that the sellers information only contains private value information; I make
this assumption in order to evaluate the sellers incentives to publicly disclose private value
information prior to a second-price auction.1 To the best of my knowledge, the underlying
paper to this chapter is the rst to evaluate the third e¤ect of disclosed information about
the targets private value characteristics in the presence of informational externalities.
Private value information that drives synergies may arise in many areas. For example in
procurement, research and development, production, human resources, sales and marketing
etc. While one potential bidders strength is his marketing environment, another potential
bidder may have technological know-how that helps to decrease production costs (see Szech
2011 for a similar argument or Gärtner and Schmutzler 2009). Other typical examples for
goods that have interdependent value/common and private value character are nancial
assets or houses (Bulow and Klemperer 2002).2 Jehiel, Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moldovanu and
Zame 2006 argue that valuations are interdependent for reasons that are related to the
market structure and the companiesrelationships with each other.
In this context, I evaluate the sellers incentives to disclose information prior to a second-
price auction in the following simple model (a variant of the model of Milgrom and Weber
1982a). The seller has a private source of information containing information about the
bidders private values. There are two bidders with interdependent values. The bidders
have a preliminary private signal, which they learn at the beginning of the game, about the
goods common and private value. The game has two periods. In period 1 the seller chooses
a disclosure policy, either full disclosure or no disclosure. If the seller chose to disclose the
1Although I assume that the sellers information does not contain common value information, there can
be a positive linkage between the sellers information and the sellers expected revenue.
2Restricting attention to common values is overly restrictive since a bidders valuation depends not only
on the goods quality, prestige value or resale value (Milgrom and Weber 1982a) but also on the buyers
preference for the good (see e.g. Myerson 1981). Similarly, the assumption of private values has been
criticized as being overly restrictive (Jehiel, Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moldovanu, Zame 2006). Therefore I consider
a setting where bidders have interdependent values.
25
information, then she discloses the information in period 2 and both bidders learn all of
the sellers signals. All signals are independently distributed. Otherwise no bidder learns
the sellers information. Afterwards, the second-price auction with two bidders takes place.
Since the biddersinformation about the common value is incomplete, there are informational
exernalities between the bidders. Note that I abstract from allocative externalities3.
To evaluate the third e¤ect of disclosure, I assume that once the seller discloses informa-
tion publicly all bidders update their beliefs about each others valuation in the same way. In
particular, I assume that bidders observe how the goods published characteristics a¤ect each
bidders valuation. This assumption implies that bidders have only one-dimensional private
information4 and can strategically adjust their strategies to their estimate about their rivals
synergies.
I characterize the seller-optimal Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game. First, I solve
for the biddersequilibrium bidding strategies and then for the sellers equilibrium disclosure
policy. Note that the ndings of this chapter are also very relevant for the English auction
since every last stage of an English auction is strategically equivalent to a second-price
auction with two bidders.
The main insight of this chapter is that the linkage principle holds if the sellers infor-
mation is su¢ ciently informative about the biddersprivate value information. To derive
this result, I characterize the seller-optimal equilibrium. I show that there are two types of
seller-optimal equilibria where the biddersbidding strategies are of linear form and contin-
uous and strictly increasing in the bidderspreliminary information. First, there exists an
equilibrium in which the seller publicly discloses her information if the sellers information
has a high impact. Second, if the seller possesses information that has a low impact on the
biddersvaluations, then an equilibrium exists in which the seller conceals the information. I
3We follow the denition of interdependent values of Jehiel and Moldovanu 2001 but rule out allocative
externalities.
4The seminal papers on e¢ cient mechanisms where bidders have multidimensional private information
are Maskin 1992 and Jehiel and Moldovanu 2001. We rule out multidimensional private information and
allow bidders to condition their bid strategies on the public information. As a result, e¢ cient equilibria after
disclosure of private value information may exist.
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also discuss conditions under which each of these two types of equilibria is the seller-optimal
equilibrium in one of two mutually exclusive parameter regimes.
Before being able to give an intuition for the main insight, I discuss the e¤ect of public
disclosure of the sellers information on the biddersbeliefs. If the seller discloses her infor-
mation, then each bidder updates the estimate of his own valuation and his rivals valuation,
i.e. of both biddersprivate values for the good. Most importantly, bidders may perceive
each other as asymmetric since the seller discloses several independent signals that idiosyn-
cratically a¤ect the biddersprivate values. A bidder with a private value advantage is said
to be strong, and a bidder with a private value disadvantage is said to be weak.
Next, I discuss the assumption of interdependent values. Since there are informational
externalities between the bidders, the bidders are exposed to the winners curse conditional
on winning. Conditional on losing, bidders are not exposed to the winners curse. Compared
with the exposition to the winners curse in the auction without disclosure, in the auction
with disclosure, bidders can be asymmetric. The weak bidders exposition to the winners
curse conditional on winning is stronger and the strong bidders exposition to the winners
curse is weaker than in a symmetric setting.
The strength of the e¤ect of disclosure on the biddersexposition to the winners curse
depends on the size of the informational externalities and the importance of the sellers infor-
mation for the biddersvaluations. If the sellers independent private value information has a
low importance for the biddersvaluations, then the e¤ect of the informational externalities
is low; that is, a bidders exposition to the winners curse changes only slightly. In this case,
the sellers incentives are similar to the incentives in an independent private value setting.
In contrast, one can show that the independent private value information has a high impact
on a bidders exposition to the winners curse if the e¤ect of the informational externalities
is high.
Bidders shade their bids when they are exposed to a winners curse. When a bidders
exposition to the winners curse changes, then the bidders bid shading behavior changes.
If the bidders turn out to be asymmetric after disclosure, then the bidders adjust their
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bidding strategies to the disclosed information in the following way. While the strong bidder
increases his bid conditional on winning, the weak bidder shades his bid conditional on
winning. However, if a bidder knows that he will lose, he is willing to bid up to an amount
so that he is sure that he loses. Whether a weak bidder may win in the equilibrium depends
on the degree of informational externality and the informativeness/importance of the sellers
information.
The strategic e¤ect of disclosure on the bidders bidding strategies is weak if the in-
formational externality and the sellers information are of low importance. Basically, the
strong bidder increases his bid conditional on winning and the weak bidder decreases it. In
comparison to the auction when no information is disclosed, the strong bidder wins more
often and the weak bidder loses more often. Overall the sellers expected revenue decreases.
Intuitively, the setting and equilibrium behavior resembles very much the independent pri-
vate value setting with the main di¤erence that bidders shade their bids to account for the
winners curse.
The strategic e¤ect is strong if the informational externality and the sellers information
are very high. The weak bidder has to shade his bid conditional on winning so much that he
bids something negative. In equilibrium, the weak bidder never wins. Conditional on losing,
the weak bidder is willing to bid at least his minimal valuation, or some bid that is adjusted
for his rivals advantage. This e¤ect introduces a linkage between the sellers information and
the price paid in the auction. Therefore the seller prots from disclosing her information,
or, in other words, the linkage principle holds if the information is very important and the
informational externalities are high.
I also discuss an interesting concept to evaluate the e¤ect of information disclosure: the
allocation e¤ect. Board 2009 denes it as the e¤ect of disclosed information on the rev-
enue triggered by the change of the allocation/winning bidder. The allocation e¤ect is a
consequence of the individual bidders adaptation of his bidding strategies to the disclosed
information. Board nds that the allocation e¤ect of public private information on the
expected revenue is always negative. I nd that this allocation e¤ect is positive for some re-
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alizations of the biddersvaluations and negative for others when bidders have informational
externalities.
2.1.2 Related Literature
Numerous papers consider disclosure of information prior to auctions, but, again, to the best
of my knowledge, the paper underlying to this chapter is the rst one to consider disclosure
of private value information in the presence of informational externalities. Some of the pa-
pers consider public disclosure of information, and the seminal paper (Milgrom and Weber
1982a) mainly analyzes optimal disclosure of common value information in di¤erent standard
auctions. The authors nd a revenue-ranking in the presence of a¢ liated signals and show
that public disclosure is optimal. They rule out disclosure of private value information and
asymmetric disclosure. Mares and Harstad 2003 relax the implicit assumption of symmetric
and public disclosure in rst-price and second-price auctions. For special valuation functions,
they show that asymmetric or private disclosure can improve revenue under some circum-
stances. Larson 2009 addresses how disclosure of independent information about common
values has no e¤ect on the sellers expected revenue when bidders have preliminary private
information. Larson rules out disclosure of private value information. Board 2009 considers
public disclosure of private value information but rules out informational externalities.
My setting lies between Milgrom and Weber 1982a and Board 2009. Milgrom and Weber
show that the linkage principle holds for the disclosure of a¢ liated common value signals
in a second-price auction. Board 2009 shows that the linkage principle fails to hold in an
independent private value second-price auction with two bidders. Notice that Board 2009
considers independently distributed signals, which is a special case of a¢ liated signals. I
consider an interdependent value second-price auction with independent signals. The seller
can disclose private value signals, as in Board 2009.
Another branch of the literature considers private disclosure of information. Mares and
Harstad 2003 show that private disclosure of common value information may be better than
public disclosure of this information. Ganuza and Penalva 2010 consider optimal costly
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disclosure, but rule out preliminary information and informational externalities. Szech 2011
considers costly disclosure of several private value information packages before an auction
with entry fees but rules out preliminary information and informational externalities.
Other papers apply a mechanism design approach to related questions. Esö and Szentes
2007 address the question of optimal disclosure in an auction with preliminary information,
but rule out informational externalities. Bergemann and Pesendorfer 2007 and Bergemann
and Wambach 2013 consider the optimal information structure in an auction and employ a
mechanism design approach to analyze this question, but rule out informational external-
ities. Gershkov 2009 considers the disclosure of common value information, but rules out
informational externalities of private information. Skreta 2009 considers optimal information
disclosure in an auction when the seller is informed about her information. She shows that
disclosure is irrelevant in a private value setting. Otherwise, it is optimal not to disclose
information.
Further strongly related literature analyses auctions with informational externalities (e.g.
Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti 1999). The seminal papers on the e¢ ciency of auctions
with informational externalities are Maskin 1992, Dasgupta and Maskin 2000 and Jehiel and
Moldovanu 2001, which provides general results for general mechanisms, such as the impossi-
bility of ex-post implementation of e¢ cient allocations with multi-dimensional signals. The
main di¤erence to this chapter is the information structure, which is the reason why the good
may be allocated e¢ ciently in an equilibrium in which the seller discloses her information.
For more recent contributions, see Birulin 2003 or de Frutos and Pechlivanos 2006. For a
general overview of the literature, I refer the reader to Jehiel and Moldovanu 2006.
This chapter also relates to the papers on almost common value auctions, which are
auctions with informational externalities where valuations are additive in the biddersprivate
information (see among others Bikhchandani 1988, Klemperer 1998, Bulow and Klemperer
2002, Levin and Kagel 2005). I basically analyze a symmetric almost common value setting
(Bulow and Klemperer 2002) with an independent private value perturbation. My model
di¤ers from that literature in that I analyze the e¤ect of disclosure.
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Since publishing private value information implies that bidders potentially perceive each
other as asymmetric, the literature on asymmetric auctions is also related. Asymmetries can
prevail in di¤erent ways, one bidder may be (more) informed and the other (less) uninformed
(see e.g. Milgrom and Weber 1982b, Harstad and Levin 1985 and Einy et al 2002). Since
the literature on asymmetric auctions is too large to be covered here, I refer the reader to
Rothkopf and Harstad 1994.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
the approach. Section 3 derives the characterization of two types of equilibria. Section 4
compares the two types of equilibria and discusses the seller-optimal equilibrium. Section 5
concludes.
2.2 Model and Approach
2.2.1 The Model
I consider a game with three players, one seller and two potential buyers. Bidders are ex-
ante symmetric with respect to the valuation structure and information structure. The seller
intends to sell a single, indivisible object to which she attaches a value zero. The bidders
have interdependent values, but in a slightly di¤erent way than in Milgrom andWeber 1982a.
Bidder i has the following valuation
Vi (ti; tj; z) = ati + btj + zi, a > b  0, i; j 2 f1; 2g ,j 6= i; (2.1)
where a, b and  are the weights with which the bidders private signal, the opponents signal
tj and one of the sellers signal zi enter the bidders valuation. Note that my specication of
bidder is valuation (2:1) is not symmetric in (ti; tj), but in (ti; tj; zi).5
Bidder is valuation, (2:1), can be rewritten as the sum of the goods private value
5In contrast to our specication, Milgrom and Weber 1982a assume that the valuation is symmetric in
ti:t i, i.e. Vi (ti; tj ; z) = V (ti; tj ; z). Also Board 2009 assumes that valuations are given by v (ti; z) for all
bidders i. See also Krishna 2009 for the denition of symmetric valuations.
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component (PV) and the goods common value component (CV)6
(a  b) ti + zi| {z }
PV
+ b (t1 + t2)| {z }
CV
:
It is common knowledge that T1 and T2, with typical realizations t1 and t2, are indepen-
dently distributed by F on

t; t

with associated density function f . Let E [T ] denote the
mean of random variable Ti, i 2 f1; 2g. I dene T2:2  min (T1; T2).
The realization of Ti, ti, is bidder is private information at the beginning of the game.
From the other playersperspectives, bidder is signal is a random variable that is distributed
by Tis true distribution.
The seller possesses information that enters the biddersidiosyncratic valuation shocks
z1 and z2, but she cannot interpret z1, z2.  can be interpreted as the marginal impact
of the sellers information Z. It is common knowledge that Z1 and Z2 are identically and
independently distributed binary random variables with typical realizations z1 and z2; zi 2
fzh; zlg with zh > zl with   P (zi = zh). Let E [Z] denote the mean of random variable
Zi, i 2 f1; 2g. I dene Z1:2  max (Z1; Z2) and Z2:2  min (Z1; Z2).
At the outset, the realizations of Z1 and Z2 are unobservable to all players. As long as
the seller does not disclose Z, from the perspective of all players, her information is a vector
of random variables with commonly known distributions. The seller can commit to disclose
the information or conceal it. Once the seller discloses Z, the bidders learn the realizations
z1 and z2, but the seller does not. A bidders valuation of not participating is zero.
The auction format is a second-price auction, which is strategically equivalent to the
English auction in the case of two bidders who have interdependent valuations (Milgrom
and Weber 1982a, Maskin 1992). The second-price auction here has the same rules as in
Maskin 2001, 2003. The winner is the bidder who submitted the highest bid. The winner
6This preference structure is a subcase of the one dened in Myerson 1981 or Jehiel and Moldovanu
2001. Myerson 1981 argued that a preference structure usually features preference uncertainty and quality
uncertainty. We refer to these two forms by distinguishing private and common value components. The case
of independent private values does not feature quality uncertainty whereas the case of pure common values
does not feature preference uncertainty.
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receives the good and pays his rivals bid. The loser pays nothing. If only one bidder
participates, then he gets the good and pays nothing. Milgrom and Weber 1982a showed
that these two formats are not strategically equivalent for more than two bidders who have
interdependent valuations. See also Maskin 1992 for a discussion.
The exact timing of the game is the following.
1. Nature draws T1, T2, Z1 and Z2. Bidders learn their private signals. The seller commits
to a disclosure policy. Bidders observe the announced disclosure policy and decide
whether to participate or not.
2. If the seller committed to full disclosure, she discloses Z. The bidders observe z1 and
z2. Bidders announce bids. The sellers good is allocated to the bidder with the highest
bid. He then pays the losers bid. The loser receives nothing and pays nothing.
If the seller committed to concealing Z, she conceals it. Bidders announce bids. The
sellers good is allocated to the bidder with the highest bid, who then pays the losers
bid. The loser receives nothing and pays nothing.
The sellers strategy is her disclosure policy, which is either full disclosure or no disclo-
sure/concealment. D denotes the full disclosure policy, and N denotes the no disclosure
policy. In this paper, I use "disclosure" and "full disclosure" as synonyms. I do not need
commitment, since the seller cannot observe the realization of Z1 and Z2 at any time in the
game.
Since the seller has no private information and she can either conceal or fully reveal z1 and
z2 to the bidders, bidder is information set at the auction stage is equal to his observable
information, which is denoted by hNi = ftig after concealment, disclosure policy N , and
hDi = fti; zi; zjg after full disclosure, disclosure policy D. Ni is a mapping from

t; t

to the
set of positive real numbers. Di is a mapping from

t; t
fzl; zhg2 to the set of positive real
numbers. I denote the bid at information set ftig in the auction after concealment by Ni (ti)
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and the bid in the auction at the information set fti; zi; zjg after the sellers disclosure of Z
by Di (ti; zi; zj).
A bidders expected utility in equilibrium must exceed 0 irrespective of his information
set, hi, since the bidder can always bid 0 which promises a payo¤ of 0.
2.2.2 The Approach
I consider the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria (see Fudenberg and Tirole 1991) in pure
strategies. The sellers strategy and the biddersbidding strategies must be mutually best
responses. It is known that even in asymmetric second-price auctions there may be multiple
equilibria (Krishna 2009). I restrict attention to the equilibria in linear bidding strategies
that are continuous and strictly increasing in the bidderspreliminary private information.
In principle, a unique equilibrium may not exist, but I am merely interested in the seller-
optimal equilibrium and what level of expected revenue the seller may realize in the second
price-auction when she can choose her revelation policy. Thus, I focus on seller-optimal
equilibria and address whether the linkage principle may hold for this type of equilibrium.
I also discuss which equilibria survive the elimination of ex-post weakly dominated strate-
gies. For interdependent values, Chung and Ely 2001 dene ex-post weak dominance.
Denition 2.2.1 (Ely and Chung 2001) Let ^j  j be a subset of strategy proles for the
opponents of j. Strategy i 2 i ex-post weakly dominates strategy ^i against ^j if for every
information set prole and every j 2 ^j
i
 
i (hi) ; j (hj) ; hi; hj
  i ^i (hi) ; j (hj) ; hi; hj
with strict inequality for at least one j 2 ^j and t.
In equilibrium, the seller commits to the disclosure policy that maximizes her expected
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revenue. Bidder is equilibrium bidding strategy is given by
i 
n
N;i
 
hNi
o
hNi 2[t;t]
;
n
D;i
 
hDi
o
hDi 2[t;t]fzl;zhg2

; i 2 f1; 2g ;
To derive the sellers decision, I compare the expected revenues from disclosure and no
disclosure.
First, I analyze the auction in the benchmark setting, in which the seller does not disclose.
In this case, I derive the revenue-maximizing strategy, which is not always the symmetric
strategy although bidders are symmetric. Sometimes the sellers expected revenue is higher
if the bidders bid their minimal valuation.
Then, I characterize an equilibrium in which biddersbidding behaviors are similar to
that in the benchmark setting whenever they are symmetric. However, if the seller discloses
information such that one bidder is advantaged and the other is disadvantaged, then it is
unclear whether the bidders play bids that constitute corner solutions or interior solutions
to their maximization problems. Remember that I call bidder i strong and bidder j weak
if zi = zh and zj = zl. Because of the potential asymmetry of the bidders, the analysis of
the revenue-maximizing bidding strategies when the seller discloses her information is a bit
more involved.
Therefore I split up the characterization of the revenue-maximizing equilibrium in two
steps. In a rst step, I analyze the bidding behavior after the seller chose no disclosure.
Second, I characterize the equilibrium in which bidders play the unique interior solution to
their maximization problems. The following partition of the parameter regime is useful. If
the realizations of Z1 and Z2 are not identical, then I distinguish regime A and regime B:
 Regime A is dened by (a b)(t t)
(zh zl) > . In this regime, the sellers information is
uninformative about/not important for the biddersvaluations.
 Regime B is dened by (a b)(t t)
(zh zl)  . In this regime, the sellers information is very
informative about/ important for the biddersvaluations.
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I can show that the interior solution for the auction after disclosure exists only if para-
meters lie in regime A and that the interior solution is unique. Moreover, it turns out that
the equilibrium in which bidders play revenue-maximizing corner solutions if z1 6= z2 only
survives the elimination of ex-post weakly dominated strategies for parameters in regime B.
Therefore I rst analyze the equilibrium where bidders play the interior solution if the seller
chose disclosure, and then I analyze the other equilibrium with the corner solution.
Last I have to compare the expected revenues and show that the seller receives a higher
expected revenue in the former equilibrium than in the latter equilibrium.
Note that the discussion of the e¢ cient allocation is relegated to Appendix 2.B.
2.3 Analysis
2.3.1 Benchmark: No Disclosure
Consider bidder is maximization problem at stage 2 when the seller committed to conceal
her information. Let Ni
 
hNi

denote bidder is reply to bidder js bidding strategy featuring
Nj
 
hNj

. Then bidder is best reply to bidder js bidding strategy when i observe hNi solves
the following problem:
max
Ni (hNi )
ETj
h
ati + bTj + E [Z]  N;j
 
hNj
 Ni  hNi   N;j  hNj  ; hNi i :
N;i
 
hNi

can be an interior solution or a corner solution, where one bidder wins with
certainty. The rst derivative is given by
@N;
 1
j
 
Ni
 
hNi

@Ni (h
N
i )

ati + b
N; 1
j
 
Ni
 
hNi

+ E [Z]  Ni
 
hNi

f

N;
 1
j
 
Ni
 
hNi

:
(2.2)
Let BRi
 
Nj
 
hNj

denote bidder is best reply bidder js bidding strategy such that Nj
 
hNj

by , i 2 f1; 2g.
Proposition 2.3.1 Assume that the seller concealed her information.
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In the class of equilibria where a bidders strategy has a linear form, is continuous, strictly
increasing in the bidders type and is not weakly dominated, the equilibrium bidding strategies
feature:
N;i (ti) = (a+ b) ti + E [Z] (2.3)
N;j (tj) = (a+ b) tj + E [Z]
i; j 2 f1; 2g ; i 6= j:
The sellers expected revenue is equal to
E
h
RN

N;i
 
hNi

; N;j
 
hNj
i
= (a+ b)E [T2:2] + E [Z] (2.4)
Proof. In Appendix 2.A.
I briey outline the proof. First, I derive the unique interior solution, which solves bidder
is rst-order condition, i.e. the reply of bidder i to bidder js bidding strategy such that
(2:2) is equal to 0. Since I am interested in equilibria in linear strategies, I will suppose
bidder js bid is of the linear form
N;j
 
hNj

= xjtj + yj
and then I show that bidder is best reply is
BRi

N;j
 
hNj

=
xj
xj   b

atj   b yj
xj
+ E [Z]

:
Then I show that bidder js best reply to BRi

N;j
 
hNj

is
BRj

BRi

N;j
 
hNj

=
axj
(a  b)xj + b2

atj +
b2
axj
yj +
a  b
a
E [Z]

;
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which must be equal to his bid in equilibrium so that
BRj

BRi

N;j
 
hNj

= N;j
 
hNj

:
This linear system has a unique solution for xj and yj, namely
xj = a+ b
and
yj = E [Z] :
Substitution into the best reply functions gives that at stage 2 the unique interior solutions in
linear form to the biddersmaximization problems, which are mutually best replies provided
the seller conceals her information are given by
BRj

BRi

N;j
 
hNj

= N;j
 
hNj

= (a+ b) tj + E [Z] ; (2.5)
BRi

N;j
 
hNj

= (a+ b) ti + E [Z] :
It can be shown by substitution that the biddersexpected payo¤s are positive.
Moreover, there are corner solutions Ni
 
hNi

; Nj
 
hNj

such that bidder i wins with
probability 1, i.e.
Ni
 
hNi
  Nj  hNj 
for all hNi and h
N
j . It is relatively easy to see that this corner solution can be ruled out as
an equilibrium.
Bidder is expected utility is positive, i.e.
ETj
h
ati + bTj + E [Z]  N;j
 
hNj
i  0:
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if bidders play
Ni
 
hNi

= at+ bti + E [Z]
Nj
 
hNj

= at+ bti + E [Z] :
However, bidder is candidate equilibrium strategy at+ bti +E [Z] is weakly dominated by
the strategy to bid his true minimal expected valuation ati + bt+ E [Z] since
ati + bt+ E [Z] > at+ bti + E [Z] ;
which is true for all ti.
It remains to be shown that the candidate equilibrium ati+bt+E [Z] and at+btj+E [Z],
i 6= j; i; j 2 f1; 2g cannot be an equilibrium in increasing and continuous strategies. The
reason is that bidder j always wins, but receives negative payo¤ for some of his types.
In the subsequent part of the chapter I write RN if I want to refer to (2:4).
2.3.2 Equilibrium I
In this subsection, I discuss an equilibrium in which the bidding strategies are interior solu-
tions to the biddersmaximization problems at each information set. It can be shown that
this type of equilibrium exists only if parameters lie in regime A, i.e. with   (a b)(t t)
zh zl .
In this equilibrium the seller conceals her information. The main intuition is that the weak
bidders exposition to the winners curse conditional on winning is larger than it would be
in the case without disclosure. Therefore the weak bidder has to shade his bid much more.
Auction Stage After Disclosure in Equilibrium I
If the seller discloses Z, then bidder is information set is represented by hDi = fti; zi; zjg,
i; j 2 f1; 2g, j 6= i. I solve the auction after disclosure for a given information set prole 
hD1 ; h
D
2

= (ft1; z1; z2g ; ft2; z2; z1g). Then bidder is maximization problem after disclosure
39
is given by
max
i(hDi )
ETj
 
ati + btj + zi   Dj (tj; zi; zj)
 i  hDi  > D  hDj  ; hDi  (2.6)
if his type is ti and bidder j bids equilibrium strategy 
D (tj; zi; zj) 8tj.
D;i
 
hDi

can be an interior solution or a corner solution, where one bidder wins with
certainty. The rst derivative is given by
@D;
 1
j
 
Di
 
hDi

@Di (h
D
i )

ati + b
D; 1
j
 
Di
 
hDi

+ zi   Di
 
hDi

f

D;
 1
j
 
Di
 
hDi

:
(2.7)
Bidder i solves (2:13) for each information set hDi provided that his opponent plays the
equilibrium candidate.
Proposition 2.3.2 Assume (a+ b) t + azl bzh
a b  0 and  <
(a b)(t t)
(zh zl) . There exists an
equilibrium of the game in which the bidders play
N;i (ti) = EZi [vi(ti; ti; Zi)] ; i; i 2 f1; 2g
after the seller committed to no disclosure and
D;i (ti; zi; zj) = vi(ti; ti; zi)  
b (zj   zi)
a  b ; j 6= i; i; j 2 f1; 2g (2.8)
after the seller committed to disclosure.
Proof. In Appendix 2.A.
For some parameters, there is an equilibrium where a bidder plays an interior solution
to his maximization problem. Clearly, the intuition for the biddersbidding strategies after
disclosure is identical to the intuition in the benchmark setting for the bidderssymmetric
bidding strategies in Proposition 2.3.1. Therefore I focus on the equilibrium strategies after
disclosure, for which I sketch the main part of the proof.
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Suppose a bidder plays a linear strategy ^j = wjtj +xjzj +yjzi+ej. Let i denote bidder
is reply to this linear strategy and BRi

^j

is best reply to ^j; i; j 2 f1; 2g ; j 6= i. If
bidder j play ^j, then the rst-order condition of bidder is maximization problem is satised
if and only if
@^
 1
j (i)
@i

ati +
b
wj
(i   xjzj   yjzi   ej) + zi   i

f

^
 1
j (i)

= 0
which implies that bidder is best reply to ^j is equal to
BRi

^j

=
awj
wj   bti + zi

wj   yjb
wj   b

  bxj
wj   bzj  
bej
wj   b:
Then the rst-order condition of bidder js maximization problem is satised if
@BR
 1
i (j)
@j
0@atj + bwj   b2
awj
0@ j + bxjwj bzj + bejwj b
 zi

wj yjb
wj b
 1A+ zj   j
1A f BR 1i (j) = 0
which implies that bidder js best reply BRj

BRi

^j

to bidder is best reply BRi

^j

against bidder j0s linear strategy is given by
BRj

BRi

^j

=
a2wj
(a  b)wj + b2 tj +
b2xj + awj
(a  b)wj + b2 zj
+
b2ej
(a  b)wj + b2   zi
bwj   yjb2
(a  b)wj + b2
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The strategies are mutually best replies if BRj

BRi

^j

= ^j which implies
b2
(a  b)wj + b2 ej = ej () (a  b)wj = 1 or ej = 0;
a2wj
(a  b)wj + b2 = wj () (a+ b) = wj for a 6= b ot wj = 0;
b2xj + awj
(a  b)wj + b2 = xj ()
a
a  b = xj,
  bwj   yjb
2
(a  b)wj + b2 = yj ()  
b
a  b = yj.
Note that wj > 0, since ^j is increasing and continuous in tj. This implies ej = 0. Then ^j =
BRj

BRi

^j

= (a+ b) tj+
a
a bzj  ba bzi.Substitution into BRi

^j

gives BRi

^j

=
a(a+b)
(a+b) bti + zi

(a+b)+ b
a b b
(a+b) b

  b
a
a b
(a+b) bzj, which simplies to 
BR
i

^j

= (a+ b) ti +zi
a
a b  
b
a bzj. Hence the equilibrium in linear strategies that are increasing and continuous in the
bidderspreliminary private information is unique and symmetric. Assumption (a+ b) t +
azl bzh
a b  0 guarantees that the bids are nonnegative.
Then the sellers expected revenue from disclosure is equal to
E
h
RDI

D;1
 
hD1

; D;2
 
hD2
i
= EZi;Zj
P2
i=1
j 6=i
R
f ti;tj jD;i (hDi )D;j (hDj )g

vi(ti; ti; Zi)   ba b(Zj   Zi)

dF (ti; tj)

;
(2.9)
In the subsequent part of the section, I will write RDI referring to (2:9).
If the parameters lie in regime B i.e.  <
(a b)(t t)
zh zl , then the strong bidder would always
win with this strategy. In this parameter regime, the derived strategies do not characterize
an interior solution.
The Sellers Incentives in Equilibrium I
I have seen that when bidders bid according to (2:8) after disclosure, then both bidders win
with positive probability in the auction following disclosure, provided that the parameter
values are in regime A.
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For regime A, I can rewrite the sellers expected revenue after disclosure, (2:9) as
RDI =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
P2
i=1
j 6=i
 (1  )
266666664
Z
f ti;tj jtj>ti+ zh zla b g

(a+ b) ti + zh    b(zl zh)a b

dF (ti; tj)
+
Z
f ti;tj jtj<ti+ zh zla b g

(a+ b) tj + zl    b(zh zl)a b

dF (ti; tj)
377777775
+2
P2
i=1
j 6=i
R
f ti;tj jtitjg [(a+ b) ti + zh] dF (ti; tj)
+ (1  )2P2i=1
j 6=i
R
f ti;tj jtitjg [(a+ b) ti + zl] dF (ti; tj)
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
:
(2.10)
If RDI exceeds the sellers revenue without disclosure, R
N , then the seller commits to
publicly disclosing Z at the beginning of the game.
Theorem 2.3.1 Assume (a+ b) t + azh bzl
a b  0 and 0 <  <
(a b)(t t)
zh zl . Suppose bidders
bid according to (2:8). Then the sellers expected gain from publicly disclosing Z is equal to
WI = R
D
I  RN (2.11)
=
 (1  ) (a+ b)

8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
P2
i=1
j 6=i
R t  zh zl
a b
t
tZ
ti+
zh zl
a b
(ti   tj) dF (tj) dF (ti)
+2(zh zl)
a b
0BB@
a b
zh zl (E [T ]  E[T2:2])
+
24 R t  zh zla bt F (ti) f  ti +  zh zla b  dti
 1
2
35
1CCA
9>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>;
: (2.12)
Then the seller prefers to conceal Z.
Proof. In Appendix 2.A.
This result shows that the seller prefers no disclosure if her information is very uninfor-
mative (in regime A, i.e.  <
(a b)(t t)
zh zl ).
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The Allocation E¤ect of Disclosure in Equilibrium I
The allocation e¤ect is the change of the revenue in reaction to the information. There is
no allocation e¤ect if the public information does not change the winning bidder, i.e. if
z1 = z2 (see Board 2009 for a similar argument). If z1 6= z2, then the strong bidder bids
more aggressively than the weak bidder and the weak bidder bids less than his expected
value conditional on winning, because he fears the winners curse much more. The e¤ect of
public information here is that the strong bidder wins more often than the weak bidder and
that the weak bidder bids less than under disclosure.
Allocation with
Disclosure.
Allocation without
disclosure.
Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the allocation e¤ect of disclosure compared to the auction after no
disclosure for z1 = zh and z2 = zl. The equilibrium allocation is e¢ cient. For allocations
above the red line in the left graph of gure 2.1 bidder 2 has the highest valuation and wins.
For all allocations below the red line, he has the lowest allocation and loses. One can easily
see that the strong bidder, bidder 1, wins more often. The reason is that bidder 1 is the
strong bidder who bids more than in the auction without disclosed information. The weak
bidder shades his bid much more. Together this implies that bidder 2 loses more often than
under no disclosure. On average the bids decrease.
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Discussion of Equilibrium I
Clearly, the unique best reply to the strategy of player j in the equilibrium with the interior
solution for  <
(a b)(t t)
zh zl is playing the symmetric strategy. This equilibrium behavior in
the auction after no disclosure does not constitute an interior solution for  >
(a b)(t t)
zh zl .
Furthermore, it can be shown that there are other Bayesian equilibria in which the sellers
expected revenue is at least weakly higher than RN . Therefore I can ignore this solution
candidate for regime B.
One can show that bidder is equilibrium bidding strategy is not weakly dominated by
any bidding strategy that features to bid his true minimal valuation by a strategy adjusted
to ati + bt+ zl for zi < zj or by ati + bt+ zh for zi > zj respectively.
2.3.3 Equilibrium II
In this subsection, I derive a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game where bidders bidding
strategies involve corner solutions if z1 6= z2 after the seller disclosed her information. In this
corner solution the advantaged bidder wins with certainty if z1 6= z2 and the seller discloses
if the informational externalities are su¢ ciently high. The characterization will show that
in the class of equilibria that I consider this equilibrium only exists if the parameters of the
model lie in regime B. For this, we must check robustness of the equilibrium strategies to
the elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
Since it can be shown for parameter regime A,  <
(a b)(t t)
zh zl , that the seller conceals her
information in the revenue-optimal equilibrium involving such corner solutions, I can restrict
attention to regime B with   (a b)(t t)
zh zl .
The Auction Stage After Disclosure in Equilibrium II
Assume   (a b)(t t)
zh zl . For parameter regimeA the equilibria are ruled out by the elimination
of ex-post weakly dominated strategies, which I will show later.
If the seller discloses Z, then bidder is information set is represented by hDi = fti; zi; zjg,
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i; j 2 f1; 2g, j 6= i. Bidder is maximization problem after disclosure is given by
max
i(hDi )
ETj
 
ati + btj + zi   Dj (tj; zi; zj)
 i  hDi  > D  hDj  ; hDi  (2.13)
if his type is ti and bidder j bids equilibrium strategy 
D; (tj; zi; zj) 8tj.
D;i
 
hDi

can be an interior solution or a corner solution, where one bidder wins with
certainty. The rst derivative is given by
@D;
 1
j
 
Di
 
hDi

@Di (h
D
i )

ati + b
D; 1
j
 
Di
 
hDi

+ zi   Di
 
hDi

f

D;
 1
j
 
Di
 
hDi

:
(2.14)
Denote a best reply of bidder i to some bid Dj
 
hDj

by BRi
 
Dj
 
hDj

, i 2 f1; 2g.
Let  be some real number between t and t:
Proposition 2.3.3 Assume   (a b)(t t)
zh zl . If the seller discloses her information, then
there exists an equilibrium in which the bidders equilibrium bidding strategies 1 and 

2
satisfy
D;i
 
hDi

=
8><>:
(a+ b) ti + zi if zi = zj
at+ bti + zh if zi < zj
(a  b) t+ bt+ bti + zh if zi > zj
;8ti 2

t; t

; (2.15)
D;j
 
hDj

=
8><>:
(a+ b) tj + zj if zi = zj
at+ btj + zh if zi > zj
(a  b) t+ bt+ btj + zh if zi > zj
;8tj 2

t; t

;
i; j 2 f1; 2g ; j 6= i:
The sellers expected revenue from concealing is given by (2:4). The sellers expected
revenue from disclosing is given by
E
h
RD

D;1
 
hD1

; D;2
 
hD2
i
= (1  2 (1  )) (a+ b)E [T2:2] + 2 (1  ) (at+ bE [T ]) + E [Z1:2]
: (2.16)
Proof. In Appendix 2.A.
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This equilibrium where the biddersbidding strategies constitute corner solutions when-
ever z1 6= z2 provided the seller disclosed her information exists if the parameters lie in
parameter regime B. The only di¤erence to the auction after without disclosed information
is that zi and zj will be known to both bidders if the seller publicly discloses her informa-
tion. The solution for the case z1 = z2 are derived in a fashion similar to the solution to the
biddersproblems in the auction following no disclosure, since both bidders are symmetric
in these two situations. In the case of zi = zj, the bidders are symmetric. I provided an
in-depth intuition for the bidding strategies in the benchmark case in the previous section,
which is the reason why I do not provide an intuition for the equilibrium bids in case the
bidders are symmetric here.
However, I provide an intuition for the biddersequilibrium bidding behaviors in case of
zi 6= zj provided the seller disclosed. Consider without loss of generality the case zi = zl and
zj = zh, where bidders bid for 
D
i (ti; zl; zh) = at+ bti + zh; 
D
j (tj; zh; zl) = (a  b) t+ bt+
btj + zh. Bidder j is the strong bidder and always wins since
at+ bti + zh  (a  b) t+ bt+ btj + zh 8ti; tj
It is relatively easy to see that bidder js expected utility must be positive, i.e.
ETi [atj + bTi + zh   (at+ bti + zh)]  0 8tj:
Moreover, bidder js expected revenue for a slightly higher expected bid of bidder i is negative
for tj 2

t; t+ 
a

with arbitrarily small  > 0, since
ETi [atj + bTi + zh   (at+ bti + zh + )] < 0
()
a

tj   t  
a

< 0:
This implies that there is no other solution of linear form such that one bidder wins for
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certainty, so that the seller would gain more.
The weak bidder i can bid anything as long as he loses without having to fear the potential
winners curse. By deviating from (a  b) t+ bt+ btj + zh to a higher bid bidder j cannot
change his expected probability of winning. By decreasing his bid, he can only decrease
his probability of winning and thereby decrease his expected payo¤. By deviating upwards,
bidder i can only decrease his expected revenue, by winning with positive probability and
paying (a  b) t + bt + btj + zh, which exceeds his expected valuation. If bidder i deviates
downwards, he still loses and receives payo¤0. Therefore none of the bidders has an incentive
to deviate in the case zi = zl and zj = zh, which holds for all i; j 2 f1; 2g ; i 6= j.
In the subsequent part of the section I write RDII if I want to refer to (2:16).
The Sellers Incentives to Disclose in Equilibrium II
The sellers expected net utility from publicly disclosing Z, which I denote by WII for
  (a b)(t t)
zh zl , is equal to the di¤erence between the expected revenue with disclosure and
without disclosure
WII = R
D
II  RN :
Substitution gives
WII = 2 (1  )
 
b

(E[T ] E[T2:2])
(E[T2:2] t)   ab

(E [T2:2]  t)
+(zh zl)
2
!
if   (a b)(t t)
zh zl . If R
D
II exceeds the sellers revenue without disclosure, R
N , then the seller
commits to publicly disclosing Z at the beginning of the game.
Theorem 2.3.2 If   (a b)(t t)
zh zl and bidders play strategies satisfying (2:3) and (2:15),
then the seller publicly discloses her information if and only if
  max
 
2

a  b(E [T ]  E [T2:2])
(E [T2:2]  t)

(E [T2:2]  t)
(zh   zl) ;
(a  b)  t  t
zh   zl
!
(2.17)
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holds true; otherwise she conceals her information.
Proof. In Appendix 2.A.
Condition (2:17) says that the seller discloses if the impact of her information on the
biddersvaluations is su¢ ciently important.
The shape of the distribution inuences (E [T ]  E [T2:2]) and (E [T2:2]  t).
Example 2.3.1 7For instance, if t  tk on [0; 1] ; k > 0, with associated density f (t) > 0
for all t 2 [0; 1], then
E [T ]  E [T2:2]
E [T2:2]  t =
1
2k
:
For the uniform distribution, i.e. for k = 1, condition (2:17) reduces to
  (a  b)
zh   zl
The Allocation E¤ect of Disclosure in Equilibrium II
There is no allocation e¤ect if the realizations satisfy z1 = z2. Therefore I only discuss the
potentially positive e¤ects for the case z1 6= z2. In these cases the strong bidder always wins.
From the characterization of the e¢ cient allocation, I know that the auction is e¢ cient in
regime B.
7Levin and Kagel 2005 mention the power distribution as an example for which it can be shown that an
auctioneer may prot from having an advantage bidder with valuation v (t1; t2) + z, z > 0 and a regular
bidder with v (t1; t2) instead of having two regular bidders with valuations v (t1; t2) and v (t2; t1).
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Allocation with
disclosure.
Allocation without
disclosure.
Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2 (regime B) depicts the allocations in equilibrium I in case of asymmetric
realizations of z1 = zh and z2 = zl. In both graphs of Figure 2.2, the red line separates the
equilibrium allocation conditional on the realizations of t1 and t2. For (t1; t2) below the red
line in the blue area, bidder 1 wins the second-price auction, and for (t1; t2) above the red
line in the green area, bidder 2 wins the second-price auction. The left graph illustrates the
equilibrium allocation of the second-price auction after disclosure, and the right graph shows
the equilibrium allocation of the second-price auction without disclosure. If no information
is disclosed, then a bidder wins if he is the bidder with the highest preliminary private signal
(right graph). If the information is disclosed, then bidder 1, the strong bidder wins (left
graph). The light blue area in the left graph marks the allocation e¤ect. Comparing the
equilibrium allocations, one easily sees that disclosure induces an allocation e¤ect for all
type proles such that t2 > t1, since bidder 2 would receive the good in the auction after no
disclosure.
Disclosure induces the weak bidder to lose more often (always). As a consequence, the
weak bidder loses having the higher preliminary signal and the sellers expected revenue is a
function of E [T ] instead of E [min (T1; T2)] whenever z1 6= z2, where E [T ] > E [min (T1; T2)].
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This is a positive allocation e¤ect on the sellers expected revenue. Moreover, a comparison of
the sellers expected revenues from disclosure and no disclosure shows the higher b, relative to
a, the higher the positive allocation e¤ect; that is the higher the informational externality of
the winning bidders private information, relative to the losing bidders private information,
the more protable is disclosure.
The winning bidder does not receive an information rent with respect to the sellers
information, since the losing bidder always bids at least the winning bidders idiosyncratic
shock. Since the losing bidder does not want to be subject to the winners curse, he must
shade his bid su¢ ciently. The higher , the higher the losing bidders bid.
Discussion of Equilibrium II
Proposition 2.3.3 and Theorem 2.3.2 describe equilibrium II. I characterize an equilibrium,
where bidders bid the seller-optimal corner solution for regime B. In this section I show that
this equilibrium is not robust to the elimination of ex-post weakly dominated strategies if
the parameters of the model satisfy regime A.
Suppose the bidder wins with i 2

v (ti; t; zi) ; v
 
ti; t; zi

against j with probability
1 and that he bids ^i 6= j . We can show that the following holds true. If, for a given
information set, bidder is equilibrium bid lies in the interval between his minimal valuation,
v (ti; t; zi), and his maximal valuation, v
 
ti; t; zi

, i.e. in i 2

v (ti; t; zi) ; v
 
ti; t; zi

, then
the e¤ect of a deviation always depends on his rivals true type tj.
First, I show that D;i (ti; zh; zl) 2

v (ti; t; zh) ; v
 
ti; t; zh

. Two conditions must hold
(a  b) t+ bt+ bti + zh  ati + bt+ zh8ti
()
(a  b) t  (a  b) ti8ti
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and
(a  b) t+ bt+ bti + zh  ati + bt+ zh8ti
()
b
 
t  t  (a  b) (ti   t)8ti:
The former condition is true. The latter condition holds true if
2b > a:
Next, I show that D;i (ti; zl; zh) 2

v (ti; t; zl) ; v
 
ti; t; zl

. Two conditions must hold
at+ bti + zh  ati + bt+ zl8ti
()
  (a  b) ti + bt  at
(zh   zl) 8ti
and
at+ bti + zh  ati + bt+ zl8ti
()
  (a  b) (ti   t)
(zh   zl) 8ti:
These conditions hold true for  such that
 2
"
(a  b)  t  t
(zh   zl) ;
b
 
t  t
(zh   zl)
#
; (2.18)
which implies again that 2b > a is a necessary condition.
Therefore the seller-optimal equilibrium in the considered class of equilibria is unique if
it exists.
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2.4 Disclosure and the Seller-optimal Equilibrium
In this section, I would like to discuss the revenue-maximizing equilibrium. Together with
Example 2.3.1 the discussions of the equilibria about the robustness to the elimination of
ex-post weakly dominated strategies imply that there is a nonempty parameter regime such
that there exists and equilibrium in which the seller discloses her information.
In the equilibrium of regime B, the seller discloses if her information is su¢ ciently infor-
mative, provided the equilibrium exists.
Equilibrium I exists if (a+ b) t +  (azl   bzh)  0 and  < (a b)(t t)(zh zl) . The seller always
conceals her information. If t = 0, then the former condition is equivalent to a zl
zh
 b.
Equilibrium II is the unique seller-optimal equilibrium of the considered class of equilibria if
conditions (2:17) and (2:18) hold true. The reason is that the seller prefers disclosure over
no disclosure if and only if (2:17), which implies that the expected revenue is strictly higher
than in the rst equilibrium. Moreover, if (2:17) is not true and  <
(a b)(t t)
(zh zl) holds true,
then the seller conceals the information in both equilibria and the sellers expected revenue
is identical in both equilibria.
We considered the robustness to the elimination of ex-post weakly dominated strategies.
The second equilibrium is robust to the elimination of ex-post weakly dominated strategies
if
(a b)(t t)
(zh zl)   
b(t t)
(zh zl) implying that the informational externality must be su¢ ciently
strong, b > a
2
. Therefore the rst equilibrium is unique in the considered class of equilibria
if  <
(a b)(t t)
(zh zl) , provided it exists.
2.5 Conclusion
I have studied the sellers incentives to publicly disclose a set of signals about the bidders
private valuations precedent to a second-price auction with two bidders. I assume that
bidders have preliminary information with informational externalities on other bidders. An
important aspect is how disclosure a¤ects the biddersbidding strategies.
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I characterize the revenue-maximizing/seller-optimal Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the
second-price auction with two bidders. The seller publicly discloses her information if the
impact of her information is very high, meaning it is informative about the biddersvalua-
tions.
The individual bidders exposition to the winners curse conditional on winning with
positive probability is stronger for weak bidders after disclosure of the information. Only
if the weak bidder loses with certainty is he willing to bid more carelessly. Disclosure may
have two e¤ects: an informational e¤ect and a strategic e¤ect.
My result that the linkage principle holds if the sellers information is su¢ ciently informa-
tive about the biddersprivate value information relates to the linkage principle for positively
a¢ liated signals in Milgrom and Weber 1982a. The common intuition is that the linkage
principle holds whenever the public information reduces the bidders winners curse. In my
model, this reduction is not a direct e¤ect of the public information but an indirect e¤ect,
because it only occurs endogenously in the equilibrium. I show that the linkage principle
may hold if the public information has a su¢ ciently high impact on the biddersvaluations,
and in equilibrium the advantaged winner wins whenever bidders are asymmetric.
I consider the case of a two bidders second-price auction. For the case of two bidders the
second-price auction is equivalent to the English auction, but not for more than two bidders
(Milgrom and Weber 1982a and Maskin 1992). However, the English auction with two
bidders occurs at the nal stage of each English auction. Moreover, Perry, Wolfstätter and
Zamir 2000 show that a two-stages auction with two bidders at the second stage is equivalent
to the English auction of Milgrom and Weber 1982a. They report the use of such an auction
mechanism for the privatization of an Italian conglomerate. A recent paper proposed the
indicative auction mechanism (Ye 2007). In the numerical examples provided by Ye 2007 for
the case with initial private value knowledge and additional common value component, the
optimal number of bidders in the second stage is two. Variants of the English auction have
been reported to be the oldest and probably most commonly used systems (Cassady 1967,
Krishna 2009).
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Sequential, Multi-dimensional Screen-
ing1
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Motivation
Consider a landowner contemplating to construct a house on her land. A constructor is
contacted to build the house. The plans for the house are relatively complex; a variety of
decisions have to be taken. To x ideas, suppose there are two broad issues relating to the
exterior and the interior design. The landowners ideas for the exterior design are relatively
standard, but her tastes for interior designs are quite particular. As a result, the constructor
knows the costs of completing the exterior parts, but he only has a vague idea about the
costs relating to the interior parts. However, he will learn these costs as time goes by.
This is a natural situation, in particular in large scale procurement environments, but the
situation arises equally naturally in the context of price discrimination. Consumers thinking
about buying a (new generation) smart phone know quite well how they value the services
and applications they have already been consuming on their old phones. However, they
may only have a vague idea about their valuation for new applications. Broadly speaking, a
customer switching from a standard mobile phone to a smart phone knows how many calls
he needs to make, but only time will tell how much data he will download with the phone.
1This chapter is based on the paper "Sequential, multidimensional screening", Litterscheid and Szalay
2014.
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Moreover, casual evidence suggests that rms respond to this information structure.2
This chapter is based on a paper, in which we would like to advance our understanding
of contracting solutions in these types of environments. We study a two-period model where
a principal contracts with an agent to trade a bundle of services. At the beginning of the
game, the agent has private information about the costs of producing one item in the bundle.
He privately learns the costs of producing the other item in the second period. Optimal
contracting is dynamic; principal and agent get together both at the outset of the game as
well as later on, i.e. in period 2, when more information is available. At the beginning of
period 1, the agent decides whether or not he will eventually deliver the bundle of services,
but the precise terms of the contract may still be left open at this time. At the second
get-together, the remaining details of the contract are specied. The services are produced
when all information is available and the agent is paid when all services have been produced.
The literature has analyzed problems that share some but not all the ingredients of our
problem. In a nutshell, our problem is a convex combination of a two-dimensional screening
problem with a two-dimensional allocation à la Armstrong and Rochet 1999 and a sequential
screening problem à la Courty and Li 2000. The main di¤erence to Armstrong and Rochet
1999 is the sequential information structure. The main di¤erence to Courty and Li 2000
is that we assume that the object has two components and that the agents ex-ante type
informs about the cost of production of both components; in particular, the agents ex-ante
type contains perfect information about the costs of producing the rst component and
imperfect information about the costs of producing the second good. To the best of our
knowledge, the underlying paper to this chapter is the rst to takes this approach. We
2E.g., service provider Orange UK o¤ers a choice of pay as you go services and monthly plans. Moreover,
selecting into one of these plans limits the options to choose from later on. In particular, conditional on
the selected plan a consumer has the possibility to buy one out of a given variety of additional bundles of
services.
Specic examples of such options include plans Dolphin and Monkey http://www.best-mobile-
contracts.co.uk/networks/orange.html. Dolphin o¤ers di¤erent bundles of classical services with modern
services, i.e. texts, minutes and data volume. Monkey o¤ered bundles of free music and texts.
The key properties for our purposes are that a bundle of services is traded and that the choice from options
is made sequentially.
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describe the relevant literature in much greater depth below.
We raise and answer the following questions. What constraints does incentive compatibil-
ity impose in this environment; put di¤erently, what is the set of implementable allocations in
the present context? Moreover, what are the qualitative properties of an optimal allocation
from the principals perspective? Is it natural to expect the classical downward distortions
in economic activity due to asymmetric information? Can the principal prot from starting
construction works on her house before all information is available?
3.1.2 Main Findings
To answer the rst question, we provide a detailed analysis of the set of binding incentive and
participation constraints. It is instructive to analyze the principals design problem in two
steps. In the rst step, the allocation is taken as given and we search for the least cost way
of implementing the given allocation. In the second step, we optimize over the allocations.
Since our sequential screening problem involves a two-dimensional allocation, the problem
of implementing given allocations is rich. One needs to derive the rent-minimizing transfer
payments as a function of the allocations, which is equivalent to identifying the set of binding
constraints. If the allocation is one-dimensional, then the sequential screening problem is
regular and easily solved. However, if the allocation is multi-dimensional, then, as is well
known, the set of binding constraints at the optimum changes with the allocation.
Since the problem involves a sequential information structure, the agents information
rent depends on his optimal deviations o¤ the equilibrium path. One needs to understand
systematically which deviations are most tempting for the agent as a function of the alloca-
tion that the principal wishes to implement. The revelation principle for multi-stage games
(Myerson 1986) keeps silent about the agents optimal deviations o¤ the equilibrium path.
However, the timing of the agents learning process can simplify the buyers problem
if we put structure on the information structure; that is, we can derive a relaxed problem
by assuming that the agents cost parameters are positively correlated, which is a common
assumption in the sequential screening literature. We identify for any incentive compatible
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allocation two constraints that must be binding in any optimal contract. In particular, the
agent with a high cost of constructing the exterior parts of the house is indi¤erent between
participating and not participating; the agent with the low cost of exterior construction is
indi¤erent between reporting this parameter truthfully or not and moreover obtains a rent.
The level of this rent depends on what the agent with an initial low cost realization would
report in the second round of communication, had he falsely reported his cost of constructing
the exterior parts as high.
Then substituting for the expected transfer payments, we consider a relaxed problem
where we assume that the incentive compatibility constraint of the ine¢ cient ex-ante type
holds and show at the end that the solution to the relaxed problem solves the original
problem. It is straightforward to derive the rent-minimizing transfer payments and optimal
deviations o¤ the equilibrium path. That is, we characterize the set of binding incentive
compatibility constraints for the relaxed problem and the agents optimal deviations o¤ the
equilibrium path as a function of the allocation.
Substituting for the ex-post transfer payments and the agents information rents, we can
optimize the relaxed problem with respect to the allocation. The buyers optimal allocation
depends on his preferences over the allocations and the agents information rent as a function
of the allocation.
Our main qualitative nding is that the optimal mechanism can induce overproduction if
the two items of the object are either weak substitutes or strong complementarities. To the
best of our knowledge, this is a new reason for overproduction; that is, the optimal allocation
can feature overproduction if, from the buyers perspective, the two di¤erent components of
an object in a sequential screening problem are either substitutes or strong complements.
To understand the economics behind our main qualitative result, one needs to understand
the trade-o¤s that are introduced by the interaction between the di¤erent dimensions of the
object. The interactions determine the buyers preferences over the agents cost types.
For instance, consider the case when the two dimensions of the object are strong comple-
ments. In this case, the buyer has strong preferences for a bundle of homogenous goods/an
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object with components of homogenous quality; that is, the marginal value of increasing the
quality of one component is increasing in the quality of the other component. Therefore
the buyer would like to design a mechanism that features homogenous allocations, even for
heterogenous costs of producing the two goods. In a perfect world he would do so. How-
ever, the buyer must pay the sellers e¢ cient ex-ante type some information rent to induce
incentive compatible reports. To minimize the information rent of the seller, the buyer can
distort the allocations of the sellers ine¢ cient ex-ante type for a given transfer payment.
Then he chooses the optimal distortions by choosing the rent-minimizing pattern of bind-
ing constraints given the agents optimal deviation o¤ the equilibrium path. This choice is
inuenced by the positive correlation of the cost parameters. Consider the distortions of
the second good for which the agent learns his production costs later. Relaxing one ex-post
types incentive constraint by downward distorting his allocation means tightening another
ex-post types incentive compatibility constraint. The tightened incentive constraint can be
slightly relaxed by slightly upward distorting the other types allocation. The buyer can
save more information rent by downward distorting the second allocation of the most ine¢ -
cient ex-post type for two reasons: the quantity of the ine¢ cient ex-ante type is downward
distorted, and the ex-ante and the ex-post type are positively correlated.
Our main result also depends on the agents incentives to report his ex-post type truth-
fully, once he lied about his ex-ante type. Depending on how sensitive the allocation variables
respond to information that arrives late, the agents best deviation features truthtelling or
lying after a false report in the rst round of communication.3 The solution depends crucially
on the nature and strength of interactions between the items in the bundle in the principals
3It is important to point out that an appropriate version of the revelation principle (Myerson (1986))
applies in our environment. However, the principle implies only that the agent nds it optimal to announce
both parameters truthfully, which implies in particular, that he will report the second parameter truthfully
once he has been truthful about the rst parameter. The dynamic literature has termed this behavior
truthfulness on equilibrium path. The revelation principle has no implications whatsoever on what the agent
does o¤ equilibrium path, that is after a rst period lie. Clearly, the agent has by denition an incentive
to remain on equilibrium path. However, the utility loss to the principal to ensure such remaining on path
depends on the agents best alternative to truthtelling. Therefore, the o¤-path behavior becomes a crucial
ingredient to the analysis.
59
payo¤ function. Consider the case of strong complements. For strong complements, the
optimal allocation triggers a second period lie after a rst period lie, because the buyers
preferences are shaped by the agents ex-ante type. Then the buyers willingness to pay for
the object with homogenous dimensions is higher than for an object with rather di¤erent
dimensions. For instance, we nd that, due to the positive correlation of the two cost pa-
rameters, it is cheaper to induce the seller to report that the ex-post type is e¢ cient if he
reported his ex-ante type to be e¢ cient, irrespective of his ex-post type.
Which of these cases are economically most relevant? What are reasonable assumptions
on the strength of interactions between the items in the bundle the principal consumes?
We obtain guidance from the comparative statics properties of the rst-best allocation if we
are willing to impose that changes in marginal costs of producing one item have more of an
impact on the level of that item rather than the other one. If moreover the support of second
period information is at least as wide as the support of rst period information, then only
the case of mild complements and substitutes is relevant. Even for weak substitutes upward
distortions are possible. For applications in which these assumptions make sense, we provide
a strikingly simple cook-book recipe: optimal contracts can be found by imposing truth-
telling constraints on and o¤ equilibrium path and the procedure picks up the optimum
even if the truthtelling constraints o¤ path are binding. In the case of weak complements,
the o¤-path incentive compatibility constraints are slack, while these constraints are binding
in the case of weak substitutes.4
Last, although waiting enables the agent to deviate in more complicated ways, there is a
strictly positive option value of waiting if the exterior and the interior of the house are either
strict complements or substitutes for the landowner; that is, the added exibility is always
valuable to the landowner. If, from the buyers point of view, there is some interdependency
between the goods, then the e¢ cient quality level of one item depends on the quality level of
the other item, and thereby the e¢ cient quality level of one item depends on the production
4This latter result strikes us as pretty surprising, because - as cannot be stressed enough - it has nothing
to do with the revelation principle but rather emerges from the solution of the overall maximization problem.
60
costs of both items. As a consequence, beginning construction works before the constructor
has all information about the costs of the interior of the building comes at a loss to the
landowner, unless the landowner values each item in the bundle independently of the other
item.
3.1.3 Related Literature
Our analysis builds on two branches of the literature: multi-dimensional screening on the
one hand and sequential screening on the other hand.
The closest related paper on multi-dimensional screening is Armstrong and Rochet 1999.
Armstrong and Rochet analyze a tractable model of two-dimensional screening (for fur-
ther static multi-dimensional screening problems with two-dimensional information and two-
dimensional allocation, see Dana 1993 and Severinov 2008). Armstrong and Rochet assume
that the agent knows all his information from the outset, the information is two-dimensional,
the allocation problem is two-dimensional, the agents type is two-dimensional and the mech-
anism is static. Our paper di¤ers in several aspects from Armstrong and Rochet 1999. First,
we assume that, at the beginning of the game, the agent learns one dimension of his type,
and, later on, he obtains the other dimension. Second, we consider a sequential screening
mechanism; that is, a mechanism with two stages. Third, we allow for substitutability and
complementarity between the goods but restrict attention to positive correlation between the
informational parameters, while Armstrong and Rochet consider neutral goods but allow for
arbitrary correlations. We clearly do not do justice to the multi-dimensional literature in this
short account. For an in depth survey, see Rochet and Stole 2003; for general approaches,
see Armstrong 1996 and Rochet and Choné 1998.
The seminal paper of the literature on sequential screening is Courty and Li 2000. Se-
quential screening problems are characterized by a sequential information structure; that is,
as in our model, the agent is initially endowed with his privately known, so-called ex-ante
type, which is a vague idea about his preferences, and later on renes this idea to his ex-post
type, which is his posterior estimate of his preferences. The main di¤erence to Courty and
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Li 2000 is that, in their model, the allocation is one-dimensional, while we assume that both,
the allocation is two-dimensional and that the ex-ante type determines the cost of producing
one allocation and also contains some information about the costs od producing the other
item.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the rst one to consider a setting where the
agents ex-post type is two-dimensional and the allocation is two-dimensional. Our assump-
tions captures a di¤erent set of problems and allows to analyze screening problems where the
principal and the agent trade an object that features substitution e¤ects or complementarity
e¤ects between its two dimensions.
In the context of sequential screening problems, dynamic lying strategies determine the
agents information rent; where an agent lies a second time, if he lies a rst time, arise nat-
urally if the objects two dimensions are strong substitutes or strong complements. Sequen-
tially optimal lies are also analyzed in Es½o and Szentes 2007a,b, 2013. The main di¤erence is
that they assume that the ex post type is drawn from the full support and one-dimensional.
In this setting, an agent who misreported early information will always be able to undo his
lie by reporting his ex-post type truthfully (see also Li and Shi 2013). The main di¤erence
to our setting is that the ex post type and the allocation are two-dimensional. Therefore the
ex-post type does not satisfy the full support assumption. Hence, optimal allocations reect
di¤erent trade-o¤s.
A paper where the optimal mechanism induces a second lie after a rst lie is Krähmer and
Strausz 2008. The main di¤erence between these two papers is that Krähmer and Strausz
analyze a setting where the support of the ex-post type depends on the realization of the
ex-ante type. The optimal mechanism induces the agent to lie o¤ the equilibrium path if his
ex-ante type is e¢ cient and is su¢ ciently more important than the ex-post type. In Krähmer
and Strausz 2008, the relative importance of ex-ante and ex-post types is an inherent feature
of the distribution of these types. The main di¤erence to Krähmer and Strausz 2008 is that we
consider a two-dimensional allocation problem with interactions between the two dimensions.
The economic intuition why a second lie occurs is very di¤erent. If the interactions between
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the objects two dimensions is weak, then the optimal mechanism does not induce a second
lie. However, if the interactions are su¢ ciently strong, then the second dimension will be
designed very closely to the rst dimension, irrespective of the realization of the costs of
producing the second dimension.
A question related to our timing application is addressed in Krähmer and Strausz 2012,
where it is shown that ex post participation constraints eliminate the value of sequential
screening in that there is bunching with respect to early information. In that sense, the
principal could simply wait for denite information to arrive and not screen until then. Note
that this is di¤erent in our context where early information is directly payo¤ relevant; not
screening early would expose the principal to a static multi-dimensional screening problem
later on; hence, this is suboptimal in our model.
For more recent analyses of sequential screening models, see also Boleslavsky and Said
2012, Krähmer and Strausz 2012, 2013 and Li and Shi 2013; for a combined model of moral
hazard and adverse selection, see Garrett and Pavan 2013. Bhaskar 2013 analyzes dynamic
deviation strategies in the pure moral hazard model.
Closely related to sequential screening are the papers on dynamic mechanism design.5
Baron and Besanko 1984 and Battaglini 2005 provide the rst general analysis of optimal
contracts in this dynamic framework. Battaglini 2005 studies monopolistic selling to cus-
tomers whose tastes follow a Markov process. Pavan, Segal and Toikka 2014 provide a
general model of dynamic mechanism design. In each period, new information arrives and
the designer chooses a set of allocation variables as a function of current information and past
reports. In each period, the agents private information is captured by a one-dimensional
parameter. This is the key di¤erence to our problem, where there are two payo¤ relevant
parameters that simultaneously a¤ect the agents payo¤. Under this assumption, we obtain
a natural taxonomy of cases featuring binding constraints with respect to one-shot deviations
or double, dynamic deviations, respectively. The latter case, by denition, fails to satisfy
the version of the one-stage-deviation principle by Pavan, Segal and Toikka 2014, which
5See Pavan et al. (2014) for a much more extensive survey of the literature on dynamic mechanism design.
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applies precisely when the best deviation for the agent is to lie once and then to return to
truthful reporting strategies forever after. So, ultimately the qualitative di¤erences of our
contracting solutions as compared to those in Pavan, Segal and Toikka 2014 are due to the
one-stage-deviation principle applying or failing, respectively. In turn, multi-dimensionality
provides a natural reason for the failure of the one-stage-deviation principle.
Complementary to this chapter is contemporaneous work by Battaglini and Lamba 2013
who argue that there are important interactions between the regularity conditions imposed on
the screening problem and the length of the time horizon. In the dynamic screening problem
separation may not be feasible even though it would be feasible in the static counterpart of
the model. In particular, Battaglini and Lamba 2013 provide natural examples where locally
optimal contracts fail to satisfy global incentive constraints. Unlike in our model it is the
within period incentive constraints that become binding beyond the local ones; in our model,
within period incentive compatibility is standard, but the dynamic incentive constraints
become binding beyond the local ones. Similar to the present approach, their analysis allows
them to explain allocations that could not be rationalized using local constraints only, in
particular, dynamic pooling: initial separation followed by pooling in later periods.
Chapter 3 is organized as follows. In section two, we present the model and state the
buyers problem. Section three presents and solves the buyers problem. Section four discusses
the structure of optimal allocations in regular cases where the strength of complementar-
ity/substitutability of goods in the buyers utility function is limited. Section ve gives an
example that is outside this regular structure. In section six, we discuss the optimal timing
of productive decisions in our model. The nal section concludes. Proofs are relegated to
Appendix 3.
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3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Setup
A buyer contracts with a supplier to obtain two goods in quantities x and y: The buyers
utility is
V (x; y)  T;
where T is a transfer made to the seller. The sellers payo¤ is
T   x  y;
where  and  are cost shifters.
Contracting is a sequential process. At date 1; the seller knows the realization of  (but
not of ) and the conditional distribution of  given ; whereas the buyer only knows the joint
distribution of types. The cost realizations are binary, so that  2 ; 	 and  2 ; 	 ;
where  >  > 0 and  >  > 0: The joint distribution is completely characterized by
Pr ( = ) =  and  ()  Pr =  j	 : At date 2,  becomes known to the seller but not
to the buyer. Also, goods are produced and traded in exchange for the transfer T at that
date. The game and the information structure is common knowledge.6
We place no assumptions on V (x; y) for the time being except that V (x; y) is jointly
concave in x and y and that the rst unit of consumption is extremely valuable to the buyer,
that is limx!0 V1 (x; y) =1 for all y and limy!0 V2 (x; y) =1 for all x:7 Further assumptions
will be discussed as we go along.
6In our model there are two choice variables, x and y; that interact with two informational variables, 
and : The essential di¤erence to Courty and Li (2000) is that x enters the agents payo¤ function.
7Throughout the paper, Vi (x; y) and Vij (x; y) for i; j = 1; 2 denote partial and cross derivatives of the
function V with respect to its arguments.
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3.2.2 The Buyers Problem
Invoking the appropriate revelation principle (Myerson 1986), it is without loss of generality
to analyze optimal contracting in terms of direct, incentive compatible mechanisms, where
the agent announces each piece of information when it arrives. Thus, the contracting game
is dynamic and involves two rounds of communication. In the rst round at date 1, the seller
reports a value ^ 2 ; 	 ; in the second round at date 2, the seller reports a value ^ 2 ; 	 :
The seller is given incentives to announce these values truthfully. This implies in particular,
that truthfulness about  is optimal after a truthful report about : To rule out all feasible
deviations by the seller, we need to analyze also what the seller would announce about 
o¤ equilibrium path, that is, had he falsely reported  in the rst round of communication.8
Since the optimal behavior of the agent in the second round depends on the rst round
report, ^, the rst round true type, , and the second round true type, , we need to
distinguish between the incremental information that arrives in round two and the agents
private information. That is, in the second period, the agent privately knows which node,
identied by the triple

; ^; 

; in the game tree has been reached. We let ^

; ^; 

for
^ 6=  denote the optimal report at node

; ^; 

and treat these reports as choice variables
(subject to incentive compatibility constraints) of the principal.
It is easy to show that the optimal mechanism is nonstochastic. This is because the
principal is risk averse (with respect to lotteries over x and/or y) while the agent only cares
about the expected values of such lotteries. Even though the equilibrium concept is a bit
di¤erent, the proof essentially follows from Myerson 1986.
We can now state the buyers problem:
max
x(;);y(;);T (;);^(;;)
EEj [V (x (; ) ; y (; ))  T (; )] (3.1)
8It is important to notice that the revelation principle does not have any implications on reporting o¤
equilibrium path, except for the fact that the agent chooses the optimal report to send as part of his strategy.
So, to assess the value of a deviation in the rst round of communication, we need to consider the possibility
that the optimal thing to do in the second round after a rst round lie is to lie again.
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s.t.
T
 
; 
  x  ;   y  ;   T  ;   x  ;   y  ;  ; (3.2)
T
 
; 
  x  ;   y  ;   T  ;   x  ;   y  ;  (3.3)
T
 
; 
  x  ;   y  ;   T (; )  x (; )  y (; ) (3.4)
T (; )  x (; )  y (; )  T  ;   x  ;   y  ;  (3.5)
Ej [T (; )  x (; )  y (; )] (3.6)
 Ej

T
 
; ^
 
; ; 
  x  ; ^  ; ;   y  ; ^  ; ;  ;
Ej

T
 
; 
  x  ;   y  ;  (3.7)
 Ej

T
 
; ^
 
; ; 
  x  ; ^  ; ;   y  ; ^  ; ;  ;
Ej [T (; )  x (; )  y (; )]  0; (3.8)
Ej

T
 
; 
  x  ;   y  ;   0; (3.9)
and for  6= ^
^

; ^; 

2 arg max
^
T

^; ^

  x

^; ^

  y

^; ^

(3.10)
for all ; ^ 2 ; 	 and  2 ; 	 :
Constraints (3:2) through (3:5) are the second period constraints after a truthful report
in the rst period: after such a truthful report in period one, the seller must nd it optimal
to be truthful about  as well. We term these constraints on-path constraints for the
obvious reason. (3:6) and (3:7) are the rst period incentive constraints. As of date one,
the seller anticipates that after having misreported  in the rst period, he chooses the
second period report optimally, as captured by (3:10) : Since nodes

; ^; 

for  6= ^ are o¤
the equilibrium path (on equilibrium path, the rst report is truthful), we term constraints
ensuring any particular behavior at such o¤-path nodes o¤-path incentive constraints.
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(3:8) and (3:9) are the participation constraints.
Before diving into the quite intricate analysis, it is useful to take a birds eye view of the
problem. At the rst time of contracting, there are only two possible types - because the
seller only knows  but not yet : Moreover, the seller decides whether or not he wishes to
participate at that date. He anticipates optimal behavior at date 2, so each report gives rise
to a continuation value. Due to this structure, our model has much in common with the
simple (static) binary model of screening, so much of the logic of that model will carry over.
The essential complication relative to the static counterpart is that the continuation values
are endogenous and there is no simple shortcut to determine these values.
It is instructive to understand the properties of the rst-best allocation.
3.2.3 The First-best
If the buyer and the seller both know  at the outset and both learn  at date two, then
both (3:8) and (3:9) are binding at the optimum and the optimal allocation satises
V1 (x (; ) ; y (; )) =  (3.11)
and
V2 (x (; ) ; y (; )) =  (3.12)
for  2 ; 	 and  2 ; 	 :
To sharpen our intuition for relevantcases in the second-best, it proves useful to ask
how the rst-best solution depends on the cost parameters. Obviously, x and y move in
the same direction in response to changes in the parameters if x and y are complements
and move in opposite directions if x and y are substitutes. Beyond that, it is important to
understand how strongly these choices respond to information that is learned in period 2.
Lemma 3.2.1 If x and y are complements (V12 (x; y)  0 for all x; y), then the rst-best
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allocation, dened by (3:11) and (3:12), satises
y
 
; 
  y (; )  ()x  ;   x (; )
for arbitrary     > 0 if and only if V12 (x; y)  ()  V11 (x; y) for all x; y:
If x and y are substitutes, (V12 (x; y)  0 for all x; y), then the rst-best allocation satises
y
 
; 
  y (; )  ()   x  ;   x (; )
for arbitrary     > 0 if and only if V12 (x; y)  ()V11 (x; y) for all x; y:
Proof. In Appendix 3.
If the utility function of the buyer features interactions that are not too strong, then a
change in  has a stronger impact on y than on x: We believe this is the natural case, but
other cases are possible.9
We now address the buyers problem under asymmetric information.
3.3 Analysis
We assume that the low cost producer in the rst period is better to the buyer than the high
cost producer in the sense of a weakly positive correlation
Assumption 1:  and  are weakly positively correlated, that is  ()     :
First-order stochastic dominance is a regularity condition that is commonly used in the
sequential screening literature. Assumption 1 implies the following Lemma:
Lemma 3.3.1 If  ()     ; then (3:8) is automatically satised if (3:9) is.
9In the context of strategic interactions, the natural case would generate stability of a system of best
replies; see, e.g., Tirole (1988) for a discussion. Note moreover that joint concavity with respect to x and y
requires that V11V22   V 212  0; so a concave function cannot be irregularboth with respect to changes in
 and :
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Proof. In Appendix 3.
The argument is essentially the same as in a static two-type model. We can use the rst
period incentive constraint (3:6) to show that an allocation that satises (3:9) automatically
also satises (3:8) :
Clearly, at least one participation constraint must be binding; otherwise all payments
could be lowered and the buyers payo¤could be increased. From Lemma 3.3.1 we can deduce
that constraint (3:9) is binding at the optimum. Likewise, at least one of the rst period
incentive constraints must be binding. Otherwise we could again reduce some payments in a
way that keeps incentive compatibility satised and increases the buyers expected payo¤. It
is easy to see that the critical constraint is (3:6) :Which other constraints bind is a relatively
complex matter. The reason is that the implications of optimal o¤-path reporting are quite
intricate. We begin with a discussion of the implications of the on-equilibrium path incentive
constraints.
Lemma 3.3.2 ^
 
; ; 

=  for x
 
; 
  x  ;  and ^  ; ;  =  for x  ;  
x (; ) : Likewise, ^
 
; ; 

=  for x
 
; 
  x  ;  and ^  ; ;  =  for x  ;  
x (; ) :
Proof. In Appendix 3.
The on-path constraints have some, however limited, implications for the optimal reports
o¤path. In particular, it is never the case that the agent nds it optimal to lie at all o¤-path
nodes in the second period. Depending on the monotonicity properties of the x allocation,
there are always some nodes at which truthtelling about the second period incremental
information is automatically - by implication of the on-path constraints - induced. The
intuition is quite simple. E.g., the on-path constraints of type
 
; 

make reporting ^ = 
optimal for that type. At node
 
; ; 

; the agent has an even stronger incentive to report
^ =  if x
 
; 
  x  ;  ; because that boosts his extra rent from having exaggerated  in
round one.
The di¢ culty at this stage is of course that the monotonicity of the x allocation with
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respect to  is not known and endogenous. Our solution strategy is as follows. Building on
the insights from static models of screening, we aim for a reduced problem, where constraints
(3:9) and (3:6) hold as equalities, while (3:7) (in addition to (3:8)) is slack. We solve this
reduced problem and provide su¢ cient conditions such that its solution satises the neglected
constraint (3:7) : In turn, the reduced problem is tackled in a two step procedure, where we
determine at step one the cheapest way to implement a given allocation and then determine
the optimal allocation in step two. In the rst step problem we simultaneously optimize over
payments and o¤-path reports.
3.3.1 The Reduced Problem
If the agent with rst period cost  is indi¤erent between participating and not, the agent
with rst period type  is indi¤erent between being truthful and lying about ; and the
remaining rst period constraints are slack, then the principal faces the standard trade-o¤
between the e¢ ciency of the allocation and the rent that needs to be given to ex ante type :
Denote this rent as : It is useful to split the principals problem into two steps. In the rst
step, we take the allocation as given and determine optimal payments that implement the
allocation. Implementability of the allocation includes that the incentive constraint of the
ex ante type  needs to be satised as well. Formally, letting 
 denote the expected prot
ex ante type  can make by mimicking type ; we require that 
  0: Once the optimal
payments are known, we maximize with respect to the allocation that the principal wishes
to implement.
Identifying the minimal payments, while straightforward in the static model, is pretty
involved in the present context. The reason is that implementation is much more exible
in the multi-dimensional context and so the pattern of binding constraints is not obvious.
The reader who is not interested in the details of this step can skip subsection 3.3.1, consult
Lemma 3.3.3 for the solution to the problem, and continue reading from subsection 3.3.1
onwards on a rst go. However, to ultimately understand the structure of optimal allocations
in sections 3.4 and 3.5 below, the reader needs to go back to subsection 3.3.1 to relate the
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pattern of binding constraints to the underlying model primitives.
Implementing Given Allocations at Lowest Cost
For a given allocation (x; y)10; payments to types
 
; 

and optimal o¤-path reporting at
nodes
 
; ; 

for  2 ; 	 solve the following problem:
  min
fT(;);^(;;)g
2f;g
Ej

T
 
; ^
 
; ; 
  x  ; ^  ; ;   y  ; ^  ; ; 
(3.13)
s:t:
^
 
; ; 
 2 arg max
^
T
 
; ^
  x  ; ^  y  ; ^ for  2 ; 	
Ej

T
 
; 
  x  ;   y  ;  = 0;
(3:2) ; and (3:3) :
The buyer minimizes the rent that needs to be given to the seller with ex ante type ; taking
into account that the optimal reporting strategy of this type in period two can be to misreport
his parameter  when he has misreported his parameter  in the rst period. However, if
the buyer wishes to implement such a sequential lying strategy - because expected payments
can be reduced this way - then he needs to explicitly make sure that the strategy is optimal
from the sellers perspective as well.
Once the solution to the rst program is found, we can choose payments to types (; )
and the optimal reporting at nodes
 
; ; 

for  2 ; 	 to render constraint (3:7) as slack
as can be. Formally, given the payments and reports

T
 
; 

; ^
 
; ; 
	
2f;g that solve
10Throughout the paper we denote by (x; y) the allocation for all types (; ) 2 ; 	 ; 	.
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program (3:13), payments and reports

T (; ) ; ^
 
; ; 
	
2f;g solve the problem:

  min
fT (;);^(;;)g
2f;g
Ej

T
 
; ^
 
; ; 
  x  ; ^  ; ;   y  ; ^  ; ; 
(3.14)
s:t:
^
 
; ; 
 2 arg max
^
T (; ^)  x (; ^)  y (; ^) for  2 ; 	
Ej [T (; )  x (; )  y (; )] = ;
(3:4) , and (3:5) ;
Notice that we solve problem (3:14) only after having solved problem (3:13) : This procedure
reects our solution strategy that is based on reduced problems where constraint (3:7) is
slack. As long as (3:7) is slack - formally, as long as 
  0 - only the solution of problem
(3:13) is directly payo¤ relevant. For this reason, we focus primarily on program (3:13) in the
main text and relegate the solution to program (3:14) entirely to Appendix 3. We come back
to these results only when we verify that the neglected constraint, (3:7) ; is indeed satised.
The solution to the programs depends on the allocation that the buyer wishes to imple-
ment. In particular, dene x ()  x  ;   x (; ) ; y ()  y  ;   y (; ) ; and the
following sets
Xi () 
n
f(x (; ) ; y (; ))g2f;g j
 
   y ()      x ()  0o ;
Xii () 
n
f(x (; ) ; y (; ))g2f;g j
 
   y ()        x ()  0o ;
Xiii () 
n
f(x (; ) ; y (; ))g2f;g j
 
   x ()      y ()  0o ;
Xiv () 
n
f(x (; ) ; y (; ))g2f;g j  
 
   x ()      y ()  0o :
For future reference, also dene Xintj () for j = i; : : : ; iv as these same sets when all the
dening inequalities are strict, Xj  Xj () [ Xj
 


for j = i; : : : ; iv; and nally X () 
[ivj=iXj () : These sets are depicted in the following graph:
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Figure 3.1. The space of implementable allocations is divided into four regions, i through
iv, for each type  2 ; 	 : The cost minimizing payments that implement allocations
within each regime depend on the regime itself.
Only y-allocations that are monotonic in  are incentive compatible. Hence, we only need
to consider such allocations. From Lemma 3.3.2 we know that depending on the monotonicity
of the x-allocation, truthful reporting is automatic at some nodes o¤ path. Whether it is
optimal to induce truthful reporting at the remaining nodes o¤path depends on which of the
sets Xj () for  2

; 
	
and j = i; : : : ; iv contain the allocation x; y that is implemented.
Note that the sets Xj () for j = i; : : : ; iv are dened for both values of : The solution to
program (3:13) depends on which set Xj
 


contains the allocation o¤ered to ex ante type
; the solution to (3:14) depends on Xj () : Very conveniently, the dividing lines between
the sets have isomorphic representations. The complete set of implementable allocations is
thus given by Xj ()Xk
 


for j; k = i; ii; iii; iv; leaving us with 16 possibilities. However,
it turns out that under very natural conditions, the solution of the overall problem has the
property that j = k; so there are only 4 cases economically relevant in our model. Therefore,
to economize on space, we just present our result anticipating this result:
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Lemma 3.3.3 For (x; y) 2 Xi
 = i  Ej
 
   x  ; +   ()          y  ; 
incentive compatibility constraints (3:2) and (3:5) are binding and all types report truthfully
o¤ path;
for (x; y) 2 Xii
 = ii  Ej
 
   x  ; +   ()          y  ; 
all types report truthfully o¤ path and the agent is indi¤erent between truthfully reporting
and lying at nodes
 
; ; 

and
 
; ; 

;
for (x; y) 2 Xiii
 = iii 
 
   x  ; +  1          y  ;   (1   ())      y  ; 
incentive compatibility constraints (3:2) and (3:5) are binding and ^
 
; ; 

= ^
 
; ; 

=
 and ^
 
; ; 

= ^
 
; ; 

= ;
for (x; y) 2 Xiv
 = iv 
 
   x  ; +  ()      y  ;           y  ; 
incentive compatibility constraints (3:3) and (3:4) are binding and ^
 
; ; 

= ^
 
; ; 

=
 and ^
 
; ; 

= ^
 
; ; 

= .
Proof. In Appendix 3.
Allocations in Xi induce truthtelling o¤ path automatically in the sense that we can
naïvely assume truthtelling o¤ path. Solving program (3:13) under this hypothesis, we nd
that payments are minimized if constraint (3:2) is binding. In turn, for these payments, it
is straightforward to verify that ^
 
; ; 

= : Taken together with Lemma 3, this implies
the result. Intuitively, suppose that x is independent of : In this case, truthtelling about 
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is simply a question of monotonicity of y in : This intuition generalizes to all allocations in
Xi that share the property that x and y move in the same direction and y is more sensitive
to changes in  than x is.
For allocations in Xii conjecturing truthtelling naïvely would prove to be false; the seller
would not report truthfully o¤ path if we simply took such behavior as given. While the
optimal report o¤ path at nodes
 
; ; 

and
 
; ; 

is indeed to tell the truth, this needs
to be ensured explicitly with the appropriate constraints at nodes
 
; ; 

and
 
; ; 

.
Moreover, these constraints are binding at the optimum. Finally, when the dependency of the
x allocation on information  becomes strong, it becomes too costly to insist on truthtelling
at all nodes o¤ path. Instead, the cheapest way to implement any given allocation in sets
Xiii and Xiv induces some type to lie o¤ path. Intuitively, take again the extreme cases
within sets Xiii and Xiv and suppose y is independent of : Clearly, there is no way to induce
truthtelling about  in period 2 in this case. Instead, the seller chooses the report that
maximizes his rent from being able to produce x at lower cost, so he chooses the report that
maximizes x (; ^). For example, for (x; y) 2 Xiii the seller always reports ^
 
; ; 

= ,
regardless of his true .
The functional form of the minimal rents that the agent with rst period type  depends
on which of the regimes i through iv prevails. The cases are ordered by increasing complexity.
Case i (where (x; y) 2 Xi) is the standard one, where the agent announces  truthfully in
period two regardless of the report about . The expected rent of an agent with parameter
 =  consists of two parts. First, the agent has a lower cost of producing x than the agent
with  = : The expected cost advantage is Ej
 
   x  ;  ; because  (which will be
announced truthfully) is not yet known when  is announced: Secondly, type  has a higher
probability of being relatively more e¢ cient at producing y:Moreover, in period two, an agent
with a parameter  =  receives a higher utility than an agent with parameter ; because this
agent could always overstate his cost of producing y: At the optimum, the agent of type
 
; 

is exactly indi¤erent between reporting the truth and mimicking type
 
; 

; so the di¤erence
between type
 
; 
0
s and type
 
; 
0
s utility is exactly
 
    y  ;  : The expected
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additional gain - due to having a low type  in period one - from this rent arising from having
a low rather than a high value of  is exactly equal to
 
 ()          y  ;  :11
Case ii still features truthtelling on and o¤ equilibrium path, but the agent must be kept
indi¤erent between reporting honestly and exaggerating his  parameter at two nodes; in
particular at node
 
; ; 

:We can again split the agents expected rent as of the rst period
into the expected direct gain from misreporting , Ej
 
   x  ; , and the expected
additional gain arising from the combined facts that an agent with a low parameter  obtains
a rent in period two and that an agent with parameter  =  forms expectations based on
a more favorable distribution of  than an agent with parameter  =  does. Formally,
the di¤erence in utilities between types
 
; 

and
 
; 

is set so as to keep the agent who
has exaggerated  in the rst period from exaggerating  in the second period and so this
di¤erence equals
 
     x  ;   x  ; +      y  ;  : Multiplying this term by the
di¤erence in distributions,
 
 ()     ; and simplifying, we obtain ii:
In cases iii and iv; the allocation and the associated cost minimizing payments induce the
agent to lie o¤ equilibrium path. To avoid repetition, we focus on case iii only. In this case,
the most tempting deviation to the agent with  =  is to exaggerate  and to underreport  at
node
 
; ; 

: Put di¤erently, a double deviation involving both parameters is strictly better
to the agent with type  than a single deviation. As a result, the expected cost advantage
due to having a low rather than a high value of  is simply equal to
 
   x  ;  ; because
the agent reports ^
 
; ; 

=  for both realizations of . Moreover, he obtains the utility
level that type
 
; 

obtains,
 
1          y  ;  ; minus the expected loss in case he
has a higher  realization in period two than the type he imitates, (1   ())      y  ; .
The stronger the complementarities, the stronger is the buyers incentive to design a
mechanism that features homogenous goods, even for heterogenous costs of producing the
two goods. However, the buyer also has an incentive to minimize the information rent
11Pavan et al. (2013) have termed the latter expression an impulse response function, because the term
measures the impact of the agents current information on future allocation choices.
In our problem, both x and y are determined at date two, so things are slightly di¤erent, but the intuition
is similar.
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and the costs that he pays. The buyer must pay the buyer with the e¢ cient ex-ante type
some information rent. Since the buyer prefers the most e¢ cient cost types
 
; 

and
(; ) to produce e¢ ciently. Therefore she can minimize the sellers information rent only
by distorting the allocation of the ine¢ cient ex-ante type . To minimize the rent of ex-
ante type , the buyer can must distort the allocations of
 
; 

or of
 
; 

, such that these
typesincentive compatibility holds. Relaxing type
 
; 

s incentive constraint by downward
distorting y
 
; 

means tightening the incentive constraint of
 
; 0

,  6= 0. The tightened
incentive constraint of type
 
; 0

can be relaxed by upward distorting y
 
; 

. Relaxing
the incentive constraint of
 
; 

and tightening the incentive constraint of
 
; 

is cheaper,
although the buyer downward distorts both x
 
; 

and x
 
; 

. So the buyer should prot
from the strong complementarities The reason here is that the positive correlation of  and
.
The optimal payments and the value of the second minimization problem can be found
in Appendix 3. The reason we do not state these things in the main text is that we do not
need these results for the discussion of the reduced problem that we now solve.
Optimal Allocations in the Reduced Problem
We can now turn to the design of the optimal allocations in the reduced problem(s). Since
we are neglecting constraint (3:7) ; we allow for any f(x (; ) ; y (; ))g2f;g 2 X () :
Formally, the reduced problem for each constraint set is
Wj  maxf(x(;);y(;))g
2f;g
2Xj()
f(x(;);y(;))g2f;g2X()
EEj [V (x (; ) ; y (; ))  x (; )  y (; )]  j;
(Pj)
where j is dened in Lemma 3.3.3. The principal faces a classical trade-o¤ between ef-
ciency and rent extraction, with the complication that the functional form of the rent
expression depends on the qualitative features of the allocation that is being implemented,
as explained in Lemma 3.3.3.
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The overall optimum for the buyer is
W = max fWi;Wii;Wiii;Wivg :
The solution has the following simple structure:
Proposition 3.3.1 Suppose that either V12 (x; y)  0 for all x; y or V12 (x; y)  0 for
all x; y: If in addition V12 (x; y) 2
h
V11 (x; y)
 
  ; V11 (x; y)
 
 
i
for all x; y,then W =
max fWi;Wiig : Moreover, Wi  Wii if V12  0 for all x; y and Wii > Wi if V12 < 0 for all
x; y:
Proof. In Appendix 3.
The intuition is straightforward and easiest to understand with the help of gure 3.2.
Figure 3.2. Along the dividing line between any two regimes, payo¤s from adjacent
programs are equal.
The idea to prove the results is as follows. The payo¤s in the various regimes have a
continuity structure that is displayed in the gure. For allocations that are feasible in two
regions, say region i and region ii, the payo¤s from programs Pi and Pii are identical for a
given allocation. Formally, we have Wi = Wii for a given allocation that satises x
 
; 

=
x
 
; 

: Moreover, none of the programs Pj is ever so constrained that an allocation in
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the origin of the diagram is implemented. Hence, we can use simple revealed preference
arguments to prove payo¤ dominance in the cases described in the proposition. For V12 < 0;
the solution to program Pi satises x
 
; 

= x
 
; 

; whereas the solution to program Pii
does not. Since, the allocation that maximizes program Pi is feasible also under program
Pii, but is not chosen, it follows by strict concavity of the problem that the value of the
objective under program Pii is strictly higher. Likewise, for V12  0; the solution to program
Pii satises x
 
; 

= x
 
; 

; so the same argument can be made. However, the subtle
di¤erence in this case is that the optimal allocation under program Pi might also lie on the
feasibility constraint x
 
; 

= x
 
; 

: However, since programs Pi and Pii are identical on
the feasibility constraint x
 
; 

= x
 
; 

; we have payo¤ dominance in the weak sense.
Essentially the same arguments can be used to compare payo¤s from programs Pi and Piii
and between programs Pii and Piv:
Complements versus substitutes are enough to determine whether program Pi or program
Pii gives a higher payo¤. The reason is as follows. We know from Lemma 3.3.3 that the rent
expression j is identical in cases i and ii except for di¤erences in  () and 
 


: Thus, the
question is simply which set Xj
 


matches better with the complementarity/substitutability
between the goods. If x and y are complements, then both x and y should be allowed to
move in the same direction in response to changes in : If x and y are substitutes, then x and
y should be allowed to vary in opposite directions in response to changes in : Moreover, the
proposition not only compares payo¤s between programs Pi and Pii but between all programs
Pj: Recall the conditions from Lemma 3.2.1 that make y more responsive to changes in  than
x: The conditions in Proposition 3.3.1 simply adjust the earlier conditions for di¤erences in
the supports of early and late information. In particular, the conditions are identical if the
supports of the parameters have the same width. A pattern of relatively larger variation in
y than in x matches better with the sets Xi
 


and Xii
 


than with the sets Xiii
 


and
Xiv
 


: Consequently, under the condition given in the proposition, the maximum of the
reduced problem is attained either by problem Pi or Pii:
The reader may verify that the su¢ cient condition in the proposition captures a relevant
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parameter restriction with the help of the following example:
Example 3.3.1 V (x; y) = 2   1
2
(x  )2   1
2
(y   )2 + xy:
In the example, the condition is satised for V12 (x; y) =  2
h
  
  ;
 
 
i
: Note that the
utility function is jointly concave in x and y for  2 [ 1; 1] : Thus, for  
   1; the set of
parameter values that violate the condition becomes empty. Conversely, there is always a
nonempty set of parameter values that generate a concave buyer problem and satisfy the
su¢ cient condition even if
 
  < 1. In this sense - at least in this example - the su¢ cient
condition isolates the important case rather than the pathological one. Therefore, we impose
henceforth
Assumption 2: either V12 (x; y)  0 for all x; y or V12 (x; y)  0 for all x; y and in
addition V12 (x; y) 2
h
V11 (x; y)
 
  ; V11 (x; y)
 
 
i
for all x; y:
We solve the full problem under this assumption. However, there are clearly cases that
violate Assumption 2. For that reason, we discuss a particular case that violates Assumption
2 in section 5 below.
3.3.2 The Solution to the Full Problem
Obviously, the reduced problem is of interest only if it solves the overall problem; that is, if
the solution of the reduced problem satises the neglected constraint, (3:7) : Checking the
neglected constraint requires knowing the set Xj () that contains the allocation o¤ered to
the ex-ante type , fx (; ) ; y (; )g2f;g. Note that this allocation corresponds simply
to the rst-best allocation for that type. Since intuition and proof for the following result
are essentially the same as for Lemma 1, we state without further discussion:
81
Lemma 3.3.4 The rst-best allocation dened by (3:11) and (3:12) satises (x; y) 2
Xi if 0  V12 (x; y)     V11 (x; y) for all x; y;
Xii if 0  V12 (x; y)    V11 (x; y) for all x; y;
Xiii if V12 (x; y)     V11 (x; y) for all x; y;
Xiv if V12 (x; y)    V11 (x; y) for all x; y:
Moreover, the rst-best allocation is in the interior of these sets if the corresponding inequal-
ities are strict.
Proof. In Appendix 3.
Combining Proposition 3.3.1 and Lemma 3.3.4, we observe that the solution to the re-
duced problem satises fx (; ) ; y (; )g2f;g 2 Xj () if and only if

x
 
; 

; y
 
; 
	
2f;g
2 Xj
 


for j = i; ii: Obviously, this was the reason to economize on space in Lemma 3.3.3 in
the rst place. The reduced problem picks up the overall optimum under natural conditions.
Proposition 3.3.2 The solution to the reduced problem solves the overall problem under
Assumption 2 if in addition either
I) goods are independent (V12 (x; y) = 0 for all x, y) or
II)
max
x;y
 V12V11V22   V 212 (x; y)
         minx;y
 V22V11V22   V 212 (x; y)
 ; (3.15)
and either
a) (x; y) 2 Xinti (which holds in particular for  small enough if x, y are strict complements
for all x; y); or
b) (x; y) 2 Xintii (which holds in particular for  small enough if x, y are strict substitutes
for all x; y) and in addition  () = 
 


:
Proof. In Appendix 3.
For independent goods, Assumption 2 is enough to guarantee that the reduced problem
picks up the overall optimum. For strict complements or substitutes we need to impose
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additional structure. For strict complements (substitutes) and  su¢ ciently small, the entire
allocation is an element of Xinti (Xintii ). The reason is that in the limit where  tends to zero,
the second best allocation converges to the rst-best allocation, whose properties we have
described in Lemma 3.3.4. Building on this insight, we can go back to Lemma 4 (to be
precise to the proof of Lemma 4 in Appendix 3) and check the precise functional form of
the neglected constraint, (3:7), and verify whether it is true that 
  0. Indeed, we have

  0 for complements if condition (15) holds; we have 
  0 for substitutes if condition
(15) holds and on top of this the cost parameters are independent,  () = 
 


:12
Condition (15) restricts V12 relative to V22: The new condition is imposed because 

depends on the allocation o¤ered to both ex ante types, not just the one o¤ered to one
particular type. The condition is satised in our example for  2
h
   
  ;
 
 
i
:The set of
parameters that satisfy both Assumption 2 and condition (3.15) is always nonempty. If
 
  = 1; then the conditions are identical; otherwise, one set is a strict subset of the other.
3.4 The Structure of Optimal Allocations
We can now investigate how the optimal allocation depends qualitatively on the interaction
between goods in the buyers utility function. To discuss this question in the simplest
possible case, we simply state the result for the case where the optimum for ex ante type 
is an allocation in Xinti
 


and Xintii
 


: In this case, the optimal allocation for ex ante type
 satises
V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

=  +

(1  )
j

 

     
V2
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

= 
12Note that the conditions in part II of the proposition are far from necessary. E.g., one can also derive
su¢ cient conditions for the case of substitutes and strictly positive correlation.
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and
V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

=  +

(1  )
(1  j) 
1         
V2
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

=  +

(1  )
 
 ()     
1          ;
where j = i; ii and by convention i =  () and ii = 
 


: The optimal allocation for ex
ante type  is given by (3:11) and (3:12) :
For the case of complements, the optimal allocation for ex ante type  displays the stan-
dard downward distortions relative to the rst-best. For strictly positive complementarities,
all allocation variables are strictly below the rst-best optimal levels. This is quite di¤er-
ent for the case of substitutes, which displays both upward and downward distortions. In
particular, x
 
; 

is distorted downwards and as a result, y
 
; 

is distorted upwards.
Building on the discussion following Lemma 3.3.3, the intuition for the rst-order con-
ditions is straightforward. The rst-order conditions for x
 
; 

display the trade-o¤ be-
tween e¢ ciency and extraction of rents due to lower costs of producing x: (1  )   and
(1  )  1     ; respectively, are the probabilities that the cost realizations equal  ; 
and
 
; 

; respectively. These are the weights attached to the e¢ ciency motive. On the
other hand, a change in the x allocation a¤ects the agents expected rent by j
 
   
and (1  j)
 
   , respectively. A change in the y  ;  allocation does not a¤ect the
agents rent, whereas a change in the y
 
; 

allocation a¤ects the agents expected rent by 
 ()         . These e¤ects are weighted by ; the probability that  = :
3.5 The Case of Strong Interactions
So far, we have characterized optimal allocations for regular cases, where the strength of
interactions between the goods is relatively mild. If the ratio
 
  is relatively large, then
mostutility functions will display relatively mild interactions between the goods in this
sense. This loose statement can be given a very precise meaning in the concrete example
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of negative quadratic utility. For that case, all concave utility functions satisfy Assumption
2 if the support of second period information is wider than the support of rst period
information. On the other hand, if the reverse is true, then one can give natural examples,
where an allocation outside the sets Xi [ Xii becomes optimal. Specically, we have the
following result:
Proposition 3.5.1 Suppose that  
  < 1 and consider the quadratic utility function of
Example 1 with  2

 
  ; 1

: For that utility function, for  su¢ ciently close to zero, the
overall optimal allocation satises (x; y) 2 Xiii.
Proof. In Appendix 3.
For  2

 
  ; 1

; it follows from Lemma 5 that the solution of the reduced problem is
an element of Xintiii for  close to zero. Moreover, it is straightforward to verify that 
  0
in the example. Hence, we have shown that it can be strictly optimal to induce lying o¤
equilibrium path.
Consider now the structure of the optimal allocation for the case where (x; y) 2 Xintiii :
The rst-order conditions for the allocation o¤ered to ex ante type  are as follows:
V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

=  +

(1  )
1

 

     
V2
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

=    
(1  )
(1   ())

 

     
and
V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

= 
V2
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

=  +

 
1    
(1  )  1          :
This allocation displays upwards distortions in the quantity y
 
; 

; for given quantity
x
 
; 

: Since we are considering complements, this upwards distortion does not arise simply
as a compensating e¤ect due to a downward distortion in x
 
; 

; but rather reects the par-
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ticular structure of binding incentive constraints for this particular case. Recall from Lemma
3.3.3 that the best deviation of an agent with  =  is to report ^ =  in period one and
^ =  in period two, regardless of the actual realization of : Hence, the reduction in x
 
; 

reects the fact that the conditional probability of receiving report ^ =  is one; vice versa,
there is no rent reduction motive when choosing x
 
; 

at all, because the agent with  = 
is never going to imitate type
 
; 

: Recall moreover, that in addition to the rents from
producing x more e¢ ciently, the agent with type  =  obtains rents from producing y more
e¢ ciently; in particular, the agent would obtain (when deviating to ^ = ), the utility level
that type
 
; 

obtains,
 
1          y  ;  ; minus the expected loss in case he has
a higher  realization in period two than the type he imitates, (1   ())      y  ;  : As
a result, all else equal (that is, for a given x-allocation), the principal reduces y
 
; 

below
the rst-best level and increases y
 
; 

beyond the rst-best level. Whether the overall
production levels are above or below rst-best depends on the specic utility function.
3.6 Discussion: Sequential Screening and the Value of
Waiting
What if x needs to be determined already in period one? We can obtain the optimal mech-
anism with sequential production from our problem if we add the requirement that
x
 
; 

= x (; ) for  2 ; 	 : (3.16)
Technically, (3:16) is a consistency requirement in the sense that the level of x can only
depend on information that is available when the level of x is chosen.
It is straightforward to see that o¤-path lies are not an issue under this constraint. The
reason is that x

^

is sunk by the time the report about  needs to be made and moreover
enters the sellers prot in an additively separable way. So, seller types who have lied in
the past correspond to types with di¤erent xed costs of producing the y good. However,
xed costs do not change the sellers incentive to report about : So, the on-path incentive
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constraints automatically ensure that reporting is truthful also o¤ path.
It is also obvious that sequential production cannot do better than delaying production
of both goods until all information is there. The reason is that we are simply adding an-
other constraint, (3:16) ; to the buyers problem and thereby eliminate some exibility o¤
equilibrium path (precisely because the on-path constraints automatically imply a particular
o¤-path behavior).
Solving the transfer minimization problems (3:13) and (3:14) for given allocation choices
x and y, under the consistency condition (3:16) and its implication of truthfulness of path,
we nd that at the solutions to these problems constraints (3:2) and (3:9) and (3:6) and
(3:5) are binding. Using the optimal payments, the buyers problem of nding an optimal
allocation can be written as
max
x();y(;)
EEj [V (x () ; y (; ))  x ()  y (; )]
      x  +   ()          y  ; 
Moreover, the neglected incentive constraint (3:7) is equivalent to
 
 ()           y  ;   y  ;         x    x () :
The following proposition is now obvious:
Corollary 3.6.1 Delayed and early production achieve the same payo¤ only for indepen-
dent goods. If V12 (x; y) > (<) 0 for all x; y; delayed production is strictly better than early
production.
The proof of the statement follows from the discussion in an obvious way and is therefore
omitted. The logic is simply that the allocation under sequential production is always feasible
under delayed production of both goods but is not chosen at the optimum, except for the
case of independent goods.
It is instructive to take a closer look into the losses associated to sequential production.
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The allocation o¤ered to ex ante type  is rst-best e¢ cient; that is, there is no distortion
at the top. The allocation o¤ered to ex ante type  satises the rst-order conditions
Ej

V1
 
x
 


; y
 
; 

=  +

1  
 
    ;
V2
 
x
 


; y
 
; 

= ;
and
V2
 
x
 


; y
 
; 

=  +

1  
 ()    
1          :
The expected marginal benet of x
 


is equal to  + 
1 
 
    : For given allocation
y
 
; 

; this corresponds to the standard result that x
 


is distorted downwards relative
to the rst-best. Likewise, for given allocation x
 


; y
 
; 

is set e¢ ciently, while y
 
; 

is distorted downwards. Whether the entire allocation is higher or lower than rst-best
depends on the nature of interactions between the goods. For the case of independent
goods, the overall allocation relates exactly as stated to the rst-best allocation.
For nonzero interactions between the goods, there are two sources of losses for the prin-
cipal due to choosing x early on. Firstly, it is simply the case that both allocation choices
should be adjusted to both cost conditions. Secondly, as we have explained at great lengths,
it is sometimes not optimal to insist on truthtelling o¤ path when both x and y are chosen
late. Intuitively, it becomes easier to screen the information in the second round of reporting
when the principal has more screening instruments available.
Note that in the case of weak substitutes in the sense of Proposition 2, the rst-order
conditions di¤er only in that the marginal utilities interact with each other; the virtual
cost expressions on the right hand side are identical for both timing congurations.13 It is
then straightforward to see how the optimal allocations di¤er from each other in the more
exible regime with delayed production and in the regime with early production of x: For an
allocation in the regime with delayed production in Xintii
 


; we have that y
 
; 

> y
 
; 

13In the case of complements, the virtual marginal cost of x
 
; 

is increased while the virtual marginal
cost of x
 
; 

is decreased for given level of y:
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and x
 
; 

> x
 
; 

: If the x allocation is now forced to take the common value x   ;
then, heuristically, x
 
; 

is reduced while x
 
; 

is increased. Since the marginal utility
of consuming y still must take on the same value, the y allocation has to respond more to
 than it does in the exible regime. Hence, the variation in the level of y is increased in
response to the reduction in the variation in the level of x:
Thus, if the buyer has a choice, then starting production before all information is avail-
able is never strictly better than waiting until all information is available. In other words,
our model features a nonnegative option value of waiting. The timing of production is irrel-
evant only in the case where the buyers utility is additively separable in the utilities from
consuming x and y:
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter solves a tractable two-dimensional model of screening where the agent produces
two goods, knows the cost parameter of producing one good from the outset, and learns
the cost parameter of producing the second good at some later date. We assume positive
correlated cost parameters. Depending on whether the goods are complements or substitutes
and on how strongly the goods interact, a di¤erent pattern of binding constraints arises at
the optimum. For weak complements, we obtain a standard solution, where the allocations
of the ine¢ cient types are downward distorted, and the principal only needs to worry about
single deviations. Note that the solution to the full problem could also be obtained by a
naive procedure that imposes truthtelling at all nodes of the game, even at those that are
not reached if the agent is truthful early on in the game, but all o¤-path constraints are
slack. Therefore, we can simply ignore the o¤-path incentive compatibility constraints. For
weak substitutes, it is still true that the solution can be obtained by imposing truthtelling
on and o¤ equilibrium path. In this case, upward distortions may arise. However, now
a truthtelling constraint o¤ the equilibrium path is binding at the optimum. As a result,
the solution displays both upward and downward distortions. Finally, in the case of strong
89
interactions between the goods, inducing the agent to lie again after a rst may be rent-
minimizing for the principal. In this case, upward distortions may arise even in the case of
complements.
As a simple by-product of our work we compare our solution to the literature by varying
the timing of production in our model. It is always desirable to postpone all decisions until
all information is available, if that is feasible. The comparison to the static model of two-
dimensional screening is done in companion work. An interesting set of questions that we
do not address in this work relates to repeating the interaction between the buyer and the
seller.
Clearly, multi-dimensional problems are more complex than one-dimensional ones. How-
ever, the timing of the information process imposes quite some structure on our problem.
Part of the analysis of sequential screening problems has no grounds whatsoever in the rev-
elation principle per se, but emerges from implementing given allocations at lowest cost (see
also Krähmer and Strausz 2008). However, the buyers preferences impose structure on this
problem so that the complicated problem becomes tractable.
We provide a natural setting in which upward distortions may arise as a feature of the
optimal mechanism.
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Appendix 1
I can formulate this problem for a belief  = P (i = A) ;  2 (0; 1). ((rA;mA) ; (rB;mB))
denotes the optimal mechanism provided the sellers belief is . For a given belief , the
monopolists optimal mechanism ((rA;m

A) ; (r

B;m

B)) is the solution to
max
rA;rB ;mA;mB
mA + (1  )mB (3.17)
subject to
jrj  mj  0; (3.18)
jrj  mj  jri  mi; (3.19)
rj 2 [0; 1] (3.20)
for i 2 fA;Bg, j 2 fA;Bg,j 6= i,
where constraint (3:18) is the individual rationality condition of a buyer j, constraint
(3:19) is the incentive compatibility condition of buyer j, and constraint (3:20) is the feasi-
bility condition that restricts the quantity to less than 1. Constraint (3:20) must be imposed
because the buyer has unit demand in my setting.
This static problem has been investigated in more generality by many authors like Mussa
and Rosen 1978 or Maskin and Riley 1984. Applying standard methods I can derive the
following well-known solution.
Lemma 3.7.1 The solution to the static problem (3:17) is given by
M 
(
((1; A) ; (0; 0)) if A  B
((1; B) ; (1; B)) if A  B
: (3.21)
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The sellers expected revenue is given by
max (A; B) . (3.22)
Proof of Lemma 3.7.1. The proof builds on the solution to the optimal nonlinear pricing
with two types in Bolton and Dewatripont 2005 pp. 52. I restate their proof in my notation.
Let ((rA;mA) ; (rB;mB)) be the optimal mechanism.
Step 1: At the optimum the individual rationality constraint of type A does not bind.
Note that the following relation holds
ArA  mA  ArB  mB  BrB  mB  0:
The rst inequality holds by the incentive compatibility constraint of A. The second inequal-
ity holds since A > B. The last inequality holds by the individual rationality constraint of
B. Thus, the individual rationality constraint of A is satised automatically.
Step 2: The individual rationality constraint of type B must bind.
At the optimum at least one individual rationality constraint must be binding.
Suppose not. Then one can increase both transfers mA and mB by the same amount
without a violation of any constraint. This is a contradiction to ((rA;mA) ; (rB;mB)) being
the optimal.
Step 3: Solve the relaxed problem without the incentive compatibility constraint of type
B.
There are only two constraints; the binding individual rationality constraint BrB mB =
0 and the incentive compatibility constraint of A, which is equivalent to
ArA   (A   B) rB  mA:
Since there is no other constraint, this has to be binding.
The relaxed problem is given by
max
rA;rB
 (ArA   (A   B) rB) + (1  ) BrB (3.23)
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One solution candidate is rA = 1 and rB = 1 with transfers mA = A and mB = 0. The
expected revenue is A. The other solution candidate is rA = 1 and rB = 0 with transfers
mA = mB = B. The solution candidate is given by (3:21) providing expected revenue (3:22).
Step 4: Check whether the solution candidate satises the neglected constraint.
Substituting for the transfers, the neglected constraint is satised if
(A   B) rA  (A   B) rB;
which is satised at both solution candidates.
Hence the solution candidate solves (3:17).
Proof of Proposition 1.3.1. If seller 2 buys the purchase history, then she will be able
to distinguish the new customer from the old customer. Given that knowledge her expected
revenue is the sum of the expected revenue from selling good 2 to the new customer, buyer
2, and the expected revenue from selling good 2 to buyer 1.
Her expected revenue from making buyer 2 an optimal o¤er(
((1; A) ; (0; 0)) if A  B
((1; B) ; (1; B)) if A  B
(3.24)
is equal to max (A; B), since (3:24) is the solution to problem (1:1) is given by Lemma
3.7.1 for prior  and r = y and m = t.
Denote seller 2s equilibrium o¤er to seller 1s customer, buyer 1, who reported h by
((yhA; t

hA) ; (y

hB; t

hB)). If she does not condition the o¤er on the buyers report to seller 1,
then seller 2s o¤er is independent of the report to seller 1, i.e. ((yAA; t

AA) ; (y

AB; t

AB)) =
((yBA; t

BA) ; (y

BB; t

BB)).
If sA = 1 and sB = 0, then the purchase history will be fully revealing. In that case she
can perfectly discriminate buyer 1; that is, she o¤ers one unit of her good at A if the history
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is A and at B if the history is B so that her optimal o¤er to buyer 1 is
((yhA; t

hA) ; (y

hB; t

hB)) =
(
((1; A) ; (0; 0)) if buyer 1 reported h = A
((1; B) ; (1; B)) if buyer 1 reported h = B
:
Then seller 2s expected revenue, provided she bought a perfectly revealing purchase
history, is equal to (
max (A; B) + A if h = A
max (A; B) + B if h = B
:
Proof of Proposition 1.3.2. If seller 2 does not possess the purchase history, then he
does not know the customers identity and cannot identify the two buyers. From the main
text I know that the probability that a buyer has a type A is equal to +
2
. The solution
is equal to the solution of the static problem for  = +
2
and r = y and m = t. Then
by Lemma 3.7.1 her expected revenue from trading with one of her customers is equal to
max

(+)
2
A; B

. Her total expected revenue is equal to max (( + ) A; 2B).
Proof of Proposition 1.3.3. The probability that seller 1s former customer will have
demand for good 2 is A + B (1  ). If seller 1s o¤er is fully separating so that her
customer reports with sA = 1 and sB = 0, then A (1; 0) = 1 and the probability that
buyer 1 reports A given he has positive demand is A
A+B(1 ) . Therefore
A
A+B(1 ) is the
probability that the type of seller 1s former customer is A if he has positive demand. If the
purchase history contains the information that enables seller 2 to fully separate the types
according to the reports, then by Proposition 1.3.1 the revenue of seller 2 is equal to(
max (A; B) + A if h = A
max (A; B) + B if h = B
:
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Then her expected revenue under disclosure policy is equal to
(A + B (1  ))
0@ max (A; B) + AA+B(1 )A
+

1  A
A+B(1 )

B
1A
+ (1  (A + B (1  ))) max (A; B)
(3.25)
provided she bought the purchase history. If she does not purchase the purchase history,
then by Proposition 1.3.2 her expected revenue is max (( + ) A; B). The willingness to
pay for the purchase history of seller 2 is her expected revenue from buying it that exceeds
max (( + ) A; 2B). Therefore WTP (1; 0) is equal to
(A + B (1  ))
0@ max (A; B) + AA+B(1 )A
+

1  A
A+B(1 )

B  max (( + ) A; 2B)
1A :
Proof of Proposition 1.3.4. Since the seller faces a myopic problem the solution to her
problem is equal to the solution to the static problem provided by Lemma 3.7.1 for belief
 =  and r = x and m = p. Therefore her expected revenue is equal to max (A; B).
Proof of Lemma 1.3.1. This proof derives the price of the purchase history in the model
provided that seller 1 o¤ers a fully separating mechanism. I substitute sA = 1 and sB = 0
into (1:11) which gives(
A (A + A   ( + ) A)
+ (1  ) B (A + B   ( + ) A)
)
if ( + ) A  2B and A  B(
A (B + A   ( + ) A)
+ (1  ) B (B + B   ( + ) A)
)
if ( + ) A  2B and A  B(
A (A + A   2B)
+ (1  ) B (A + B   2B)
)
if ( + ) A  2B and A  B(
A (B + A   2B)
+ (1  ) B (B + B   2B)
)
if ( + ) A  2B and A  B
:
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I can simplify this to
f(1  ) BBg if ( + ) A  2B and A  B
fA (B   A) + (1  ) B (2B   A)g if ( + ) A  2B and A  B(
A (A + A   2B)
+ (1  ) B (A   B)
)
if ( + ) A  2B and A  B
fA (A   B)g if ( + ) A  2B and A  B
:
Proof of Theorem 1.3.1. Seller 1s expected payo¤ is equal to the sum of revenue from
selling to the buyer and seller 2s expected willingness to pay. From Lemma 1.3.1 seller 2s
expected willingness to pay is known. It remains to plug the expected revenue from o¤ering
mechanism (1; A   A (A   B) ; (0; 0)) and the price of the purchase history in seller 1s
expected revenue and to compare it with the threshold provided in Corollary 1.3.1.
Assume 1 > A.
Step 1: Show that (1; A   A (A   B) ; (0; 0)) satises all constraints.
Substitution of (1; A   A (A   B) ; (0; 0)) into the constraints gives:
The mechanism satises the individual rationality constraint of type B, (1:19), with
equality
0B   0 = 0:
The incentive constraint of type B, (1:21) is slack
0B   0 > 1B   (A   A (A   B))
=   (1  A) (A   B)
if A < 1. The individual rationality constraint of type A is slack
1A   (A   A (A   B)) > 0:
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The incentive compatibility constraint of type A binds
1A   (A   A (A   B)) = 0A   0 + A (A   B) :
Since all constraints are satised, I can set sA = 1 and sA = 0.
Step 2: If seller 1 o¤ers the screening contract (1; A   A (A   B) ; (0; 0)), then she
receives an expected revenue from selling to the buyer of  (A   A (A   B)). Then her
expected revenue is equal to
fA   A (A   B) + (1  ) BBg if ( + ) A  2B and A  B(
A   A (A   B) + A (B   A)
+ (1  ) B (2B   A)
)
if ( + ) A  2B and A  B(
A   A (A   B) + A (A + A   2B)
+ (1  ) B (A   B)
)
if ( + ) A  2B and A  B
fA   A (A   B) + A (A   B)g if ( + ) A  2B and A  B
which simplies to
fA + (A + (1  ) B) (B   A)g if ( + ) A  2B and A  B(
A
+ (A + (1  ) B) (2B   ( + ) A)
)
if ( + ) A  2B and A  B
fA + (A + (1  ) B) (A   B)g if ( + ) A  2B and A  B
A if ( + ) A  2B and A  B
:
Comparing this expected revenue with A, I conclude that seller 1 strictly prefers the
disclosure policy if either
I) ( + ) A  2B and A  B and B   A > 0 or
II) ( + ) A  2B and A > B.
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Appendix 2
Appendix 2.A
Lemma 3.7.2 For i 2 f1; 2g bidder i0s maximization problem is given by
max
i(hi)
Z
ftj :i(hi)j (hj)g
 
ati + btj + E [Zijhi]  j (hj)

f (tj) dtj: (3.26)
If E [Z1jh1] = E [Z2jh2], then there is an equilibrium in which bidder 1 and bidder 2 bid,
respectively,
 (h1) = (a+ b) t1 + E [Z1jh1] ;
 (h2) = (a+ b) t2 + E [Z2jh2] :
Proof of Lemma 3.7.2. The bidders equilibrium bidding strategies can be derived by
solving a set of rst-order conditions in an analogue fashion to Milgrom and Weber 1982a or
Maskin 1992. The equilibrium characterization is derived by applying the same techniques
and since the bidders are symmetric the equilibrium bidding strategies do not di¤er from the
equilibrium bidding strategies found in Milgrom and Weber 1982a. I provide a derivation
for the sake of completeness.
Suppose E [Z1jh1] = E [Z2jh2]. The rst-order condition for problem (3:26) is given by(
@ 1j (i(hi))
@i(hi)
 
ati + b
 1
j (i (hi)) + E [Zijhi]  j
 
 1j (i (hi))

f   1j (i (hi))
)
= 0:
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By the symmetry of Z1 and Z2 this is only true when the seller conceals Z or if z1 = z2.
In both cases h1 = h2 () t1 = t2. Since I am interested in symmetric Bayesian Nash
equilibria in continuous strategies which are increasing in t
i (h) = j (h)
for all ti 2

t; t

. Substitution gives(
@ 1j (i(hi))
@i(hi)
((a+ b) ti + E [Zijhi]   (hi))
f   1j (i (hi))
)
= 0;
which implies that the equilibrium satises
 (hi) = (a+ b) ti + E [Zijhi]
for i 2 f1; 2g provided that this constitutes a maximum.
The second-order condition at this point is given by
@ 1j (i (hi))
@i (hi)
1

0
(hi)
(b  (a+ b)) f   1j (i (hi)) < 0
which is true.
Moreover the winning bidders payo¤ is positive, since
(ati + btj + E [Zijhi]  (a+ b) tj + E [Zjjhj]) > 0
()
ti > tj
()
 (hi) >  (hj)
which is true whenever bidder i wins.
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Proof of Proposition 2.3.1. First, I derive the unique inner solution in linear strategies,
which are strictly increasing and continuous in the bidderstypes. Since I am interested in
equilibria in linear strategies, I suppose bidder js bid is of the linear form
N;j
 
hNj

= xjtj + yj:
Substitution into the rst-order condition of bidder i gives8<:
@ 1j (Ni (hNi ))
@Ni (hNi )

ati + b
1
xj
 
Ni
 
hNi
  yj+ E [Z]  Ni  hNi 
f

1
xj
 
Ni
 
hNi
  yj
9=; = 0;
which is equivalent to
Ni
 
hNi

=
xj
xj   b

ati   b yj
xj
+ E [Z]

:
Ni
 
hNi

is bidder is best reply to bidder js linear strategy N;j
 
hNj

and is linear in ti. I
denote bidder is best reply by BRi

N;j
 
hNj

.
Let Nj
 
hNj

denote bidder js reply to bidder is BRi

N;j
 
hNj

. Substitution into
bidder js rst-order condition gives8>>>><>>>>:
@BR
 1
i (
N;
j (Nj (hNj )))
@Nj (hNj )


atj + b
1
a

xj b
xj
Nj
 
hNj

+ b
yj
xj
  E [Z]

+ E [Z]  Nj
 
hNj

f

1
xj
 
Ni
 
hNi
  yj
9>>>>=>>>>; = 0;
which is equivalent to
Nj
 
hNj

=
axj
axj   bxj + b2

atj +
b2
a
yj
xj
+
a  b
a
E [Z]

:
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This solution is bidder js best reply to bidder is best reply to bidder js linear strategy
N;j
 
hNj

. The biddersstrategies must be mutually best replies, i.e. I must have
BRj

BRi

N;j
 
hNj

= N;j
 
hNj

:
This linear system has a unique solution for x2 and y2, namely
x2 = a+ b
and
y2 = E [Z] :
Substitution into the best reply functions gives that at stage 2 the unique inner solutions in
linear form to the biddersmaximization problems, which are mutually best replies provided
the seller conceals her information are given by
BRj

BRi

N;j
 
hNj

= N;j
 
hNj

= (a+ b) tj + E [Z] ; (3.27)
BRi

N;j
 
hNj

= (a+ b) ti + E [Z] :
It can be shown by substitution that the bidders expected payo¤s are positive (see also
Lemma 3.7.2).
There is another equilibrium candidate. There are corner solutions N;i
 
hNi

and
N;j
 
hNj

such that bidder i wins with probability 1, i.e.
N;i
 
hNi
  N;j  hNj 
for all hNi and h
N
j . It is relatively easy to see that bidder is expected utility must be positive,
i.e.
ETj
h
ati + bTj + E [Z]  N;j
 
hNj
i  0
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if bidders play
N;i
 
hNi

= at+ bti + E [Z] ;
N;j
 
hNj

= at+ bti + E [Z] :
However, bidder is candidate equilibrium strategy at+bti+E [Z] is weakly dominated by
the strategy (see Denition 2.2.1) to bid his true minimal expected valuation ati+bt+E [Z]
since
ati + bt+ E [Z] > at+ bti + E [Z] ;
which is true for all ti. This implies that he wins more often and receives a potentially
positive payo¤ against bidder j by bidding his minimal true valuation.
It remains to be shown that the candidate equilibrium ati+bt+E [Z] and at+btj+E [Z],
i 6= j; i; j 2 f1; 2g, cannot be an equilibrium in increasing and continuous strategies. The
reason is that bidder j always wins, but receives negative payo¤ for some of his types.
Then the sellers expected revenue is given by
2X
i=1
j 6=i
Z
fti;tj :(ti)(tj)g
[(a+ b) tj + E [Z]] f (tj) dtjf (ti) dti
=
2X
i=1
j 6=i
Z
titj
[(a+ b) tj + E [Z]] f (tj) dtjf (ti) dti
= (a+ b)E [T2:2] + E [Z] :
Proof of Proposition 2.3.2. a > b  0 and (a+ b) t + zl    b(zh zl)a b . In the main
text I provide an argument for the uniqueness of this equilibrium in the sense that there is
no other equilibrium in linear strategies in which each bidders strategy is a solution to the
rst-order condition of the respective bidders maximization problem. The proof provided
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here only establishes that there is an equilibrium with strategies
1 (t1; z1; z2) = (a+ b) t1 + z1   
b (z2   z1)
a  b (3.28)
and
2 (t2; z2; z1) = (a+ b) t2 + z2   
b (z1   z2)
a  b (3.29)
if a > b by proving that these strategies are mutually best responses. I do this in the rst
two steps of the proof. In the third step I prove that the (3:28) and (3:29) are nonnegative
if (a+ b) t + zl    b(zh zl)a b holds true and in the last step I show that the equilibrium is
e¢ cient if a > b. The last step is only given for completeness. Actually I already know that
the equilibrium is e¢ cient by Maskin 1992, since the single-crossing condition is satised.
Step 1: Assume that 2 plays (3:29) and suppose that bidder 1 has private signal t1 such
that
1 (t1; z1; z2)  2 (t; z2; z1) ;
which is equivalent to
t1  t+ (zj   zi)
(a  b) :
Bidder is maximization problem is given by maximizes over ^
max
^
Z
ft2:^>2(t2;z2;z1)g
[at1 + bt2 + z1   2 (t2; z2; z1)] dF (t2) :
I want to show that (3:28) solves this problem.
The rst-order condition with respect to ^ of bidder 1s problem is given by
@ 12

^; z2; z1

@^
24 at1 + b 12 ^; z2; z1
+z1   2

 12

^; z2; z1

; z
 35 f  12 ^; z = 0:
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The second derivative is given by
@ 12

^; z2; z1

@^
0BBBB@

b
@ 12 (^;z2;z1)
@^
  1

f

 12

^; z2; z1

+
24 at1 + b 12 ^; z2; z1+ z1
 2

 12

^; z2; z1

; z2; z1
 35 f 0  12 ^; z2; z1 @ 12 (^;z2;z1)@^
1CCCCA
I rst solve the unconstrained problem and then check the constraint. The solution to
the rst-order condition is given by
 12

^; z2; z1

=
1
a+ b

^   z2 +  b
a  b (z1   z2)

The rst-order condition is given by
1
a+ b
"
at1 +
b
a+b
h
^   z2 +  ba b (z1   z2)
i
+z1   ^
#
f

 12

^; z2; z1

= 0
which is equivalent to
at1 + z1 +
b
a+ b

  a
a  bz2 + 
b
a  bz1

= ^
a
a+ b
:
Solving this equation for ^ gives
^ = (a+ b) t1 + z1    b
a  b (z2   z1)
= 1 (t1; z1; z2) :
The prove for bidder 2 is performed in the same manner and therefore neglected.
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I simplify the notation and write  12

^

instead of  12

^; z2; z1

. The second-order
condition is satised if
@ 12

^

@^
0BBB@

b
@ 12 (^)
@^
  1

f

 12

^

+
"
at1 + b
 1
2

^

+z1   ^
#
f 0

 12

^

@ 12 (^)
@^
1CCCA

^=1(t1;z1;z2)
< 0:
Substitution gives
1
a+ b
0BB@

b 1
a+b
  1 f  12 ^
+
"
at1 + b

t1 + 
z1 z2
a b

+ z1
   (a+ b) t1 + z1aa b   bz2a b 
#
f 0

 12

^

@ 12 (^)
@^
1CCA

^=1(t1;z1;z2)
=
1
a+ b

  a
a+ b
f

t1 + 
(z1   z2)
a  b

< 0:
since
@ 12 (^)
@^
= 1
a+b
and  12

^

= 1
a+b
h 
(a+ b) t1 + z1
a
a b    ba bz2
  z2 +  b(z1 z2)a b i
=

t1 + 
z1 z2
a b

. I conclude that the candidate maximizes bidder is expected utility given
that bidder j bids 2 (t2; z2; z1) since a > 0.
Note that bidder 1 has a positive probability to win since 1 (t1; z1; z2)  1 (t; z1; z2).
In the next step I prove that this strategy is also a best reply to 2 (t2; z2; z1) for all other
types t1 such that 

1 (t1; z1; z2)  1 (t; z1; z2) ; who have a probability to win of 0 playing
1 (t1; z1; z2).
Step 2: Assume z2 > z1. I show that (3:28) is also bidder 1s best response to (3:29) if
his type t1 satises 

1 (t1; z1; z2)  1 (t; z1; z2) () t1  t+  (zh zl)a b .
Clearly, bidder 1 loses with certainty if he uses a bid , which satises  < 2 (t; z2; z1).
Thus, he is indi¤erent between any of these bids. Ties occur with probability 0 as F is
atomless. Thus, I need to show that any  > 2 (t; z2; z1) gives a negative payo¤.
If bidder 1 plays (3:28), then his probability of winning is zero. Suppose bidder 1 deviates
to a strategy 0 = 2 (t; z2; z1) + ,  > 0 so that 1 wins with positive probability. Then his
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expected value of playing that strategy 0 is negative for all t1 2

t; t

at1 + bt+ zl  

(a+ b) t+ zh   b (zl   zh)
a  b

 0
if and only if
t1  t+ 1
a  b (zh   zl) ;
which is true.
Step 3: Bids are positive if for all t1; t2; z1; z2 if the following system of inequalities denes
a nonempty regime
(a+ b) t+ z1   b (z2   z1)
a  b  0;
(a+ b) t+ z2   b (z1   z2)
a  b  0:
These conditions can be rewritten as
(a+ b) t+ 
az1   bz2
a  b  0;
(a+ b) t+ 
az2   bz1
a  b  0;
Bids are positive if
(a+ b) t+ min

az2   bz1
a  b ;
az1   bz2
a  b

 0
for all realizations of z1 and z2. min

azl bzh
a b ;
azh bzl
a b
	
, which is equal to azl bzh
a b by the single
crossing property and
azl   bzh  azh   bzl
()
(a+ b) zl  (a+ b) zh
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Then bids are positive if
(a+ b) t+ 
azl   bzh
a  b  0.
Step 4: The equilibrium is e¢ cient if 1 (t1; z1; z2)  2 (t2; z2; z1) if and only if at1 +bt2 +
z1  at2 + bt1 + z2.
1 (t1; z1; z2)  2 (t2; z2; z1)
()
(a+ b) t1 + z1    b
a  b (z2   z1)  (a+ b) t2 + z2   
b
a  b (z1   z2)
()
(a+ b) t1 +  (z1   z2) a+ b
a  b  (a+ b) t2
()
at1 + bt2 + z1  at2 + bt1 + z2:
Proof of Theorem 2.3.1. Assume (a+ b) t + azl bzh
a b  0. I split up the proof in three
steps. First, I evaluate the sellers gains from publicly disclosing Z at  = 0 and show that
the gains are 0 at  = 0. Second, I evaluate the derivative of RD   RN at  = 0. Third, I
show that the derivative is negative everywhere.
Assume parameters lie in regime A:
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By t  t >  1
a b (zh   zl), the expected revenue is given by (2:10), which can be rewritten
as
=
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
P2
i=1
j 6=i
 (1  )
266666666666666666666666666664
R t  zh zl
a b
t
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
tZ
ti+
zh zl
a b
 
(a+ b) ti+
zh    b(zl zh)a b
!
dF (tj)
+
ti+
zh zl
a bZ
t
 
(a+ b) tj+
zl    b(zh zl)a b
!
dF (tj)
+
tZ
t
 
(a+ b) tj+
zl    b(zh zl)a b
!
dF (tj)
 
tZ
t
 
(a+ b) tj+
zl    b(zh zl)a b
!
dF (tj)
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
dF (ti)
+
R t
t  zh zl
a b
tZ
t
 
(a+ b) tj+
zl    b(zh zl)a b
!
dF (tj) dF (ti)
377777777777777777777777777775
+
 
2 + (1  )2E [T2:2] + 2zh + (1  )2 zl
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
:
Then the impact on the sellers expected revenue is given by
RR  RN
=
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
P2
i=1
j 6=i
 (1  ) (a+ b) R t  zh zla bt
0BB@
tZ
ti+
zh zl
a b
 
(ti   tj)
+ zh zl
a b
!
dF (tj)
1CCA dF (ti)
+2 (1  )

(a+ b)E [T ] + zl    b(zh zl)a b

+ [1  2 (1  )] (a+ b)E [T2:2] + 2zh + (1  )2 zl
  [(1  )zl + zh + (a+ b)E[T2:2]]
9>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>;
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which can be rewritten as
=  (1  ) (a+ b)
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
P2
i=1
j 6=i
R t  zh zl
a b
t
0BB@
tZ
ti+
zh zl
a b
(ti   tj) dF (tj)
1CCA dF (ti)
+2 (E [T ]  E [T2:2])
+2 zh zl
a b
0BB@R t  zh zla bt
tZ
ti+
zh zl
a b
dF (tj) dF (ti)  12
1CCA
9>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>;
: (3.30)
Evaluating RD  RN at  = 0 gives
RD  RN 
=0
=  (1  ) (a+ b)
8>>><>>>:
P2
i=1
j 6=i
R t
t
tZ
ti
(ti   tj) dF (tj) dF (ti)
+2 (E [T ]  E[T2:2])
9>>>=>>>; :
With some tedious calculation one can show that
2X
i=1
j 6=i
Z t
t
tZ
ti
(ti   tj) dF (tj) dF (ti) = (E [T2:2]  E [T1:1]) :
Therefore
RD  RN 
=0
=  (1  ) (a+ b) f2E [T ]  E [T2:2]  E [T1:1]g
which is equal to 0 since  E [T2:2] =  2E [T ] + E [T1:1].
Next, I show that the derivative of RD  RN at  = 0 is 0.
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The derivative of RD  RN is equal to
@RD  RN
@
=  (1  ) (a+ b)
@
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
P2
i=1
j 6=i
R t  zh zl
a b
t
0BB@
tZ
ti+
zh zl
a b
(ti   tj) dF (tj)
1CCA dF (ti)
+2 (E [T ]  E [T2:2])
+2 zh zl
a b
0BB@R t  zh zla bt
tZ
ti+
zh zl
a b
dF (tj) dF (ti)  12
1CCA
9>>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>>;
@
:
Since  (1  ) (a+ b) > 0; by assumption, it su¢ ces to derive @R
D RN
@
(1 )(a+b) , which simplies
to
@RD RN
@
 (1  ) (a+ b)
=
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
P2
i=1
j 6=i
0BB@  
zh zl
a b
R t  zh zl
a b
t
 
tif
 
ti + 
zh zl
a b

f (ti)

dti
+ zh zl
a b
R t  zh zl
a b
t
  
ti + 
zh zl
a b

f  ti +  zh zla b  f (ti)
!
dti
1CCA
+2 (zh zl)
a b
0BBB@ 
0@   zh zla b F  t   zh zla b  f  t
+
R t  zh zl
a b
t F (ti) f
0  ti +  zh zla b  zh zla b dti
1A
+
R t  zh zl
a b
t F (ti) f
 
ti + 
zh zl
a b

dti   12
1CCCA
9>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>;
;
which can be simplied to
2
zh   zl
a  b
 Z t  zh zl
a b
t
F (ti) f

ti + 
zh   zl
a  b

dti   1
2
!
:
Clearly, the rst derivative is 0 at  = 0, since
R t  zh zl
a b
t F (ti) f
 
ti + 
zh zl
a b

dti

=0
=
1
2
R t
t
2F (ti) f (ti) dti =
1
2
. This implies that there is an extreme point or a saddle point at
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 = 0. Moreover if f
 
t

> 0, then
@
R t  zh zl
a b
t F (ti) f
 
ti + 
zh zl
a b

dti
@
=
8<:  
zh zl
a b F
 
t   zh zl
a b

f
 
t

+ zh zl
a b
R t  zh zl
a b
t F (ti) f
0  ti +  zh zla b  dti
9=;
=  zh   zl
a  b
Z t  zh zl
a b
t
f (ti) f

ti + 
zh   zl
a  b

dti:
This is negative since a  b > 0.
The second derivative,
@2(RD RN)
(@)2
, is negative i¤
@2(RD RN)
(@)2
(1 )(a+b) is negative.
@2(RD RN)
(@)2
 (1  ) (a+ b)
= 2
zh   zl
a  b
0@@ R t  zh zla bt F (ti) f  ti +  zh zla b  dti
@
1A :
Substitution gives
=  2

zh   zl
a  b
2 Z t  zh zl
a b
t
f (ti) f

ti + 
zh   zl
a  b

dti;
which is negative for all   0.
It follows that the expected revenue is maximized at  = 0.
Assume parameters lie in regime B: (a  b) (t t)
(zh zl) < .
If (a  b) (t t)
(zh zl) < , then the strong bidder always wins if z1 6= z2 and the expected
price conditional on z1 6= z2 is equal to
(a+ b)E [T ] + zl   b (zh   zl)
a  b :
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This implies that the bid of the losing bidder is much lower than v (ti; ti; zl). The expected
revenue is equal to(
(a+ b)E [T2:2] + E [Z]
+2 (1  )

(a+ b)E [T ] + zl    b(zh zl)a b   ((a+ b)E [T2:2] + E [Z])
 ) :
The expected revenue from disclosure is larger than the expected revenue from no disclosure
if and only if
(a+ b)E [T ] + zl   b (zh   zl)
a  b > (a+ b)E [T2:2] + E [Z]
which can be rewritten as
(a+ b)
(E [T ]  E [T2:2]) 
b
a b + 

(zh   zl)
> :
Since parameters are in regime B,  > (a  b) t t
zh zl . Together these conditions on  imply
(a+ b)
(E [T ]  E [T2:2]) 
b
a b + 

(zh   zl)
> (a  b) t  t
zh   zl
which is equivalent to
a
 
(E [T ]  E [T2:2])  
 
t  t > b  (1  )  t  t  (E [T ]  E [T2:2]) :
Hence if a
 
(E [T ]  E [T2:2])  
 
t  t > b  (1  )  t  t  (E [T ]  E [T2:2]), then the
seller commits to disclosure.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.3. Step 1: Equilibrium bidding strategies when the seller
conceals her information.
If the seller conceals her information, then the bidders optimal bidding behaviors at
stage 2 is characterized in Proposition 2.3.1.
Step 2: Equilibrium bidding strategies when the seller discloses her information.
112
Bidder 1s information set is given by hD1 = ft1; z1; z2g and bidder 2s information set is
given by hD2 = ft2; z2; z1g.
I want to show that bidder is best reply to j (tj; zj; zi) =
8><>:
(a+ b) tj + zi
at+ btj + zh
at+ btj + zh
if zi = zj
if zi > zj
if zi < zj
is i (ti; zi; zj) =
8><>:
(a+ b) ti + zi
at+ bti + zh
at+ bti + zh
if zi = zj
if zi < zj
if zi > zj
. I split up the proof in two cases: z1 = z2
and z1 6= z2.
Step 2.1: If z1 = z2 = z, then I can apply Lemma 3.26 to solve the bidders maximization
problem for E [Z1j t1; z; z] = E [Z2j t2; z; z] = z. Then the equilibrium bids satisfy
Di (ti; z; z) = (a+ b) ti + z; i 2 f1; 2g ; z 2 fzl; zhg :
If z1 = z2 = z, then the revenue is equal to
(a+ b)E [T2:2] + z:
Step 2.2: If z1 6= z2, then, without loss of generality, I can restrict attention to z1 > z2.
The proof for z1 < z2 works analogously and is omitted. I restrict attention to equilibria in
which one bidder wins with positive probability.
Consider the candidates
1 (t1; zh; zl) = at+ bt1 + zh;
2 (t2; zl; zh) = at+ bt2 + zh:
Note that bidder 1 wins with probability 1 if the bidders play these strategies.
Bidder 1s expected payo¤ is positive which one can check by substitution of the candi-
dates into bidder 1s payo¤, that is
at1 + bt2 + zh   (at+ bt2 + zh) > 0:
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Bidder 2s payo¤ is zero, but would be negative if bidder 2 tried to outbid bidder 1 by bidding
^2 > 

1 (t1; zh; zl) for some t1:
max
^2
Z
ft1:^2>1(t1;zh;zl)g

at2   at

dF (t1) < 0
for all ^2 > 

1 (t1; zh; zl) = at+ bt1 + zh and t2 < t. Since at+ bt1 + zh  at+ bt2 + zh,
2 (t2; zl; zh) = at+bt2 +zh is a best reply to 

1 (t1; zh; zl). Therefore bidder is best reply to
j (tj; zj; zi) =
8><>:
(a+ b) tj + zi
at+ btj + zh
at+ btj + zh
if zi = zj
if zi > zj
if zi < zj
is i (ti; zi; zj) =
8><>:
(a+ b) ti + zi
at+ bti + zh
at+ bti + zh
if zi = zj
if zi < zj
if zi > zj
.
If z1 = zh and z2 = zl, then the expected revenue condition on z1 = zh and z2 = zl is given
by Z
T
(at+ bt+ zh) f (t) dt = at+ bE [T ] + zh:
This implies together with the rst step of the proof that the overall expected revenue
after disclosure is given by
RD =
8><>:
2 ((a+ b)E [T2:2] + zh)
+ (1  )2 ((a+ b)E [T2:2] + zl)
+2 (1  ) (at+ bE [T ] + zh)
9>=>;
=
(
(a+ b)E [T2:2]
+2 (1  ) (at+ bE [T ]  (a+ b)E [T2:2]) + E [Z1:2]
)
:
Proof of Theorem 2.3.2. Substituting RD from Proposition 2.3.3 and RN into W gives(
2 ((a+ b)E [T2:2] + zh) + (1  )2 ((a+ b)E [T2:2] + zl)
+2 (1  ) (at+ bE [T ] + zh)  ((a+ b)E [T2:2] + E [Z])
)
;
which simplies to
 (1  ) (2 (at+ bE [T ]  (a+ b)E [T2:2]) +  (zh   zl)) :
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Then W > 0 if and only if
 >
2 ((a+ b)E [T2:2]  (at+ bE [T ]))
(zh   zl) : (3.31)
Appendix 2.B: E¢ ciency
Appendix 2.B is based on Maskin 2003. Consider a second price auction with two bidders.
i (hi) denotes bidder is bid for a given information set hi.
Denition 3.7.1 An equilibrium is e¢ cient if the bidder with the highest valuation wins the
auction and is allocated the good.
Superscript  denotes an equilibrium bidding strategy. The following Lemma follows
directly from the denition of an e¢ cient equilibrium of the second price auction and is
obvious. I state it for completeness.
Lemma 3.7.3 Suppose that the bidders preferences satisfy (2:1). In an e¢ cient equilib-
rium of the second price auction, 1 (h1) ; 

2 (h2), the bidder with the highest private value
component wins if and only if
i (hi)  j (hj) () (a  b) ti + zi  (a  b) tj + zj: (3.32)
Proof of Lemma 3.7.3. Consider an e¢ cient equilibrium of the English auction with
equilibrium bids 1 (t1; z1; z2) and 

2 (t2; z2; z1).
By denition of an e¢ cient equilibrium, we must have
i (hi)  j (hj) () at1 + bt2 + z1  at2 + bt1 + z2.
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Reformulating this inequality gives
at1 + bt2 + z1  at2 + bt1 + z2 ()
(a  b) t1 + z1  (a  b) t2 + z2:
Next, I graphically illustrate the properties of the e¢ cient allocation (see Lemma 3.7.3)
as a function of the biddersvaluations. The gures shall illustrate realizations of the bid-
dersvaluations as functions of (t1; t2) and for xed z1 and z2. The support of bidder 2s
private information t2 lies in the horizontal dimension and the support of bidder 1s private
information t1 is depicted in the vertical dimension.
For regime A and
(z1; z2) = (zh; zl).
For regime B if
(z1; z2) = (zh; zl).
If (z1; z2) such that
z1 = z2.
Figure 3.1: Figure A2.
For given z1 and z2, the green color in gures 1 to 3 marks those types (t1; t2) for which
bidder 2 has the highest valuation and the blue area highlights the set of type proles for
which bidder 1 has the highest valuation. Figure 1 depicts the e¢ cient allocation in regime A
for z1 = zh and z2 = zl. In regime A an allocation is e¢ cient if and only if weak bidder 2 wins
whenever t2 > t1 + 
zh zl
a b . Figure 2 depicts the e¢ cient allocation in regime B for z1 = zh
and z2 = zl. In regime B the allocation is e¢ cient if the strong bidder always receives the
good. Figure 3 illustrates the e¢ cient allocation for the symmetric case, z1 = z2, in which
bidder i has the highest valuation if and only if his private signal exceeds his rivals private
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signal, i.e. ti  tj.
117
Appendix 3
Proof of Lemma 3.2.1. The rst-best allocation x (; ) ; y (; ) satises the system of
rst-order conditions (3:11) and (3:12) for  2 ; 	 and  2 ; 	 : Dene a new, articial
system of equations by
V1 (x (; ) ; y (; )) =  (3.33)
V2 (x (; ) ; y (; )) = 
for ;  2 ;   ;  : Note that the domain of the articial system is obtained by a
convexication of the original domain of denition; hence, by construction, the extreme
points in the convexied domain are the cost types in the model. However, on the convexied
domain, we can use calculus to determine di¤erences between allocation choices. We prove
the claims by direct evaluation of the di¤erences. We focus on claim (i); the proof of claim
(ii) uses the same methods and is therefore omitted.
Proof of claim (i): Since (3:33) is dened on a convex domain, we can write (by the
fundamental theorem of calculus)
x (; )  x  ;  = Z

@
@
x (; ) d:
Totally di¤erentiating the system (3:33), we have
V11 (x (; ) ; y (; )) dx+ V12 (x (; ) ; y (; )) dy = 0
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V21 (x (; ) ; y (; )) dx+ V22 (x (; ) ; y (; )) dy = d
By Cramers rule
dx
d
=
 V12
V11V22   V 212
so
x (; )  x  ;  = Z

 V12
V11V22   V 212
(; ) d:
So, for any  2 ;  ; x (; )  x  ;  for V12  0 and x (; ) > x  ;  for V12 < 0: Thus,
these inequalities hold in particular for  2 ; 	 :
Again using (3:33) ; the fundamental theorem, and Cramers rule, we obtain
y (; )  y  ;  = Z

V11
V11V22   V 212
(; ) d:
By concavity, we have y (; )  y  ;  < 0:
Combining these arguments, we have, for any ;
 
y
 
; 
  y (; )   x  ;   x (; )  0
i¤ V12  0 and
0 
Z

V11 + V12
V11V22   V 212
(; ) d;
which is satised if V12 <  V11 for all (x; y) : Hence, these inequalities hold in particular for
 2 ; 	 : Likewise, we have
 
x
 
; 
  x (; )   y  ;   y (; )  0
for  2 ; 	 if V12 >  V11 for all (x; y) :
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Proof of claim (ii): Similarly, one shows that for V12 < 0 we have
 
y
 
; 
  y (; )     x  ;   x (; )  0
if V12  V11 for all (x; y) and
   x  ;   x (; )   y  ;   y (; )
for V12  V11 for all (x; y) :
Proof of Lemma 3.3.1. Note rst that at least one participation constraint must be
binding; otherwise all payments could be reduced by the same amount, resulting in higher
buyer surplus. To prove the statement, it su¢ ces to show the standard result that (3:9)
together with (3:6) imply (3:8). This is true if  ()    .
Let u (; ) denote equilibrium utility.
From (3:6) ; we have
Ej [u (; )]
= Ej [T (; )  x (; )  y (; )]
 Ej

T
 
; ^
 
; ; 
  x  ; ^  ; ;   y  ; ^  ; ; 
On the other hand
Ej

T
 
; ^
 
; ; 
  x  ; ^  ; ;   y  ; ^  ; ; 
 Ej

T
 
; 
  x  ;   y  ; 
since ^
 
; ; 

and ^
 
; ; 

are chosen optimally. Moreover,
Ej

T
 
; 
  x  ;   y  ; 
= Ej

u
 
; 

+
 
   x  ; 
 Ej

u
 
; 

;
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where the last inequality follows since production is non-negative.
Hence, from (3:6) ; we have that
Ej [u (; )]  Ej

u
 
; 

:
Now, from (3:2) it is straightforward to see that
u
 
; 
  u  ; +      y  ;  ;
and thus u
 
; 
  u  ;  : Using ()  (); we have moreover that
Ej

u
 
; 
  Ej u  ;  :
(3:9) written in terms of equilibrium utilities amounts to
Ej

u
 
; 
  0;
which proves the claim.
Proof of Lemma 3.3.2. The proof is by direct inspection. We consider all four o¤-path
types in sequence.
Recall that u (; ) denotes the equilibrium utility of type (; ) :
Consider type
 
; ; 

; that is an agent with preference parameters ;  who has sent a
rst period report ^ = : By reporting ^ = , he obtains utility
T
 
; 
  x  ;   y  ;  = u  ; +     x  ; 
If he reports ^ = ; then he obtains utility
T
 
; 
  x  ;   y  ;  = u  ; +     x  ;        y  ;  :
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Type
 
; ; 

prefers to report ^ =  if
u
 
; 

+
 
   x  ;   u  ; +     x  ;        y  ; 
From the on equilibrium path constraint 3:3, we know that
u
 
; 
  u  ;        y  ;  :
adding
 
   x  ;  to both sides we get
u
 
; 

+
 
   x  ;   u  ; +     x  ;        y  ;  ;
which implies that ^
 
; ; 

=  if
x
 
; 
  x  ;  :
It is easy to demonstrate the other results by the exact same procedure. In particular:
^
 
; ; 

=  follows from the on-path constraint (3:2) if x
 
; 
  x  ;  ;
^
 
; ; 

=  follows from the on-path constraint (3:4) if x (; )  x  ;  ; and
^
 
; ; 

=  follows from the on-path constraint (3:5) if x
 
; 
  x (; ) :
Proof of lemma 3.3.3. We split the proof into two cases, depending on whether x
 
; 
 
x (; ) is nonnegative or nonpositive. For both cases, we rst prove the part concerning the
allocations of type . Afterwards we turn to the allocation for type .
Preliminaries:
For convenience, note that the on-path constraints (3:2)   (3:5) can be rewritten as
follows:
T
 
; 
  T  ;     x  ;   x  ; +   y  ;   y  ;  (3.34)
T
 
; 
  T  ;     x  ;   x  ; +   y  ;   y  ;  (3.35)
T
 
; 
  T (; )    x  ;   x (; )+   y  ;   y (; ) (3.36)
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T
 
; 
  T (; )    x  ;   x (; )+   y  ;   y (; ) (3.37)
Likewise, the o¤-path constraints take the following form:
Type
 
; ; 

prefers to report ^ =  if
T
 
; 
  T  ;     x  ;   x  ; +   y  ;   y  ;  : (3.38)
and prefers to report ^ =  if
T
 
; 
  T  ;     x  ;   x  ; +   y  ;   y  ;  : (3.39)
Type
 
;; 

prefers to report ^ =  if
T
 
; 
  T  ;     x  ;   x  ; +   y  ;   y  ;  (3.40)
and prefers to report ^ =  if
T
 
; 
  T  ;     x  ;   x  ; +   y  ;   y  ;  : (3.41)
Type
 
; ; 

prefers to report ^ =  if
T
 
; 
  T (; )    x  ;   x (; )+   y  ;   y (; ) (3.42)
and prefers to report ^ =  if
T
 
; 
  T (; )    x  ;   x (; )+   y  ;   y (; ) : (3.43)
Type
 
; ; 

prefers to report ^ =  if
T
 
; 
  T (; )    x  ;   x (; )+   y  ;   y (; ) (3.44)
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and prefers to report ^ =  if
T
 
; 
  T (; )    x  ;   x (; )+   y  ;   y (; ) : (3.45)
Now we are ready to begin with the proof of the Lemma.
Suppose that
 
x
 
; 
  x  ;   0: By Lemma 3.3.2 this implies that ^  ; ;  = .
Adding the expected utility of the high type (which is zero by (3:9)) to the objective, we
obtain the following problem:
  min
fT(;)g
2f;g;^
(;;)
8>><>>:
(() ())(T(;) x(;) y(;))+()( )x(;)
+(1 ())(T(;^(;;)) x(;^(;;)) y(;^(;;)))
 (1 ())[T(;) x(;) y(;)]
9>>=>>;
subject to (3:34) ; (3:35) ; and
either (3:38) if ^
 
; ; 

= 
or (3:39) if ^
 
; ; 

= :
Consider now both possible o¤-path reports. If ^
 
; ; 

= ; then the objective is
min
T(;) T(;)
 
 ()     T  ;   x  ;   y  ; +  ()     x  ; 
    ()     T  ;   x  ;   y  ; + (1   ())     x  ; 
subject to the constraints (3:34) ; (3:35) ; and (3:38) : Note that (3:35) is automatically satis-
ed if (3:38) is. There exists a solution to the problem only if the constraint set is non-empty,
that is, if the right-hand side of (3:38) is weakly larger than the right-hand side of (3:34) :
This is the case for

x
 
; 

; y
 
; 
	
2f;g 2 Xi
 


: In this case (3:34) is binding. Using
(3:9) and (3:34) to solve for the optimal payments, we have 
T
 
; 

T
 
; 
! =  x  ; + y  ; +  1          y  ; 
x
 
; 

+ 
 


y
 
; 

+
 
1     y  ; 
!
: (3.46)
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Substituting back into the objective we have obtain
i =
 
 ()          y  ; + Ej     x  ;  :
On the other hand, if ^
 
; ; 

= ; then the problem is
minT(;) T(;)
 
1     T  ;   T  ; 	
+
 
   x  ;   (1   ())      y  ; 
   1        x  ;   x  ; + y  ;   y  ; 
subject to the constraints (3:34) ; (3:35) ; and (3:39) : The right-hand side of (3:34) is weakly
larger than the right-hand side of (3:39) for

x
 
; 

; y
 
; 
	
2f;g 2 Xiii
 


and the
reverse is true for

x
 
; 

; y
 
; 
	
2f;g 2 Xi
 


: Clearly, the right-hand side of (3:35)
is always larger than the right-hand side of (3:34) : Therefore, for

x
 
; 

; y
 
; 
	
2f;g 2
Xiii
 


; at the solution of the problem, constraint (3:34) holds as an equality. It follows that
for ^
 
; ; 

=  and

x
 
; 

; y
 
; 
	
2f;g 2 Xiii
 


; the transfers can be taken from
(3:46) so that the objective takes value
iii =
 
   x  ;   (1   ())      y  ; +  1          y  ;  :
For

x
 
; 

; y
 
; 
	
2f;g 2 Xi
 


the o¤-path constraint (3:39) is binding. Substituting
for the transfers implies that in this case
^i =
 
 ()          y  ; + Ej     x  ;  :
Since ^i  i if and only if

x
 
; 

; y
 
; 
	
2f;g 2 Xi
 


, for a given allocation
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 
	
2f;g 2 Xi
 


the optimal payments are given by (3:46), ^
 
; ; 

= 
and the information rent by i.
Next consider the second problem for the case where x
 
; 
  x (; ) : By lemma 2 this
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implies that ^
 
; ; 

= : So, the problem can be written as

 = min
fT (;)g2f;g;^(;;)
8>><>>:
()[T(;^(;;)) x(;^(;;)) y(;^(;;))]
+(1 ())[T (;) x(;) y(;)]
 Ej[T (;) x(;) y(;)]+
9>>=>>;
subject to
(3:36) ; (3:37) ; and either
(3:42) if ^
 
; ; 

= ; or
(3:43) if ^
 
; ; 

= ;
where the objective is obtained from substituting the constraint (3:6) as an equality into the
objective.
Consider rst the case where ^
 
; ; 

= : In this case, the problem is
min
T(;) T (;)
    ()    T  ;   T (; )	
+
 
 ()    x  ; + y  ;   x (; )  y (; )
   1        x (; )   ()     x  ; + :
subject to the constraints (3:36) ; (3:37) and (3:42) : The right-hand side of (3:36) is weakly
smaller than the right-hand side of (3:42) : Hence, the constraint set is nonempty if the right
hand side of (3:42) is weakly smaller than the right-hand side of (3:37) ; which is exactly
true for fx (; ) ; y (; )g2f;g 2 Xi () : So, in this case, (3:37) is binding at the solution
to the problem. Solving for the transfers from (3:37) and (3:6) ; we obtain 
T
 
; 

T (; )
!
=
 
 + x
 
; 

+
 
 ()  + (1   ())  y  ; 
 + x (; ) + y (; )   ()      y  ; 
!
: (3.47)
Substituting these transfers back into the objective, we obtain

i =  
 

  
   x  ;    ()         y  ;   1        x (; )+:
126
For future reference, we note that for (x; y) 2 Xi; this can be written as

i = Ej
 
   x  ;  Ej     x (; )   ()          y  ;   y  ;  :
Consider next the case where ^
 
; ; 

= : In this case, the problem becomes
min
T(;) T (;)
  ()T  ;   T (; )	
      x (; ) +         y (; )
+  ()

x
 
; 
  x (; ) + y  ;   y (; )+ :
subject to the constraints (3:36) ; (3:37) and (3:43) : The right-hand side of (3:43) is larger
than the right-hand side of (3:37) for fx (; ) ; y (; )g2f;g 2 Xiii () : In this case, the
feasible set is nonempty and at the solution (3:37) is binding; hence the transfers are given
by (3:47) and the objective takes value

iii =   ()
 
    y  ;       x (; ) +         y (; )
+  () 
 
x
 
; 
  x (; )+ :
Again, for future reference, if (x; y) 2 Xiii; then we can write

iii =   ()
 
    y  ; +         y (; )
+  () 
 
x
 
; 
  x (; )  (1   ())      y  ; +  1          y  ;  :
For fx (; ) ; y (; )g2f;g 2 Xi (), the right-hand side of (3:43) is smaller than the right-
hand side of (3:37) : Moreover, the feasible set is always nonempty and thus at the solution
constraint (3:43) is binding. Hence, we can substitute
T
 
; 
  T (; ) =   x  ;   x (; )+   y  ;   y (; )
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into the objective and obtain

^i =   ()
 
     x  ;   x (; )+      y (; )	
      x (; ) +         y (; ) + :
We have 
i  
^i for fx (; ) ; y (; )g2f;g 2 Xi () ; so ^
 
; ; 

=  is cheaper to
implement in that case.
Next consider the case where
 
x
 
; 
  x  ;   0: By Lemma 3.3.2, this implies that
^
 
; ; 

= : Adding and subtracting the expected utility of type ; we can write the
objective as
  min
fT(;)g
2f;g;^
(;;)
8>><>>:
()(T(;^(;;)) x(;^(;;)) y(;^(;;)))
 (() ())(T(;) x(;) y(;))+(1 ())( )x(;)
 ()[T(;) x(;) y(;)]
9>>=>>;
subject to
(3:34) ; (3:35) and either
(3:40) if ^
 
; ; 

= ; or
(3:41) if ^
 
; ; 

= :
Consider rst the case where the o¤-path report is ^
 
; ; 

= : In this case, the objective
is
  min
T(;) T(;)
8<: (() ())(T(;) x(;) y(;))+()( )x(;) (() ())(T(;) x(;) y(;))+(1 ())( )x(;)
9=;
subject to the constraints (3:34) ; (3:35) ; and (3:40) : The right-hand side of (3:40) is always
at least as large as the right-hand side of (3:34) (by the fact that
 
x
 
; 
  x  ;   0):
Hence, the constraint set is nonempty if the right-hand side of (3:35) is at least as large
as the right-hand side of (3:40) ; which is precisely the case for

x
 
; 

; y
 
; 
	
2f;g 2
Xii
 


: Since the objective is increasing in T
 
; 
   T  ;  and we are minimizing ;
T
 
; 
   T  ;  is set as small as possible, implying that (3:40) is binding. We can
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compute the transfers from (3:40) and (3:9) : We obtain0@T(;)
T(;)
1A =
0@ ()[( )y(;) ( )(x(;) x(;))]+x(;)+y(;)+(x(;) x(;))+(y(;) y(;))
 ()[( )y(;) ( )(x(;) x(;))]+x(;)+y(;)
1A :
(3.48)
Substituting these transfers back into the objective, we obtain
ii 
 
 ()           y  ; + Ej     x  ;  :
For

x
 
; 

; y
 
; 
	
2f;g 2 Xiv
 


; no solution with ^
 
; ; 

=  exists.
Suppose thus that ^
 
; ; 

= : In this case, the objective is
minT(;) T(;)f()(T(;) x(;) y(;) [T(;) x(;) y(;)])+( )x(;)+()( )y(;)g
subject to (3:34) ; (3:35) ; and (3:41) : The right-hand side of (3:35) is weakly smaller than the
right-hand side of (3:41) for (x; y) 2 Xiv: Since the objective is decreasing in T
 
; 
 T  ; 
and we seek to minimize the objective function, at the optimum (3:35) must be binding.
Thus, we can compute the optimal transfers from (3:35) and (3:9) : We obtain
T
 
; 

= x
 
; 

+ Ejy
 
; 

(3.49)
T
 
; 

= x
 
; 

+ Ejy
 
; 
    y  ;   y  ; 
Substituting these transfers back into the objective, we obtain
iv   
 

  
    y  ; +     x  ; +  ()      y  ;  :
For

x
 
; 

; y
 
; 
	
2f;g 2 Xii
 


; the right-hand side of (3:41) is weakly smaller than
the right-hand side of (3:35). Thus, (3:35) is slack. The right-hand side of (3:34) is smaller
than the right-hand side of (3:41), which implies that constraint (3:41) must be binding and
we obtain rent ii.
Consider next the second problem in case where x
 
; 
  x (; ) : By lemma 3.3.2, this
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implies that ^
 
; ; 

= : The objective then becomes

 = min
fT (;)g2f;g;^(;;)
0BB@  (() ())[T(;) x(;) y(;)] ()( )x(;)+(1 ())(T(;^(;;)) x(;^(;;)) y(;^(;;)))
 (1 ())[T (;) x(;) y(;)]+
1CCA
subject to
(3:37) ; (3:36) ; and either
(3:44) if ^
 
; ; 

= ; or
(3:45) if ^
 
; ; 

= :
where we have added the di¤erence between the right- and the left-hand side of (3:6) ; which
is zero by the fact that this constraint binds.
Consider rst the possibility that ^
 
; ; 

= : In that case the problem becomes

 = min
T(;) T (;)
0BB@  (() ())[T(;) x(;) y(;)]+(() ())(T (;) x(;) y(;))
 ()( )x(;) (1 ())( )x(;)+
1CCA
subject to (3:37) ; (3:36) and (3:44) :
The right-hand side of (3:44) is always weakly smaller than the right-hand side of (3:37) :
Hence, (3:37) cannot become binding at the optimum. Moreover, the constraint set is non-
empty exactly for fx (; ) ; y (; )g2f;g 2 Xii () : Since the objective is decreasing in
T
 
; 
 T (; ) ; at the optimum, (3:44) is binding and we can compute the transfers from
(3:44) and (3:6) :
 
T(;)
T (;)
!
=
0@+(1 ())[(x(;) x(;))+(y(;) y(;))]+()(x(;)+y(;))+(1 ())[x(;)+y(;)]
 ()[(x(;) x(;))+(y(;) y(;))]+()(x(;)+y(;))+(1 ())[x(;)+y(;)]
1A
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Since (3:44) is binding, we can substitute for
T
 
; 
  T (; ) =   x  ;   x (; )+   y  ;   y (; )
into the objective and obtain

ii =  Ej
 
   x (; )+     ()          y  ; 
If (x; y) 2 Xii; then this can be written as

ii = Ej
 
   x  ;  Ej     x (; )   ()           y  ;   y  ;  :
Consider nally the possibility that ^
 
; ; 

= : In that case the problem becomes

 = min
T(;) T (;)
0@ (1 ())fT(;) x(;) y(;) [T (;) x(;) y(;)]g
 (1 ())( )y(;) ( )x(;)+
1A
subject to (3:37) ; (3:36) ; and (3:45) :
The right-hand side of (3:36) is weakly larger than the right-hand side of (3:45) exactly
for fx (; ) ; y (; )g2f;g 2 Xiv () : Moreover, for such allocations, the constraint set is
nonempty, and at the solution of the problem T
 
; 
  T (; ) reaches its lower bound, so
(3:36) is binding. The transfers can then be computed from (3:6) and (3:36) : 
T
 
; 

T (; )
!
=
 
 + (1   ())      y (; ) + x  ; + y  ; 
 + x (; ) +
 
 ()  + (1   ())  y (; )
!
Since (3:36) is binding, we can substitute
T
 
; 
  T (; ) =   x  ;   x (; )+   y  ;   y (; )
into the objective and obtain

iv = (1   ())
 
    y (; )   1          y  ;       x  ; + 
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For future reference, if (x; y) 2 Xiv; then we can write

iv =   ()
 
     y (; )  y  ;         x  ;   x  ; 
           y  ;   y  ;         y  ;   y (; ) :
For fx (; ) ; y (; )g2f;g 2 Xii () ; the right-hand side of (3:45) is weakly larger than
the right-hand side of (3:36). Moreover, since the right-hand side of (3:45) is smaller than the
right-hand side of (3:37) ; the constraint set is nonempty. At the solution, (3:45) is binding,
so we can substitute for
T
 
; 
  T (; ) =   x  ;   x (; )+   y  ;   y (; )
into the objective and obtain

^ii = (1   ())
 
     x  ;   x (; )   ()          y  ;      x  ; +
Since 
ii  
^ii for any fx (; ) ; y (; )g2f;g 2 Xii () ; implementing ^
 
; ; 

= ; the
principal cannot gain by implementing this report.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.1. The proof of the rst statements is given in three parts. Part
I establishes properties of the solution of program Pii; part II does likewise for program Pi;
nally, part III compares the value of the objectives. The proof of the fact that Wiv  Wii
and Wiii  Wi is not given here but is available upon request from the authors; it uses
essentially the same arguments.
Part I) Consider program Pii. Up to a constant, the Lagrangian of program Pii can be
written as
(1  )Ej

V
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 
  x  ;   y  ; 
         x  ; +   ()          y  ; +  1         x  ; 	
+ 

x
 
; 
  x  ; +       y  ;   y  ;         x  ;   x  ; 	
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The conditions of optimality are
 
(1  )    V1  x  ;  ; y  ;              +       = 0 (3.50)
 
(1  )  1      V1  x  ;  ; y  ;       1         +         = 0
(3.51) 
(1  )    V2  x  ;  ; y  ;   +       = 0 (3.52) 
(1  )  1      V2  x  ;  ; y  ;        ()                 = 0:
(3.53)
We show by contradiction that at most one constraint binds at the optimum of program ii.
Suppose both constraints bind. If ;  > 0; then x
 
; 

= x
 
; 

= x
 


and y
 
; 

=
y
 
; 

= y
 


and the conditions of optimality imply that
 
V1
 
x
 


; y
 

    
1  
 
    = 0 (3.54)
and  
V2
 
x
 


; y
 


        1        
1 
 
 ()         
!
= 0: (3.55)
Using (3:52) ; the Kuhn-Tucker-rst-order-optimality-condition for y
 
; 

and substituting
(3:55) we have for  6= 0
(1  )      +  1      + 
1  
 
 ()           +       = 0
which simplies to
(1  )   1    + 
1  
 
 ()     =  
This implies  < 0 which contradicts the supposition that both constraints bind at the
optimum. It follows that at most one constraint binds at the optimum of program ii.
Further results require a case distinction between V12 < 0 and V12  0:
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Case I) V12  0:
First, we show that if V12  0, then either constraint x
 
; 
  x  ;   0 or constraint 
     y  ;   y  ;      x  ;  x  ;   0 binds at the optimum of program
Pii.
Suppose no constraint binds. Then the rst-order conditions with respect to y are given
by
V2
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 
   = 0
V2
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 
        ()    
(1  )  1          = 0:
The rst-order conditions with respect to x are given by
V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 
     
1  
 
    = 0
V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 
     
1  
 
    = 0
which imply
V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

= V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

: (3.56)
By concavity, V11 < 0; and x
 
; 
  x  ;  > 0; we have
V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

< V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

(3.57)
Together conditions (3:56) and (3:57) imply
V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

< V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

: (3.58)
By complementarity, V12  0, and y
 
; 
  y  ;  > 0; we have
V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 
  V1  x  ;  ; y  ;  (3.59)
which contradicts (3:58).
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It follows that at least one constraint must be binding at the optimum of program Pii.
Next, we show that if V12  0, then the optimal allocation satises
 
     y  ;   y  ;         x  ;   x  ;  > 0:
Suppose, contrary to our claim,
 
     y  ;   y  ;         x  ;   x  ;  = 0
and moreover  = 0 and  > 0.
The rst-order conditions with respect to x are given by
V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 
                   
(1  )   = 0
V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 
       1         +      
(1  )  1     = 0
implying that
V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

< V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

if and only if

 

  
          
(1  )   < 
 
1         +      
(1  )  1    
()
0 < :
However, we must have V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 
  V1  x  ;  ; y  ; .
To see this, note that by V11 < 0
V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

> V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

:
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By V12  0
V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 
  V1  x  ;  ; y  ; 
Together these imply that
V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

> V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

;
so that the conditions above would imply that  < 0; a contradiction.
It follows from these arguments that the optimal allocation for V12  0 satises x
 
; 

=
x
 
; 

:
Case II) V12 < 0:
If V12 < 0; then the solution to program Pii satises x
 
; 
  x  ;  > 0:
Suppose not. We know that ;  > 0 is not possible. So, if x
 
; 

= x
 
; 

; this would
have to imply that  = 0: So, we would have x
 
; 

= x
 
; 

= x
 


, y
 
; 

< y
 
; 

and  = 0. Adding up of conditions (3:50) and (3:51), the rst-order conditions for x
 
; 

and x
 
; 

; gives 

 

  
V1
 
x
 


; y
 
; 
  +  1      V1  x   ; y  ;   
  
1 
 
   
!
= 0: (3.60)
V12 < 0 and y
 
; 
  y  ;  > 0 imply that
V1
 
x
 


; y
 
; 

< V1
 
x
 


; y
 
; 

:
Together with (3:60) ; this implies that
V1
 
x
 


; y
 
; 

<  +

(1  )
 
    < V1  x   ; y  ;  :
Plugging the rst of these inequalities into (3:50) ; we obtain
(1  )   
(1  )
 
              +       > 0:
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Plugging the latter of the inequalities into (3:51) ; we obtain
(1  )  1     
(1  )
 
       1         +         < 0;
which simplies to

 
    > :
For  = 0 this implies  < 0. Hence, V12 < 0 implies that x
 
; 
  x  ;  > 0:
Part II) Consider program Pi. Up to a constant, the Lagrangian of program Pi can be
written as
(1  )Ej

V
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 
  x  ;   y  ; 
  
(
(1   ())     x  ; +  ()     x  ; 
+
 
 ()          y  ; 
)
+ 

x
 
; 
  x  ; +  "       y  ;   y  ;         x  ;   x  ; 
#
The conditions of optimality are given by 
(1  )    V1  x  ;  ; y  ;   
  ()     +         
!
= 0 (3.61)
(1  )    V2  x  ;  ; y  ;   +       = 0 (3.62) 
(1  )  1      V1  x  ;  ; y  ;   
  (1   ())        +      
!
= 0 (3.63)
 
(1  )  1      V2  x  ;  ; y  ;   
    ()                
!
= 0 (3.64)
;   0


x
 
; 
  x  ;  = 0

 
     y  ;   y  ;         x  ;   x  ;  = 0
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First, we show by contradiction that at most one constraint binds at the optimum of program
Pi.
So suppose both constraints bind at the optimum, i.e. ;  > 0. If ;  > 0, then
y
 
; 

= y
 
; 

= y
 


and x
 
; 

= x
 
; 

= x
 


. Then
V1
 
x
 


; y
 


=  +

(1  )
 
   
and
V2
 
x
 


; y
 


= 
 


 +
 
1      +    ()    
(1  )
 
    :
Using the rst-order condition with respect to y
 
; 

; (3:62) ; gives
V2
 
x
 


; y
 


=    
(1  )        :
Substituting for V2
 
x
 


; y
 


gives

 


 +
 
1      +    ()    
(1  )
 
    =    
(1  )       
which simplies to
   1     (1  )       ()       = ;
implying that  < 0. It follows that at the optimum ;  > 0 is not true.
Further results require a case distinction between V12 < 0 and V12  0:
Case I) V12 < 0:
First, we show that if V12 < 0; then x
 
; 
  x  ;  = 0 at the solution to program Pi.
To show this, we establish rst that V12 < 0 implies that at least one constraint binds.
Moreover, we show that
 
    y  ;   y  ;  >      x  ;   x  ;  at the
optimum of program Pi.
Suppose no constraint binds at the optimum, i.e.
 
    y  ;   y  ;  >
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 
    x  ;   x  ;  > 0. Then  =  = 0: The rst-order conditions with respect to
x are given by
V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 
      ()
(1  )        = 0
V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 
      (1   ())
(1  )  1          = 0
Since ()
()
> (1 ())
(1 ()) ; these conditions imply that
V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

> V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

: (3.65)
However, by V12 < 0 and y
 
; 
  y  ;  > 0
V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

< V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

: (3.66)
By V11 < 0 and x
 
; 
  x  ;  > 0
V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

< V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

: (3.67)
Taken together (3:66) and (3:67) imply that
V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

< V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

:
which contradicts (3:65) derived previously from the rst-order conditions.
It follows that at least one constraint must bind at the optimum of program Pi if V12 < 0.
Suppose that contrary to our claim, that the solution of program Pi satises 
    y  ;   y  ;  =      x  ;   x  ;  > 0;  = 0 and  > 0: Adding
up (3:61) and (3:63) gives 
(1  )    V1  x  ;  ; y  ;      ()     
+ (1  )  1      V1  x  ;  ; y  ;      (1   ())     
!
= 0:
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By V11 < 0 and x
 
; 
  x  ;  > 0
V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

< V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

By V12 < 0 and y
 
; 
  y  ;  > 0
V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

< V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

:
Taken together, we have
V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

< V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

:
Combining with the implications of the rst-order conditions with respect to x we obtain
 
V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 
   < 
(1  )
 
    <  V1  x  ;  ; y  ;    :
Substituting into (3:61) ; using  = 0; and simplifying, we have

  

 

   ()      >       ;
which would imply that v < 0; a contradiction.
It follows that for V12 < 0; the optimum of program Pi features x
 
; 
  x  ;  = 0:
Case II): V12  0:
If V12   V11 ( )( ) ; then the optimum of program Pi features
 
    y  ;   y  ;  > 
    x  ;   x  ;  :
We know that both constraints cannot bind simultaneously.
Hence, if
 
    y  ;   y  ;  =      x  ;   x  ;  ; then necessarily
x
 
; 
   x  ;  > 0: Suppose this is the case, so  = 0 and  > 0. Dene Y  ;  =
y
 
; 
   ( )
( )

x
 
; 
  x  ; . For  6= 0 the rst-order conditions with respect to x
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are given by0@ (1  )    V1  x  ;  ; y  ;      ()     
  ( )
( )
 
(1  )  1      V2  x  ;  ; Y  ;        ()         
1A
= 0
and0@ (1  )  1      V1  x  ;  ; y  ;      (1   ())     
+
( )
( )
 
(1  )  1      V2  x  ;  ; Y  ;        ()         
1A
= 0:
These conditions imply 
(1  )    V1  x  ;  ; y  ;      ()     
+ (1  )  1      V1  x  ;  ; y  ;      (1   ())     
!
= 0: (3.68)
Dene s such that s > 0, s = y
 
; 
  y  ;  and x  ;  = x  ; + ( )
( )s. Then by
V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

= V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 

+
Z s
0
@V1

x
 
; 

+
( )
( )k; y
 
; 

+ k

@k
dk
and
@V1

x
 
; 

+
( )
( )k; y
 
; 

+ k

@k
=
0BB@
( )
( )V11

x
 
; 

+
( )
( )k; y
 
; 

+ k

+V12

x
 
; 

+
( )
( )k; y
 
; 

+ k

1CCA
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we have V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 
  V1  x  ;  ; y  ;  since V12   V11 ( )( ) implies
@V1

x
 
; 

+
( )
( )k; y
 
; 

+ k

@k
 0 for all k > 0
and x
 
; 
 x  ;  > 0. V1  x  ;  ; y  ;   V1  x  ;  ; y  ;  implies by (3:68) that
 
V1
 
x
 
; 

; y
 
; 
    
(1  )
 
    (3.69)
By (3:69) into (3:61)  
(1  )   
(1 )
 
   
  ()     +         
!
 0
which is equivalent to
    ()                
which is true only if  < 0 since  = 0. Hence, we get a contradiction to  > 0 contradicting
that
 
    y  ;   y  ;        x  ;   x  ;  binds in singularity at the
optimum of program Pi.
Part III) Comparison between the programs.
As a preliminary argument, note that if x
 
; 
   x  ;  = 0; then the objectives of
programs Pi and Pii become identical. To see this, note that the objectives are identical
up to the costs of implementation, : Moreover, it is easy to verify from Lemma 3 that
ii  i = 0 for x
 
; 
  x  ;  = 0:
For V12 < 0; the maximum of program Pi satises x
 
; 
   x  ;  = 0; whereas the
maximum of program Pii satises x
 
; 
  x  ;  > 0: Hence, the solution of program Pi
is feasible but not chosen. By revealed preference, this implies that the solution to program
Pii is preferred.
Likewise, for V12  0 the optimum of program Pii satises x
 
; 
  x  ;  = 0: Hence,
the solution is feasible under program Pi. If the solution of program Pi is on the line
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x
 
; 
  x  ;  = 0; then the objectives are identical and hence the solutions of programs
Pi and Pii are identical. If the solution of program Pi is o¤ the line x
 
; 
   x  ;  = 0;
then, by revealed preference, the solution of program Pi yields a strictly higher expected
payo¤ than the solution of program Pii. Taken together, this implies weak payo¤ dominance
of program Pi:
Proof of Lemma 3.3.4. The result is essentially a corollary to Lemma 3.2.1. By the same
arguments as given there, we have
 
     y  ;   y (; ) >       x  ;   x (; ) > 0
i¤ V12 > 0 and
0 >
Z

V11 +
( )
( )V12
V11V22   V 212
(; ) d;
which is satised if V12 <  ( )( )V11 for all (x; y) :
The proof of the remaining statements uses identical arguments and is therefore omitted.
Proof of Proposition 3.3.2. We show that the neglected constraint is satised under the
assumptions.
Preliminaries:
For convenience, recall that the unconstrained solution (in the sense of unconstrained by
the implementation sets Xj for j = i or j = ii, respectively) satises
V1 (x; y) (; ) =  (3.70)
V2 (x; y) (; ) = 
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for  2 ; 	 and
V1 (x; y)
 
; 

=  +

(1  )
j

 

      (3.71)
V2 (x; y)
 
; 

= 
V1 (x; y)
 
; 

=  +

(1  )
(1  j) 
1          (3.72)
V2 (x; y)
 
; 

=  +

(1  )
 
 ()     
1          ;
where j = i; ii and by convention i =  () and ii = 
 


: Dene the following articial
systems of equations for ;  2 ;  ;  :
V1 (x; y) (; ) =  +

(1  )
j

 

 (   ) (3.73)
V2 (x; y) (; ) = 
and
V1 (x; y) (; ) =  +

(1  ) (   ) (3.74)
V2 (x; y) (; ) =  +

(1  )
 
 ()     
1          :
Note that these systems are dened on convex domains. Moreover, the solution to (3:73) for
 =  corresponds to the solution of (3:70) ; and for  =  and  = ; the solution to (3:73)
corresponds to the solution of (3:71) : Likewise, for  =  and  = ; the solution to (3:74)
corresponds to the solution to (3:70) ; for  =  and  = , the solution to (3:74) corresponds
to the solution of (3:71) for j = ii = 
 


; and for  =  and  = ; the solution to (3:74)
corresponds to the solution to (3:72) for j = ii = 
 


:
So, systems (3:73) and (3:74) are dened on convex domains. Moreover, the solutions
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to the systems at extreme points of the domain correspond to the economically meaningful
solutions of (3:70) ; (3:71) ; and (3:72) ; respectively. Hence, we can conveniently apply cal-
culus to the articial system (3:73) and (3:74) to determine di¤erences between allocation
choices.
Part I) The case of independent goods: V12 = 0:
From Proposition 3.3.1 we know that program Pi solves the reduced problem for V12 = 0:
Hence, the neglected constraint takes the form
 
 ()           y  ;   y  ; 
+
 
    Ej [x (; )]  Ej x  ;   0:
Su¢ cient conditions for the neglected constraint to hold are
y
 
; 
  y  ;   0
and 
Ej [x (; )]  Ej

x
 
; 
  0:
Moreover, we know again from Proposition 3.3.1 that x
 
; 

= x
 
; 

= x
 


at the
solution. So, the relevant rst-order conditions describing the optimum simplify to
V1 (x (; )) = 
and
V2 (y (; )) = 
for  2 ; 	 ;
(1  ) V1  x     =       ;
and nally
V2
 
y
 
; 

= 
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and
V2
 
y
 
; 

=  +

(1  )
 
 ()     
1          :
It is easy to see (by concavity of V ), that x
 
; 

= x (; ) > x
 


; so
Ej [x (; )]  Ej

x
 
; 
  0: is satised. By the same argument, we also have
y
 
; 
  y  ;   0:
Part II)
1. The case of complements.
For the case of complements with 0  V12 <  V11 ( )( ) for all x; y;, by Lemmas 3 and 4,
the neglected constraint (3:7) is equivalent to
 
 ()           y  ;   y  ; 
+
 
    Ej [x (; )]  Ej x  ;   0:
Su¢ cient conditions for the neglected constraint to hold are
y
 
; 
  y  ;   0
and 
Ej [x (; )]  Ej

x
 
; 
  0:
We now provide su¢ cient conditions such that the unconstrained solution satises these
monotonicity restrictions.
We can write
y
 
; 
  y  ;  = y  ;   y  ; + y  ;   y  ;  :
Incentive compatibility with respect to  alone requires that y
 
; 
  y  ;  : Hence, a
su¢ cient condition for y
 
; 
   y  ;   0 is that  y  ;   y  ;   0: In turn, this
follows trivially from the fact that  + 
(1 )
j
()
(   ) is increasing in  and thus that an
increase in  reduces x; which by complementarity reduces y:
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A su¢ cient condition for

Ej [x (; )]  Ej

x
 
; 
  0 is that
min
2f;g
x (; )  max
2f;g
x
 
; 

;
which in turn holds if
x
 
; 
  x (; )  x  ;   x  ;  :
It is straightforward to see that x
 
; 
  x (; ) ; since x and y are complements. Sim-
ilarly, x
 
; 
  x  ;  follows from the fact that ()
()
 (1 ())
(1 ()) and that x and y are
complements. So, we need to show that x (; )  x  ;  : We can write
x (; )  x  ;  = x (; )  x  ; + x  ;   x  ;  :
The di¤erences on the right-hand side of this equation can be conveniently computed from
(3:73) ; since we argued above that the types on the right-hand side correspond to extreme
points in the domain of denition of (3:73) : Di¤erentiating the system of equations (3:73) ;
we obtain
x (; )  x  ;  = Z

 V12
V11V22   V 212
(; ) d =
 
     V12
V11V22   V 212
(; ^) :
where the rst equality follows from setting  =  in (3:73) and applying Cramers rule and
the second equality from the mean value theorem, for some ^ 2 ;  : Likewise, by setting
 =  in (3:73) and j = i so that j =  () ; and applying Cramers rule, we have
x
 
; 
  x  ;  = Z 

@x
 
; 

@
d =
 
1 +

(1  )
 ()

 

!Z 

V22
V11V22   V 212
d
=        1 + 
(1  )
 ()

 

! V22
V11V22   V 212

^; 

:
for some ^ 2 ;  ; where the last equality follows again by the mean value theorem.
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So, we have x (; )  x  ;  i¤
 
     V12
V11V22   V 212
(; ^)       1 + 
(1  )
 ()

 

! V22
V11V22   V 212

^; 

 0:
In turn, this condition is satised if 
    
   
 
1 +

(1  )
 ()

 

!min
x;y
 V22
V11V22   V 212
(x; y)
 max
x;y
V12
V11V22   V 212
(x; y) :
Since the left-hand side is increasing in ; the condition is hardest to satisfy for  = 0; which
is the condition given in the proposition.
2. The case of substitutes:
For 0 > V12 > V11
( )
( ) for all x; y; the neglected constraint is equivalent to  
 ()           y  ;   y  ; 
+
 
   x  ;           x  ; +  1         x  ; 
!
 0:
Equivalently, this can be written as  
 ()           y  ;   y  ; 
+
 
     x  ;   x  ;            x  ;   x  ; 
!
 0:
Recall that for (x; y) 2 Xii; we have
 
     y  ;   y (; )          x  ;   x (; )  0;
so the third term on the left-hand side is nonnegative. For the case where  () = 
 


, the
rst term is zero and we only need to show that
x
 
; 
  x  ;   0:
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We can write
x
 
; 
  x  ;  = x  ;   x  ; + x  ;   x  ;  :
The types on the right-hand side correspond to extreme points of the domain of denition
of (3:74) : Therefore, we obtain - by the same arguments as used for the complements case -
x
 
; 
  x  ;  =      1 + 
(1  )
 
 ()     
1    
!
 V12
V11V22   V 212
 
; ^

+
 
    1
1  
V22
V11V22   V 212

^; 

for some values ^ 2 ;  and ^ 2 ;  : Hence, we have x  ;   x  ;   0; if
   
   
 
1   + 
 
 ()     
1    
!
min
x;y
V12
V11V22   V 212
 max
x;y
V22
V11V22   V 212
Since (
() ())
(1 ()) < 1; the expression on the left-hand side of the inequality is smallest for
 = 0; so the condition is satised if
   
    minx;y
V12
V11V22   V 212
 max
x;y
V22
V11V22   V 212
:
Finally, we need to show that the optimal allocations that solve the reduced problems
Pi and Pii; respectively, are elements of Xinti or Xintii ; respectively. Recall from Lemma 4
that the rst-best allocation is an element of Xinti or Xintii ; respectively, precisely under the
conditions that make either program Pi or Pii generate a higher value to the principal. Now
consider, for j = i; ii; iii; iv; the problems
max
(x;y)2[jXj
Pj
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The solution to each of these problems converges uniformly to the rst-best allocation as 
goes to zero. It follows that the solution of program Pi is in Xinti for  close enough to zero
if 0 < V12 <    V11 and that the solution of program Pii is in Xintii for  close enough to
zero if
 
 V11 < V12 < 0:
Proof of Proposition 3. From Lemma 4, we have conditions such that the rst-best
allocation is in Xinti . Hence, in the limit as  goes to zero, the allocations that achieve the
maxima Wj are in Xintj . So, we need to show that these maximizers satisfy the neglected
constraint. We focus on the case of strong complements. Exactly the same argument can be
given for strong substitutes.
For the example, for  2 ( 1; 1) and  su¢ ciently large to generate interior solutions;
the rst-best allocation is given by
x (; ) = 1
1 2 ( (1 + )     )
y (; ) = 1
1 2 ( (1 + )     )
The neglected constraint for (x; y) 2 Xiii takes the form
0        x  ;   x (; )+       y  ;   y  ; 
+  ()
 
     y  ;   y  ; +          y (; )  y  ;  :
The rst-best allocation is in Xiii for  >
( )
( ) : The buyers problem remains concave for
 < 1: Both conditions are satised for a nonempty set of parameters only if (
 )
( ) < 1: For
the example, the neglected constraint is equivalent to
0       1
1  2
       +      +      1
1  2
       
+  ()
 
    1
1  2
        +         1
1  2
  
     ;
which is satised if   ( )
( ) : Since
( )
( ) > 1; this condition is automatically satised.
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